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No. 1321

COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM IN ITALY:

ENRICO BERLINGUER, BETTINO CRAXI VIE FOR POWER

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ENRICO BERLINGUER, BETTINO CRAXI VIE FOR POWER

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ITALY

TEXT OF BERLINGUER'S CONTROVERSIAL 'REPUBBLICA' INTERVIEW

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Aug 78

/Text of 3-hour interview with PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer by LA REPUBBLICA editor Eugenio Scalfari in Berlinguer's Botteghe office, 2 Aug 78. The material which follows is a collection from two sources: Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Aug 78 pp 1-3 and Milan L'UNITA in Italian 2 Aug 78 p 11. The source of material is indicated at the beginning of each section./

/Text Comrade Enrico Berlinguer has granted a long interview to LA REPUBBLICA, which publishes it prominently today. The interview deals with a number of ideological and political topics which have been at the center of polemics--sometimes lively--of late. During the interview, which fills about 20 typewritten pages, Comrade Berlinguer, questioned by the paper's editor Eugenio Scalfari, answers with coherent arguments questions regarding the PCI's "loyalty" to Leninism, the practice of "democratic centralism," the historic compromise and relations with the other political forces, the Italian communists' democratic option and many other more strictly political current issues. From the interview LA REPUBBLICA has released the following excerpts to other newspapers:

/Question Are you a Leninist? Is the PCI Leninist?

/Answer If by Leninism (or Marxism-Leninism) you mean a kind of manual or statically conceived doctrinal rules or a bloc of theories, which have hardened into scholastic formulas to be applied uncritically at all times and in all places, you would be doing Lenin (not to mention Marx) the greatest wrong and distorting the essence of his political teachings, and you would be unable to understand his lesson to us or to verify--where necessary--its value in our own time. We are not Leninists of that kind, though I realize that many people would now like us to be or believe that we are conformist in precisely this way.

/Question The fact remains, however, that your party's constitution contains Article 5, which lists among the party members' duties, the study and implementation of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. This is an indication that you regard it as a complete doctrine. Therefore, Mr Berlinguer, when you talk about your party's capacity for modernization and innovation you are contradicted by what the PCI constitution states.

/Answer/ That part of the constitution has remained as it was drawn up many years ago and therefore the wording of that paragraph in Article 5 is unsuitable and could suggest the existence of Marxism-Leninism as a static and enclosed body of doctrine. As far as I am concerned, the sentence mentioning Marxism-Leninism should be replaced with a different expression which refers in a more correct and more up-to-date manner to our entire ideological heritage.

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Aug 78

/Question/ Now, in what way are you that?

/Answer/ The Italian Communist Party was born on the wave of the proletarian revolution of the Soviets and on the impetus coming from Lenin in order to react and to terminate a confusion in terms of ideas and to fill a political vacuum in which the working class and the Italian working masses found themselves as a matter of fact under the direction of the Socialist Party, especially after World War I.

Following the split at Livorno, we sprang up in order to give life to a nucleus of proletarian fighters who would have faith in the world revolution and in the Italian revolution. We were born in the way in which they was historically possible. A way which, as we know, was later on criticized by Gramsci and Togliatti. In 1924, Gramsci wrote the following in ORDINE NUOVO: "Following the split at Livorno, we found ourselves in a state of need. This is the only way we can justify our attitudes, our activities after the split." And the need was the need for the "physical struggle to defend ourselves against the fascist assault, to preserve its primordial structure for the party which had just been born." The circumstances, in summary, and the Bordighian concept, which prevailed at that time, made the Communist Party withdraw within itself, suddenly assuming an imprint, a sectarian and schematic direction, becoming an organization of a "military" rather than political type, directed and functioning, as Togliatti said, "through the codification of certain confines which the party's strategy and tactics could never have overcome, according to a formalist and juridical view of reality. We turned back and away from Hegel and Marx toward Kant and Kantism."

This initial sectarianism and abstractism were openly criticized and opposed by Lenin himself who on several occasions powerfully argued with Bordiga and Bordighism: these views experienced a crisis at the end of 1923 and were openly challenged during the first party congress in May 1924. This marked the beginning of the formation and constitution, around Gramsci, of the party's leading group which would prevail at the Third Congress in January 1926 at Lyon and which would assert that new ideal and practical orientation-- which, through its further developments, brings us down to this very day-- defeating the positions which were moving the party (and these are still Togliatti's words) toward "transforming itself into a tight little sect of Talmudists, cut off from any real development of events" and which sought to "squeeze the revolutionary push of the masses into a narrow corner."

This is the way Gramsci and Togliatti "read" Lenin in order to launch a political operation in Italy which would spring from a fact of worldwide historical importance, that is, the Russian revolution of 1917, but which would become enriched and which would be further spelled out from year to year (and, although purely by chance, with delays and even setbacks and quite a few clashes) with peculiar features, both political and ideal.

The thinking and actions of the party--which, from a Bordighian party became a Gramscian party--as a matter of act involved, although not eclectically, Marx, Engles, and Lenin as well as Machiavelli, Vico, Cavour, Antonio Labriola, and the group of southerners; but here we also come to the careful study of the forces which move and which meet in Italian society and throughout the world and the continuous efforts always--under given conditions--to maintain the strongest and broadest links with the concrete movement of the working and popular masses. This is the vision of Italy's history and world history, not as the history of a group of intellectuals or a group of rulers, but rather of subordinate classes and peoples who fight to renew their own national society and to liberate all associated humanity.

On the one hand, as a matter of fact, it is a party which knows how to enable itself to measure and gradually verify the validity of its theoretical and political orientations and hence continually to bring up to date the formulations within which the principles and ideals, which it learned from the revolutionary teachers themselves, exist, that is, those principles and ideals which distinguish it as a communist party. On the other hand it is a party which knows how to get the working class to open up and to build for itself a system of political and social relations and alliances as well as ideal confrontations which would be as vast as possible. It therefore maintains its own identity as a party but always seeks unity with forces different from itself for a task of transformation. Lenin also critically developed and qualitatively innovated Marx. This is what Gramsci and Togliatti did with Lenin; and today we force ourselves to do the same thing.

Question / That is true but, in your party's charter you have Article 5 which, among the militant's duties, includes the study and application of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. This is a sign that you consider it to be a completed finished doctrine. You, in other words, the Hon. Berlinguer, in talking about your party's capacity for updating and innovation, are contradicted by what the charter of the PCI says.

Answer / That portion of the charter remains as it was put together many years ago and hence, the formulation of that paragraph in Article 5 is inadequate; it might make us think of the existence of a "Marxism-Leninism" like a motionless and closed body of doctrine. As for the phrase in which it speaks of "Marxism-Leninism" it should be replaced with a different formulation which more correctly and in a more updated fashion would review our entire ideal heritage.

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 2 Aug 78

/Question/ Who must decide on this issue?

/Answer/ The next congress.

/Question/ But are you Leninist or are you not? This is not out of personal curiosuty: It is a problem which you must face up to now.

/Answer/ Are you sure? Are you really sure that now, in 1978, after what has happened and what is happening in Italy, Europe and the world, the problem which we Italians must face up to is answering the question whether or not we are Leninists? And I do not mean you, but does everyone who asks us that question really know Lenin and Leninism--do they really know what it is about when they discuss it? Permit me to doubt it. In any case, I feel that the lesson which Lenin taught us--by drawing up a real revolutionary theory and thus going beyond "the orthodoxy" of reformist evolutionism, exalting the subjective aspect of the party's independent initiative, fighting against positivism, vulgar materialism, the messianic wait-and-see attitude suited to social democracy and by opening the way to the proletarian forces of renewal and liberation which were struggling in Russia and throughout the world is still fully alive and valid. Valid too is the lesson of the Lenin, who smashed the domination and world unity of the capitalist, imperialist and colonialist system, of the Lenin, struggling in every corner of Europe for peace against war, of the Lenin, who discovered the decisive nature of the industrial proletariat's alliance with the poor peasants and who, a few months before October 1917, "in that inflamed situation, did not rule out the possibility of a peaceful development of the socialist revolution and the continuation of a form of party pluralism" (as Togliatti said in 1956) and of the Lenin, who regarded socialism as the form of society which should achieve democracy completely.

/Question/ What about the Lenin of democratic centralism, the Lenin who stifled political debate or organized dissent within the party and in Soviet society?

/Answer/ Just a moment; let us establish a distinction. It is true that a restriction of internal dissent began to become evident toward the end of Lenin's life, that is, even before Stalin's advent. And we do not hesitate to criticize and reprove this. But let it not be forgotten that Lenin was the one who involved in the party leadership and the Soviet Government persons who had previously opposed his line and even the October 1917 uprising, such as Zinovyev and Kamenev. And as for democratic centralism, let us put an end to convenient distortions. Or at least let us stop identifying it with the degenerations of "organic centralism" and "bureaucratic centralism" which came subsequently but which had nothing to do with democratic centralism as conceived and implemented by Lenin; that is, not as predetermined unanimity, but as a method of finally insuring the essential unity in the party's approach and specific work; that is, after the possible different positions had been

freely and democratically expressed, the majority position would rightly become that of the entire party. Democratic centralism was not and therefore must not be regarded as a method which stifled freedom of opinion within the party, but as a rule guaranteeing--once the internal democratic debate was over--the elementary precondition for any party to be able to operate efficiently, that is, in a united and disciplined manner.

And note that it is one thing correctly to implement that kind of democratic centralism in a party of cadres, such as the Bolshevik Party, and quite another to implement it in a mass party such as ours, whose dimensions and democratic workings are structurally broader and in which every member can not only express his thought but can also demand that a vote be taken and a democratic, majority decision be reached on any proposal of his in statutory bodies.

Question So you do not renounce Lenin....

Answer For goodness' sake! I would like to add, however, that my answer is not intended and must not be taken as a prejudiced manichean or apologetic reply. We Italian communists have our own characteristics, our own ethical and policy development and our own history. Since we were born into our own experience, into our own analysis and research and into our own battles, there has been a place for Lenin--and a very significant one, though by no means exclusive and anything but dogmatic. Anyone who asks us to issue condemnations or to forsake history and especially our own history, is asking us something which is both impossible and stupid. History cannot be renounced--either one's own or anyone else's. One must try to understand it and to transcend it, to grow and renew oneself within continuity.

We have taken steps forward in altering and updating our line and political conduct not by breaking away from our own particular past, not by separating ourselves from our background, not by forsaking our roots and not by leaving a vacuum behind us, but by developing the great and inalienable theoretical and cultural heritage, which has accumulated over 130 years of struggles by the revolutionary movement, which originated with the Communist Manifesto; by involving ourselves in the effort to understand every aspect of the real Italian situation, to understand and convey the significance and direction of our national history and to reflect in these new times the best of our cultural traditions and civil gains. Machiavelli said: "If the republic and the factions (that is, the modern-day parties) do not renew themselves they will not last. And the way to renew them is to take them back to their principles."

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Aug 78

Question But, in the beginning, you Italian communists wanted to do like they had done in Russia; you were not looking for a different, autonomous, original road, or, as you say, an unexplored road.

Answer Yes, above all from 1921 until 1924, the PCI behaved the way you say and that was almost inevitable. I would remind you however that neither

Gramsci, nor Togliatti asked that the soviets /councils/ be immediately established throughout Italy (I do not recall whether this was to be done through a government decree!) but rather that "unprincipled demagog" who answers to the name of Nicolae Bombacci. Nevertheless, the line followed in the beginning was the line which you described. That choice was the consequence of a specific error of extremism (which, by the way, almost all European communist parties made), in other words, they wanted to export and transplant Leninism outside and beyond the specific political, economic, and social conditions under which it was able to triumph; they wanted to transfer the methods of assumption of power through insurrection by the Russian proletariat who seized power from the tsars--they wanted to transfer those methods to the West, from the "lowest point" to the "highest point" of the capitalist system. It took us another 20 years in order completely and definitely to correct this extremist mistake. When Togliatti landed at Salerno in March 1944, he said most clearly that we communists, in Italy, would not propose for ourselves the objective of "doing the way they had done in Russia." Not the councils but parliament was the choice which the Italian working class had to make. And it made it thoroughly and completely, thanks to the PCI.

/Question/ You are telling us a story of autonomy which however also reveals long pauses.

/Answer/ You are perhaps alluding to the story from the creation of the Cominform and the condemnation of Tito, in 1948, up to our Eighth Congress in 1956. During that period of time we did indeed have a certain blurring in the assertion of our autonomy and originality--in other words, on the explicit theorization of the Italian road to socialism--with regard to the international communist movement. But let us not forget that this was the Cold War. Nevertheless, during those years, the PCI's political action was always coherent in defense of national interests, of democracy, and the unity of the popular masses as well as the democratic forces and that led to the development of important new positions, those that were formulated and supported by Togliatti during the battles for the defense of parliament (1953), in defense of peace against the atomic threat, through the meeting between the communist movement and the Catholic world. The comrades from the PSI had the same experience during those years. With the 1956 congress, our autonomous strategy resumed its impetus and achieved new developments also on the ideological level, particularly with regard to the concept and practice of internationalism.

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Milan L'UNITA in Italian 2 Aug 78

/Question/ You said just now that the question regarding your Leninism was an excuse....

/Answer/ Personally, I regard it as provocative.

/Question/ Why?

/Answer/ The truth is that people fear that the presence of this particular PCI will alter the old balance of forces in our society and state and that the working class' entry into the institutions (and access to the top of them), from which it has always been kept distant, through all kinds of legal and illegal duress, will abolish new and old forms of privilege. In order to prevent this process, which is nevertheless very advanced, there is recourse to an attempt to exorcize the Communist Party. There is an attempt to test its level of democracy. Hence the questions on Leninism. In fact our examiners want to tell them that our party, as a Communist Party, is not legitimate in Italy. In other countries the Communist Party has not been made illegal; they want us to outlaw ourselves here. They want us to tell them: We were wrong to be born; long live social democracy, the only form of political and social progress. Then our examiners would declare themselves satisfied; That is the right answer; dissolve the party and go home.

/Question/ Mr Berlinguer, who are your examiners?

/Answer/ For many years it was the DC especially, which took on that role with the most reactionary part of the Italian bourgeoisie, together with the Italian centers which had Italy under their guardianship. I must say that for some time the Christian Democratic leadership group has somewhat attenuated--though not yet abandoned--its vocation as examiner, and even important groups in the production bourgeoisie look at things more carefully. The international vetoes are still strong, however illicit. And now there is a new vocation to examine us on the part of a section of the present Italian Socialist Party leadership group. This is something new. I would not hesitate to say that it is disturbing.

/Question/ How do you explain this?

/Answer/ Oh, I can explain it and I understand it. The PSI has made its mistakes and paid for them dearly. It used to be a major force on the Italian left: it was still the foremost leftwing party in 1946. Then it registered a decline while we were moving forward. There are many reasons for this, but some have their roots in the distant past. Italian socialism, as I have already mentioned, did not build a culture of its own, fully independent from the bourgeois currents, or its own autonomous class strategy. It was a powerful movement which, 100 years ago, was the first to arouse the awareness of the proletariat and set in motion a vast process of human and political liberation. This is where its greatness lies. However--despite its notable individual cultural and political contributions--the party lacked an adequate theoretical system. On the cultural front it lives by--how can one put it?--carrying things forward from the past, eclectically mixing together positivism, reformism, trade union anarchism and extremism. But there is another peculiarity rooted in Italian socialism--a strongly positive character compared with other West European socialist parties. It never identified with European social democracies of the German or British types.

Looking at the post-liberation period, the PSI, after a time of close, unified relations with us, later demanded an autonomy which was threatened by no one and subsequently, by pursuing this line, it reached the center-left and unification with the Social Democratic Party--which cost it a serious loss of votes and political strength. This experience induced the Socialists to make corrections. But for some months now it would seem that the PSI has been tending to become the reference point of a neoliberal, neosocial, democratic and even extremist sector. We must wait and see where all this will lead. But we are certainly not indifferent. The PSI is still a great working class party, and if it is strengthened, the Italian left will be strengthened. If it destroys the left's unity, however, it is the left which is weakened. This has already happened once. We would not like it to happen again.

/Question/ The PSI maintains that the balance of power within the left must be changed.

/Answer/ It has a right to its wishes. This is not what worries us. However, we would like the growth of the PSI to coincide with a general overall strengthening of the left, and thus with a strengthening of its unity; whereas it seems to us that some Socialist comrades are thinking solely of an internal redistribution of total leftwing votes. It would seem that the Socialists are paying very little attention to this aspect of the question--a general strengthening of the whole of the left--when in fact this is the vital aspect.

/Question/ Some Socialists claim that you are not mature enough to govern. You can take part in broad coalition governments, but not in a leftwing alternative alignment posing as a government force. Their questions about Leninism stem from this analysis.

/Answer/ I have already said that the question of our democratic "legitimacy" is a pretext. I might add that 50 years of PCI history, of antifascism and democratic struggle are indisputable proof of tests passed with flying colors. On the subject of the European social democracies, I might remind you that these too have known black pages in their history. The French social democrats took part in the Indochina war, the Algerian war and the Suez landing. These are events which have happened in the last 20 years. Let us leave it at that. The weakness of the proposal for a leftwing alternative has nothing to do with the fact that the Communist Party in Italy is stronger than the Socialist Party. There are other reasons why the leftwing alternative is not a stable, realistic solution in Italy.

/Question/ What are these, Mr Berlinguer?

/Answer/ In Italy there is a Catholic question, with very peculiar characteristics; in Italy there is a bourgeoisie and a working class which differ from the German, British or American bourgeoisie and working class; finally, the Italian constitution was drawn up by a union of forces which meant that it was and still is different from and more advanced than all existing

constitutions in capitalist countries. But at the same time in Italy there is constant danger of a coalition of moderate, conservative and reactionary rightwing forces with bases in the masses. These are the reasons which make the position of the leftwing alternative an abstract one, not the PCI's alleged Leninism, which supposedly leads it to obstruct the alternative and direct its efforts at the historic compromise. When they think about it really carefully, I believe that our Socialist comrades are aware of this truth as well.

Question One has the feeling that you have put rather a lot of water into the wine of your historic compromise lately.

Answer Not at all. The historic compromise has been deliberately changed for something which never existed before. It has been said: The PCI wants to get an agreement with the DC and crush all other political forces. We have never thought of any such nonsense. In reality, we have been made into a convenient target at which to fire.

Question Finally, Mr Berlinguer, can you explain the historic compromise to us in a few clear words?

Answer Yes. We are certain that Italy is a country which is in need of great social economic and political changes; a radical reform of structures, public morality and social organization. It is impossible to start effecting such changes without the consent of the main social forces (the workers, the production bourgeoisie, the farmers, the masses of young people and women) and the main political forces (Communists, Socialists, Catholics and secular elements). This shared historical responsibility does not necessarily compel all of them to be members of the majority and the government. From time to time it is possible to have different political formulas, government coalitions and majorities--provided that this joint responsibility, this national solidarity, this effort at mutual understanding remain and provided above all that the Communists retain their commitment to change the country. This is the historic compromise. And this is why I maintain that anyone who is against the historic compromise is sometimes concealing, more or less consciously, an anticomunist prejudice and a desire for the process of change not to happen or not to be as profound and radical as we think necessary.

Question Careful, Mr Berlinguer: You are excommunicating at the outset anyone who does not think like you.

Answer I am not excommunicating anyone. Any democratic position is legitimate and all must be taken into account in some way or another. Moreover, despite the fact that many people, yourself included, are against it, the historic compromise remains an incontrovertible fact: Despite everything, significant steps forward have been taken along the political road which we have indicated.

Question However, the PCI has also paid a certain price for it.

/Answer/ You are obviously referring to the recent local elections. We did in fact sustain appreciable losses on 14 May; it was just after Moro's death, there was considerable emotion, and this gave rise to an increase in the votes for the DC. Moreover, the places where elections took place were mostly in the south, where we have always experienced a considerable difference between general and local elections. The results were different in the 25 June round. But I do not deny that the results of the partial local elections and the referendums cause us to reflect and have in fact caused us to conduct a critical and self-critical appraisal.

/Question/ Why?

/Answer/ Because for some time we allowed our loyalty to the majority to overshadow our criticism of the government and the DC. And also because we have been and still are, as written on several occasions, "in the middle of the road," that is, halfway between opposition and the government. But that is not our fault; the entire country is in the middle of the road.

/Question/ Is this stage over?

/Answer/ The issue of our participation in the government remains open. However, the "exceptional" stage of the emergency is over--Moro's abduction and death, those dreadful days when, together with the leaders of the DC, the Italian Republican Party and other parties, we shouldered the responsibility for resolutely responding to the terrorists' attack against the republic.

Then followed the test of the referendums and then the presidency.... They were a terrible 6 months. Now another phase has started--that of the implementation of the government program. There is the problem of the south, of employment, of young people, of restoring health to public finance. We will be extremely rigorous and demanding on these points.

The government knows that if the program is not implemented within the agreed time and with the agreed contents we are prepared to leave the majority. If anyone believes that we are happy and contented to be in the majority because we are "legitimized" by the company, they have miscalculated. We are in the majority because of our sense of responsibility to the country and because we are aware that our contribution is an important one. But we will not remain in it if we see that it is not equal to the tasks and undertakings for which it was established.

/Question/ The year 1979 will be the year of Europe. You said at the latest PCI Central Committee meeting that the PCI has taken a definitive option for Europe. Do you confirm this?

/Answer/ I do confirm it. We know that the process of European integration must be conducted--at least for the time being--mainly by forces and interests still deeply linked with capitalist structures which we want to transform.

We know that transnational integration conducted and guided by those forces will place limitations on the process of national transformation. This is the by no means unimportant reason why, for instance, the French communists and also the French socialists regard the acceleration in the process of monetary, economic and political unification in the EC with many reservations. We believe, however, that in any case we must press forward toward Europe and its unity and that the challenge, which this goal presents, must be taken up and that the democratic class struggle of renewal must be raised to a European level and established in European awareness.

/Question/ Mr Berlinguer, there is still capitalism in Western Europe. Does the PCI still want to abolish capitalism?

/Answer/ The answer is yes. We do eventually want to establish here in Western Europe an economic, social and state order which is no longer capitalist, but which does not repeat any model or any of the socialist experiences hitherto realized and which at the same time is not reduced merely to exhuming social democratic-type experiences, which have restricted themselves to administering capitalism. We want a third solution, which is demanded precisely by the impossibility of being satisfied with the current world situation.

/Question/ You want to abolish capitalism. What about democracy?

/Answer/ It is precisely in order to save democracy and in order to make it broader, stronger and as orderly as possible that capitalism must be transcended. Historical experience--especially since the twenties--demonstrates that the recovery, safeguarding and development of democracy have been and are the result of a struggle whose protagonists are the working class, the workers, their class parties and first and foremost the communists. This is because it was the capitalist and bourgeois forces which, in order to preserve their domination, did not hesitate to impede, limit, amputate, empty and--through forms of fascism--to destroy democracy. And now the very profound crisis affecting all the societies of so-called "market" capitalism demonstrates the kinds of anarchical process of corporative disintegration to which democracy is subjected and to those dangers of reactionary, authoritarian adventures it is exposed. Being consistently anticapitalist also means being consistently democratic. This is why we now believe that democracy is an inalienable working class gain which must not be relinquished. And herein lies a development and step forward from one aspect of Leninism, at least as it took shape in October 1917 and subsequent years.

Lenin viewed the struggle for democracy as a struggle which the proletariat also had to wage to the full, but which still remained within the context of a struggle to carry out the bourgeois revolution. As far as we are concerned, however, democracy (including the so-called "formal" freedoms which were initially the gain of the bourgeoisie) is a value which historical experience shows was universal and permanent and which therefore the working class and the communist parties appropriate and must assert also in building

a socialist society. In any case, this is how we Italian communists see it and want to assert it. Moreover, this is not a choice we have just made, it is a truth which we discovered not just now, but decades ago. We have proclaimed it, not in words, but through the example of many, many communists, in bloodshed, in the fascist prisons and on the mountainsides with the partisan army. This is why we do not have to endure any examinations.

CSO: 3104

ITALY

BERLINGUER'S CONTROVERSIAL 'REPUBBLICA' INTERVIEW: REACTIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Survey of Reactions

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 3 August 78 pp 1, 12

[Text] There are those--among the press and politicians--who take this opportunity for fruitful reflections and there are those who try to fan the flames of hoped-for divisions among the communists and the socialists. Numerous statements. Unmotivated attacks by Cicchitto.

Rome. There have been vast echoes from the interview which Comrade Enrico Berlinguer gave to REPUBBLICA, as was to be expected. But less foreseeable was the tone of many of those comments and above all a rather monotonous accentuation--in the press as well as in the statements made to some of the political leaders--on a pretended "polemic" (which, for some people, was downright "tough") on the part of Berlinguer with respect to the PSI. LA STAMPA for example had the following headline: "Berlinguer Mounts Sharp Attack on PSI"; and CORRIERE DELLA SERA echoed: "Berlinguer's Polemic With the PSI"; IL GIORNO had this headline: "Berlinguer Polemicizing With PSI."

The topic of relations with the socialist comrades as a matter of fact was taken up only in the final portion of the lengthy interview and in terms which are quite difficult to define as "sharp attack." It was not by chance that LA REPUBBLICA, inserting a subtitle at this point, wrote quite correctly: "New socialist strategy causes worry."

And here is what Berlinguer said: "The Christian Democratic leadership has for some time now somewhat played down its penchant for examination (with regard to the PCI--editor's note), although without abandoning it entirely and major groups among the productive bourgeoisie also see things with a clearer eye. There is now a new vocation toward examination on the part of the current PSI leadership group. This is something new. I do not

hesitate to say that it constitutes cause for worry." For the rest, Berlinguer pointed out the risk that "some socialist comrades" might today be more preoccupied "with a redistribution of votes inside the left, rather than the overall strengthening of the left and of its unity."

Obviously, extrapolating an attack against the PSI on the basis of these considerations can only be the result of one choice: the choice of fanning the flames of a possible, growing polemic between the communists and the socialists. As a matter of fact, quite specifically, we have, on the one side, those who are mostly interested in unity as just another objective, rather than a legitimate confrontation, and on the other hand we have those who evidently want the polemic to "come out into the open" and to develop, with sovereign indifference, toward the risks inherent in a break-up of unity.

In a statement, PRI [Italian Republican Party] secretary Biasini asserted that he "had a positive opinion of the interview on the three major problems: the recognition of the universal and permanent value of democracy, also by virtue of those fundamental aspects which the left in the past had wiped away rather quickly as 'formal liberties'; the specific choice to be made for European unity with the acceptance of the challenge inherent in this objective; the rejection of the alternative of the left as a solution which is neither stable, nor realistic." Biasini also used the word "interesting" in referring to the authentic interpretations of the historical compromise given by Berlinguer as "an accord between the political and social forces to cope with the emergency and to work toward the country's renewal, without any ties to any prejudicial formulas involving a government majority."

Another statement, which implies an invitation--explicit and implicit throughout the entire interview--to engage in reflection in the direction toward confrontation, yes, but with clear, unity-oriented objectives, was made by the socialist Labriola. "With this authoritative contribution," says Labriola, "which in practice means launching the congressional debate of the PCI, we have arrived at a point at which we note the opportunity and urgency of an organic estimate of the principal political problems facing the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] which could be accomplished by the party's top political bodies as activities are resumed after the August break. It will be very useful," Labriola continues, "to confirm and adapt, to the extent that this has become necessary, our commitment toward assuring and at the same time stimulating the political framework of national unity and to develop confrontation among all of the left-wing forces in order to promote the incomplete but launched evolution of the Communist Party, since the PSI is a party which operates and discusses while having its roots within the left and not within uncertain confines of in-between areas."

A statement by the ("grass roots") Christian Democrat Piero Bassetti is very serious in terms of the proper level for the problem which the Berlinguer interview brought up in general: "This was an extremely interesting

interview, above all because there is an effort have to go beyond the false dilemma of 'Leninism, yes; Leninism, no' and to promote the growth, within the PCI, but also outside, of the awareness of the fact that, in a modern and pluralist democracy, the topic of democratic centralism or, instead, of democratic alternation [in office] are not wiped away with formalistic swipes but involve an in-depth search by both parties so that the problem of degeneration (from democratic centralism to bureaucratic centralism, from democratic alternation to frozen democracy) is inherent within modern societies."

An editorial, which will appear today in VOCE REPUBBLICANA and which takes up the topic of relations between the PCI and the PSI runs along those same lines, in other words, lines of reflection, debate, unity-oriented intention, as well as careful attention to the country's interests. Arguing with Indro Montanelli--who tenaciously seems to point to an exasperation of the bitter debates and conflicts between the two parties--VOCE writes the following: "In our opinion, this is the way the problems should be seen: those who want to be adversaries of the left, such as they exist in other countries of the West, must not hope for a struggle of attrition between the communists and the socialists but rather their convergence on a secure democratic base. Otherwise, either you have an emergency or you have a return to formulas which we have already had too much negative experience with."

Both IL POPOLO and L'AVANTI! today are devoting an editorial to the Berlinguer interview after yesterday's silence.

IL POPOLO dwells on the issue of the historical compromise, as it was stated in the Berlinguer interview, emphasizing that here we find precisely spelled out the fact "that this is neither a government formula, nor a preferential accord with the DC [Christian Democratic Party] alone" and here we also find "confirmation of the search for a third solution between capitalism and socialism, a third way which in reality appears a little bit geometrical and culturally undefined. There is no pretentious revelation here--continues the DC organ--that an undoubtedly commitment-oriented affirmation is not paralleled by a real attempt at clarifying the ways in which one can reconcile the permanent value of pluralism with the value of hegemony by a single class."

L'AVANTI! likewise devotes a series of connected arguments, reservations, and criticisms to Berlinguer's statements. In particular, the editorial seems preoccupied with removing any suspicion of "wanting to divide the left." "We are not stuck on any kind of undefinable neosocialism," writes the magazine. "If anything, we have always clarified the socialist position on its own grounds and in the context of the democratic socialist current of the European movement where it was born." In the conclusion, the PSI journal--in very arbitrary terms, to which it will be necessary to come back--downright insinuates that dangers of a breakup of the left today supposedly come from the PCI.

"The response has already been given by Zaccagnini at the CN [National Council Meeting] when he expressed his estimate of the Community Party's evolution but also said that this evolution must lead to some conclusive results." That is what the Hon. Galloni, deputy secretary of the DC, said.

"The interview," he added, "does not introduce anything new; it describes the type of evolution which the Communist Party has gone through but there are still some dark spots regarding precisely the outcome to which that evolution will lead. The questions that deserve an answer are concerned by the fact that Berlinguer stated what the Communist Party does not want to be but he is not yet in a position to tell us what the Communist Party does want to be. And this is the basic point which was illuminated by the Hon. Moro and with respect to which the Communist Party has not taken any steps forward."

The tones and intentions of all of these statements, which we have reported here, are diverse as we go on to listen to Comrade Fabrizio Cicchitto. Cicchitto says that "the Berlinguer interview is a deliberate attempt to accentuate the tones of the confrontation between the socialists and the communists." Cicchitto denies that he wants to "examine" the PCI and, denying his own statements, asserts that "through this interview the Communists certainly are not heading for any new shores." He adds that "the examination is something which Berlinguer might do to the others, not only by making us wait until October but by moving on from examination to excommunication." Cicchitto then says that the PCI is completely entitled to "try to come up with a democratic way out for the diverse tendencies and thrusts which come from civilian society: I do not understand" he adds "how an attempt of this kind can be condemned and excommunicated, unless one wishes to assert that we have a leading party and a party with limited sovereignty within the left." Cicchitto then reacts to Berlinguer's consideration according to which the PSI today seems more interested in a redistribution of votes within the left than in strengthening the left as a whole: "It is not we," he says, "who invented the term 'gathering votes in the neighbor's garden.' This is a famous expression of Togliatti and it is a practice which the PCI has pursued coherently from the left-of-center government until 20 June 1976. We intend to interrupt that practice, to the extent that this is possible; we feel that the socialist area has been unduly occupied also by the Communist Party." Cicchitto shows here that he has a less summit-oriented and dogmatic idea of the "areas"; he shows that he does not see how one should have to follow either of them like liegemen. The socialist leader concludes: "We think that, among the two major parties, the DC and the PCI, there is not an indistinct area but that a socialist pole might take shape here and that this would prevent, both a frontal clash and a kind of political collusion and which would create the--evidently long-term--conditions for a democratic alternation [in power] which would follow the phase of emergency governments and national unity which we likewise expect to be rather lengthy." In this connection it is recalled that Berlinguer, in his interview, far from mentioning the PSI as some kind of "indistinct area," instead talked about it in the

following terms: "The Socialist Party is still a grand party of the working classes and, if it gets stronger, it is the Italian left that will also get stronger."

Reactions Within PCI

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 3 August 78 p 3

[Article by Miriam Mafai: "Berlinguer at Last on the Offensive"]

[Text] PCI rank and file satisfied after LA REPUBBLICA interview. Along the party's "periphery," agreement with the secretary's position is strong and widespread. Moreover, his arguments look like a positive response to the preoccupation and demands which have for some time now been expressed by the provincial and regional secretaries.

Rome. "A cultural and political counteroffensive which we felt was necessary." This is how a regional PCI leader commented on the Berlinguer interview which appeared yesterday in LA REPUBBLICA. After a long period of time, during which the communist top leadership seemed essentially pre-occupied with coming up with reassuring and slightly weary answers to the pressing debate opened by some Christian Democratic and Socialist sectors, yesterday's declaration looked like a strongpoint, "like a manifestation of legitimate pride," "like a challenge to those who hope for our continuing yielding." Along the periphery, agreement with Berlinguer's positions is strong and widespread. And there is more: these positions, like a positive response, support the preoccupations and demands which had been expressed for quite some time by provincial and regional secretaries.

Berlinguer had responded to those preoccupations already during the last Central Committee meeting, admitting that "in recent times we did not sufficiently emphasize our identity," urging "a more energetic battle on the grand topics of ideology and prospects," emphasizing the "need for pressure and struggle against all resistances, against the encumbrances and sabotage which are manifest also within the majority in regard to the need for fully and quickly implementing the agreed-upon program in all of its parts."

Signs of widespread ill humor among the fringes had reached [party headquarters on]Botteghe Oscure [street] from many directions after the 14 May elections and the results of the referendums. Here are the essential criticisms that were expressed.

1. The constant search for an accord with the DC, on the national and local levels, runs the risk of causing us to lose incisiveness in action. There is a serious gap between the future choices and the specific and immediate results achieved. Hence the need for pushing the government so as rapidly to obtain visible successes in economic and social terms.

2. There is a delay in the reflection on the contents of our proposed strategy: The watchword of austerity was brought out more pervaded with the Franciscan spirit rather than with a desire for real renewal. There is a lag also in the analysis of the features and consequences of the crisis which does not involve all strata and all categories and all parts of Italy in the same way.

3. The party, overall, is being pushed more toward a search for consensus than toward a real debate. Not all channels of communication between the grass roots and the top leadership work the way they should. Hence the continuous "surprises" over election results and propaganda material prepared at Botteghe Oscure which does not take into account the questions and the real mood in the country.

The PCI leadership group did not react to these criticisms in a uniform manner.

In reality, the problem facing Berlinguer and his closest collaborators was the problem of understanding up to what point the situation could be forced without however running the risk of a break with the DC. It was precisely on this point that opinions at [party headquarters ~~on~~] Botteghe Oscure [street] did not entirely agree.

Some leaders, including Bufalini, Perna, and Napolitano, are mostly worried about the breakup of the political framework. Hence the tendency to respond to the criticisms from the grass roots in essentially pedagogic terms and a rapid switch to a revision of the critical points in the recent past; hence also the very sharp criticism expressed by Bufalini with regard to the ideologies of 1968. The others--including Tortorella, Reichlin, Minucci, and Occhetto--respond by emphasizing that a more energetic action toward the DC not only is possible without threatening the political framework now achieved but helps the same forces which, within the DC, chose the line of confrontation and emergency. Therefore, however, they add, it is necessary with great courage to reopen a discourse toward the entire left, also in dealing with those groups (such as the PDUP [Proletarian Unity Party]) who, on their own account, launched a re-examination of their past choices.

In this discussion, which outlines the congress debate as such, we find the Berlinguer interview now which, in the defense of the party's story and physiognomy, refutes what there is instrumental in the demand for revision. Thus the statement, to the effect that the PCI is ready to leave the majority and the statement--which may seem rather obvious--that the PCI's objective is to overcome capitalism, are about to testify to a switch by Berlinguer toward a position of greater toughness, turning it into the reference point for all those who, at the center and along the periphery, have reason for criticism with regard to a management of the emergency line [policy] which often seemed entirely too much concerned with the particular moment, with the demands and the interests of the DC,

to the detriment of that prospect of real change in society which for always is the very reason behind the PCI's existence.

Comments by DC's Zaccagnini

Rome PAESE SERA in Italian 5 August 78 p 1

[Article by Fabrizio Coisson: "Zac Gets Into Debate on Eurocommunism"]

[Text] DC secretary dwells on problem of relations with USSR. Sticky points. Communist reply.

Benigno Zaccagnini allowed 3 days to pass; he silently stood by while the bitter debate between the PCI and the PSI got worse; then he spoke out yesterday on the Berlinguer interview. This was perhaps the most critical comment from the DC on the communists throughout this entire tormented year of 1978. The central point is always the same: relations with the USSR. According to Zaccagnini, "there are some serious dangers hidden" in the historical analysis presented by the PCI secretary. "We think that the justification of the positions assumed by the PCI before 1956, relating the whole thing to the situation triggered by the 'Cold War' is wrong. In this way you are in fact asking a serious question about the effects which a further deterioration in international relations would have on communist policy." In other words: if the PCI at that time lined up with the USSR, would it do the same thing now? This is a question which, according to Zac, also pertains to Eurocommunism which "appears heavily conditioned by 'external factors' that influence its elaboration, concrete action, and prospects."

Although the judgement on Berlinguer's passage dealing with Leninism is more cautious, as far as Zac is concerned, nonetheless, "the strategic proposal (the Berlinguerian third way) looks rather weak and in substance is negative." But there is enough to say that the remarks by the DC secretary were at least very critical. Naturally, the polemic does not revolve around specific, immediate political choices; hence, there is no risk to the political equilibrium or to the government and Zaccagnini instead urges that they be strengthened. But the DC secretary's remarks--he talked to Ariano Irpino, during a "friendship celebration"--also registers some harsh points.

To justify him, it is said that Zac continued to be irritated by the negative judgement expressed by the communist newspaper on his remarks at the last National Council meeting of the DC. The address by Ariano Irpino therefore would seem to be a kind of polemical retort. This is a somewhat partial motivation which did not do away with the suspicion that--in the dispute which now has been going on for some time between the PCI and the PSI--this move by Zac is like a positive signal to the socialists. The DC secretary's aides are the first to deny this thesis: there were many barbs in the speech which were also directed at the PSI and the line of confrontation was definitely confirmed. "The criticisms were expressed not only on the directly political level."

It was perhaps also for this reason that the PCI's decision was not to reply in a polemical fashion. Today's issue of L'UNITA only reverses the main questions asked by Zac. Is there is risk of a return to the Cold War? But this is not a question that concerns the PCI only; it concerns the entire country, it concerns the decisions of the DC, and Italy's role on the international scene. Is there criticism of the "third road" between the socialism of the East and the European social democracies? But it is precisely the DC which talks of "third ways" and of its cultural and political roots. In summary, the first communist reply tends to emphasize that the problems under discussion touch not only the PCI but the Italian political forces as a whole. And if the PCI is making an examination, a reflection on its own past, then it would be opportune for the other parties to do likewise.

After the socialist polemic had at least partly been placated (following the comments by the historical leader De Martino, Lombardi, and Mancini), the debate opened up by the DC secretary should not have too many consequences. Today, of all days, VOCE REPUBBLICANA reminds the PCI that a left-wing alternative to the present government is not possible. "It is therefore necessary to try to bring about a democratic conversion among the left-wing forces and not to cause their reciprocal attrition." Today it is up to Giulio Andreotti on TV to review his 2 years in power: a rather long process, sometimes contradictory, which however calls attention to the specific activities, the problems to be solved (in addition to those that were solved) with a glance at the unknown factors in the resumption of political activities after August [recess].

Giuseppe Bartolomei, DC Senate President

Rome IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 16 August 78 pp 10-12

[Interview with Giuseppe Bartolomei, Christian Democratic senate leader, by Massimo Tosti: "Emergency--in Expectation of Something Better"]

[Text] The accord with the communists--explains the leader of the Christian Democratic senators--is valid only because the parliamentary situation does not offer any alternatives. But the judgement on the PCI remains what it has always been. There are many positive aspects but also some risks in the new socialist course. Something will probably happen in autumn.

[Answer] My impression? The most immediate one is that the interview was aimed above all at the old militants for whom he demands ideological continuity in party action. This is therefore a key for interpreting the meaning of the evidently diverse tone with which he addresses the others, those who are outside his world, in order to broaden the consensus in his own party.

Today's political fact of life is the lengthy interview and clarification provided by Enrico Berlinguer on the PCI, on Leninism, on the historical compromise, on the government, and on relations with the other political forces. Giuseppe Bartolomei, leader of the Christian Democratic senators, 55 years old, from Arezzo, a senator since 1963, offers a substantially negative estimate of the communist secretary's "confession." In this interview, Bartolomei judges the political moment: the emergency, the Christian Democratic Party, the errors of these past years, and the new socialist course. And he also touches on other topics.

Question: Berlinguer said: "For us, Lenin is not a dogma." Does it not seem to you that this assertion tends to strengthen the impression that there has been a radical change in the PCI?

Bartolomei: For the meaning of Berlinguer's position seems to me in substance to be this: they are not Leninists by taking Lenin in a scholastic fashion, in other words, transplanting his tactic as such, just about anywhere (but who would admit intending to do so in this manner?). What they are critically rethinking is the design and the strategy. Consequently, the soviet [council] in Italy is useless since--through a certain manner of management in parliament and of the representative institutions--one can get as much as one would get from the Soviet-style councils and, at the right moment, one would also get something similar to those councils. In substance I would say that Berlinguer claims validity for the Livorno split--one of the sensitive points in the bitter debates with the PCI--which was desired by Lenin, not so much for Italian reasons but rather for the necessities of the world revolution (or the interests of the USSR).

After having criticized the leadership of the first Communist Party of Italy and the "sectarian" stewardship of Bordiga, siding with Lenin, he maintains that the PCI reaffirms its own autonomy "through the practice of internationalism." This is a very obscure expression which one could also use in order to say that dissent from the USSR does not involve the overall strategic design of the leading state but rather the tactic of its implementation. In other words, what would turn out to be the soviet under estimation of the autonomous capacity of the national brand of communism which are not equipped to accomplish a penetration and a planetary transformation of capitalist reality in a socialist direction. In this sense, the liquidation of the left-wing alternative also becomes logical, with respect to the final objective of that "profound renewal of structures, of public morality, and of social organization" which can spring only from a different vision of the world. And there is also an explanation of the polemic with the PCI which supposedly does not have a culture that is autonomous from the bourgeois currents, nor an autonomous class strategy of its own.

Question: Has the PCI changed?

Bartolomei: The Hon. Berlinguer declared that the PCI, in its search for alliances, keeps its own identity intact. Then he laments the fact that people continue--and that includes the PSI--to want to examine democracy in the PCI whereas this supposedly is an attempt to outlaw it. But this is also a kind of admission of incompatibility between this type of party and the liberal-democratic vision of our establishment.

Question: What is the most immediate political fallout from these interviews?

Bartolomei: There is quite a lot. Let me mention the most obvious point here. Just a few days ago, Zaccagnini declared that we are still far from getting out of the emergency to which are tied the program accord and the current equilibrium.

Berlinguer replied rather brusquely, declaring that "the exceptional phase of emergency is over with" which is why we face the problem of implementing the government program. These two situation estimates are substantially very different.

Question: How can you explain and how can one reconcile two situation estimates which are so different?

Bartolomei: In the light of the diversity of the two parties and their prospects. But you can come up with a wealth of meanings and interpretations for the emergency. If, by emergency, we mean the situation of economic, social, and institutional destabilization, then I would say that it has its background in the past 10 years.

On top of the social-historical weaknesses of Italy at the delicate moment of transition from a rural condition to an industrial condition during the sixties, there is now superposed the world crisis which, from the French May onward, has been a cultural crisis in addition to being an economic crisis. But to remain in Italy, I would like to add that destabilization also contributed to a specific political strategy.

Question: Are you talking about the Communist Party?

Bartolomei: Sure. The fact that the promoters of this strategy reviewed many of their positions brings up the question as to whether the change is functional or strategic--but the fact as such remains. And there also remains the reality that the system, once weakened, does not manage to withstand certain stresses.

The unity accord should have the function--according to some people, such as La Malfa, for example--to create conditions for the social pact. [It should lead] toward obtaining certain incompatible demands, and the subsequent stresses, so long as the present phase of disequilibrium has not been overcome, in other words, the entire pathology of the system itself.

Question: In other words, the emergency can be overcome only through an understanding among everybody, including the PCI?

Bartolomei: In my view, the problem of the emergency is tied to certain political equilibrium, but not necessarily to those. And, above all: it is tied to the capacity which certain equilibriums, certain alliances, have when it comes to solving problems connected with the recovery of the system's physiology. The important thing here is not the survival of a formula but the results which that formula produces.

Question: And what is the bottom line here?

Bartolomei: Considering the current state of affairs, given the lack of parliamentary alternatives, this combination will be judged in the light of whatever worse things could happen to us. But that must not mean resignation since there are limits beyond which we cannot go and we are therefore stuck with the permanent problem of how to make the situation evolve along positive lines.

Question: Excuse me, Senator Bartolomei. It seems to me that we have not yet cleared up the meaning of the contradiction between a DC which maintains that the emergency is not over with. Let me come up with a response to that: believing that the thesis of the emergency is already over and done with, Berlinguer demands an "institutional" role in the government for the PCI. Citing the gravity of the situation, the DC justifies the entirely exceptional understanding with the PCI before its own electorate.

Bartolomei: Zaccagnini explicitly declared in the directorate--and the directorate gave him the go-ahead on that basis--that the understanding was limited in terms of time and that it was confined to some specific points. Hence, the "No" to the political alliances which would not be acceptable to us and the "Yes" to the idea of taking everything that is available in order to seek and implement solutions useful to the country within the democratic context and in the context of its traditional international choices. Now that the PCI is trying to play its own game, this is evident and also explainable. But, in my judgement, the question is a different one: are there any possible solutions, better than the present one, on the political level, today, in this situation? That is the point. I continue to be against an organizational alliance with the PCI and Berlinguer's recent interview only adds to my concern.

Question: In your opinion, will this polemic lead to the very brink of the break? Or will it stop just short of it?

Bartolomei: The Socialist Congress at Turin undoubtedly accentuated the differences in the position and prospects of the two parties. But the polemic is determined by the space which each party wishes to obtain within the area of the left as a whole.

Question: What is your judgement on the new socialist course?

Bartolomei: It seems to me that, for the moment, the PSI's strategy is very dynamic and quite unbiased. This may imply risks but it is explained in the light of the need for greater electoral strength.

Question: Let me give you an example: in your opinion, does the PSI of Craxi deserve more faith or more diffidence?

Bartolomei: That is not for me to say. That is up to the voters.

Question: In terms of political relations, this judgement must also be made by the leaders of the other parties.

Bartolomei: I believe in pluralism and hence I believe in the political role of the PSI. I may have some reservations on the way in which this role is developed. But I see many positive aspects in Craxi's socialism: some courageous choices made by the Turin congress. Some basic orientations. I only ask myself whether some of the instruments adopted are the best that can be used in attaining the objectives which Craxi proposes for himself.

Question: You referred to 1968 and to the novelty which the great challenge produced. Does it seem to you that the DC knew how to get hold of this novelty?

Bartolomei: The change which we experienced in recent years came to a head above all in the crisis of the traditional ideologies; in a ruthless criticism of Marxism, in the recovery of a certain lay-radical culture; in the revival, in other words, of individual values at the expense of the community, of the hierarchy, of bureaucratization, and of the concept of the centralist party, as Lenin wanted it. Today the most important political problem concerns relations with society: the emergence of autonomy in all of its forms--worker or extraparliamentary autonomy of the middle classes or labor union autonomy. Terrorism, the negative judgement on the parties, the referendums, the civil lists, the birth of the little labor unions--all of these are phenomena of autonomy. And the discourse cannot be terminated with the anathema of Qualunquism. Behind these facts there is a demand for participation and for shared responsibility, a political demand, not a rejection of politics. Now, here--also for us in the DC--we find not only the problem of changing faces or persons but also of restoring a certain type of relationship between the decisions at the summit and the instances of public opinion.

Question: I would like to put the same question to you in more concrete and political terms. Do you not believe that this phenomenon of opposition from public opinion is also justified by what is happening in the Palace? After Moro's death, Zaccagnini promised that the DC would change its way of making politics. Does it seem to you that this promise was kept?

Bartolomei: Look--events are much greater than our little promises. The problem is one of strategy but also one of persons or promises.

Question: But is there a strategy? IL MANIFESTO commented on the session of the Christian Democratic National Council as follows: "Some prefer the PCI, some others prefer the PSI--and all want power. And they have it." Does it seem to you that the future line of the DC has been clarified?

Bartolomei: If problems were clear, then they would no longer be problems. It seems to me that there is a noteworthy search going on in the DC. The debate has brought out many critical positions and that to me is a sign of vitality. Now the important thing is not to exclude but to coordinate this variety of positions and proposals toward specific points. The moralistic discourse on power is often nothing more than an easy polemic. You make politics with the instruments of power. The trouble comes when it turns out to be an occupation for its own sake.

Question: You say that there has been political differentiations here. How come all of you or almost all of you voted for the secretariat's agenda?

Bartolomei: There have been highly diversified positions. And this is a good thing. But it is important to compose these different situation estimates into a single dialectical unity. This is the sense of a vote which is like an invitation and a request addressed to Zaccagnini to make an effort of synthesis and initiative: to prepare a strategy which would sustain us in the deliberations which we will have to go into during the next several months.

Question: What is the significance, in this attempt, to spell out an election strategy to make Piccoli chairman of the National Council?

Bartolomei: The idea is to involve and to spread responsibility around among all of the party's components so that they may together make this effort. To make sure that the effort will be successful, we must prevent this operation--on the eve of the congress--from boiling down to a mere power majority gathering of some components which the others are then asked to join.

This has been the meaning of my vote, strengthened by the confidence I have in Piccoli, based on his long experience of local and enthusiastic collaboration.

Question: Until 2 months ago, we were looking for the elections for head of state like some kind of turning point. Today, what decisive moment do you see on the horizon?

Bartolomei: You have the Christian Democratic Congress, you have the Communist Congress, and you are going to have the European elections. But I would not pin down any particular date or occasion.

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ITALY

SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI) RESPONDS TO BERLINGUER INTERVIEW

Socialist Reaction

Rome PAESE SERA in Italian 3 August 78 p 1

[Article by Fabrizio Coisson: "Craxi Steps Up Debate With PCI"]

[Text] Violent reply from socialist leader: "PCI will not risk splitting the left." De Martino's comment more cautious: "We need a serious debate."

On the eve of the political recess, the bitter debate inside the left has flared up even more. Suspicions had been rife for quite some time between the PCI and PSI top leadership but they had been held down; the confrontation above all involved broadside articles in AVANTI! or L'UNITA. Somebody had the impression that the communists were on the defensive, more cautious, more diplomatic. On Wednesday, the Enrico Berlinguer interview did away with this impression: "One might say that the PSI is trying to become the reference point for a neoliberal, neosocial-democratic and even extremist area. We are about to see where all this will lead. But we are certainly not indifferent." There are dangers to the unity of the left.

It is said that Bettino Craxi, when he learned of the interview and its contents, remained surprised but not dissatisfied: "It is always better to speak clearly. They accused me of being polemical; now I am in good company." For an official reply from the PSI however we had to wait all day yesterday: an editorial in AVANTI!--fruit of a consultation between Craxi and his collaborators in his personal office on Tomacelli Street, written and rewritten three times to find the "proper" adjectives.

Adjectives which however are very harsh: "The attempt to push us to the right, which one can read between the lines of the communist polemic, is very awkward; this is the worst possible way to state relations with us. We are not stuck on any kind of neosocialism with an undefinable brand; the PSI in fact does not involve the risk of splitting the left. So many times before in history, the left has been divided by the sectarianism and integralism of the communists." A violent reply which also touches

on the questions of Leninism, going all the way to the "Eurocommunist seesaw and foolish aspirations." A tone which, to more than one observer, recalled the polemical thrusts at the birth of the left-of-center.

The entire majority gathering around Craxi fell in with this tone of voice. "Berlinguer would like to examine us himself, he would like to refer us to October or perhaps even excommunicate us," said Fabrizio Cicchitto, the young Lombardian in the socialist directorate. "But it is not a crime to try to strengthen your own party, to come up with a democratic way out for diverse tendencies springing from civilian society. Unless of course you want to say that you have a leading party and a party with limited sovereignty within the left." The polemic is thus brought to the subject of the autonomy of the parties within the left and the national unity policy (something which is not denied by Berlinguer). According to a historical leader, such as Riccardo Lombardi, the accusations "of radical liberalism or of being a party of destabilization are unfounded and offensive" likewise and downright point "at the objective of producing new splits in the PSI."

This last, grave observation perhaps signals an element of more profound embarrassment, within the PSI, in dealing with the choices of the secretariat. This is not a case where not all of the positions adopted by the socialists are of one mind in commenting on the Berlinguer interview. We asked former PSI secretary Francesco De Martino to give us his impression briefly, in the Transatlantic [hotel?] at Montecitorio. "Among the positive aspects I would list the announcement that the term Leninism will be dropped from the PCI statutes." But Berlinguer confirmed one point of validity in Leninism. "Yes, but it is considered within the overall complex of a historical experience, not as a closed doctrine, applicable today as it was yesterday." De Martino believes that the Berlinguer interview is not only of incidental importance: "I also agree with the question that the rebalancing of the forces within the left must move toward the overall strengthening of the left. If each of the two parties aims only at its own particular interest, then we run the risk of not attaining the overall interest." And what about the risks of a breakup on the left? "On that score there is much to be discussed. These are topics on which we must reflect and to which we must come back, as it were, after the summer, with an in-depth approach."

Silvano Labriola likewise considers the Berlinguer interview to be a stage in the internal debate within the left, a stage in the "evolution of the PCI" which "is helped along by the fact that the PSI is a party which operates and discusses while it has its roots within the left and not within the uncertain confines of intermediate areas." That was a barb directed at the Craxi people. This is perhaps a sign that--regarding the identity and position of the PSI within the left--there is an open confrontation also inside the Socialist Party.

Craxi, PSI Secretary, Comments

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 6-7 August p 3

[Text] In a short lead article published in AVANTI!, rich in ironic sal- lies, hinted at by the title ("Long Live the Revolution!"), PSI secretary Bettino Craxi gets into the polemic triggered by the Berlinguer interview in LA REPUBBLICA and at the same time comments on the remarks addressed by Zaccagnini at Ariano Irpino. Craxi begins by recalling that "when a democracy is afraid of the debate of ideas, it embarks upon the wrong road and in the long run becomes something else."

The socialist leader does not assign "excessive importance to the counsels of caution which are little supported by arguments and even less so to the intimidating insinuations which emerge with regard to the merit of the questions under debate, instead advancing the idea of deviation, of sin, of prohibited paths." Craxi then rejects "the image of a rash, unwise, and adventurous PSI with its retinue of grandparents, uncles and aunts, and parents full of anxiety: that is only the kind of caricature you find in an operetta."

Responding indirectly to the criticisms of Mancini, Craxi adds that "the important question is not to refrain from responding to one blow with three blows but to know how to reply to a sick and contradictory argument with three healthy and straight-forward arguments."

Craxi then takes up the statements made by Zaccagnini for whom the DC is a "gradually revolutionary" party. "Italy is a beautiful country; we have everything here but the only species on the way to extinction is the species of the conservatives," notes the socialist secretary. And thus, "already having the fortune of being able to count on a Leninist and pluralist, revolutionary and conservative party, we now learn that the Italian 'conservative pole' is not to be found in the DC where it is, although in cohabitation with nonconservative forces, but elsewhere, and far away, since the DC gradually advances on the road of revolution." "If you can see the sky reflected in the water, then you will see fish reflected in the trees," continues Craxi, "and reformers, progressives, and revolutionaries instead should take note of this clear 'gradually revolutionary' reality and they should be less superficial in their analyses."

Michele Achilli, PSI, Responds

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 19 August 78 p 6

[Article by Michele Achilli: "Do We Want Berlinguer to be Like Marchais?"]

[Text] Letter from inside the PSI. We received and gladly publish the article by the Hon. Michele Achilli.

Although several days have passed since the latest flashes in the bitter debates between the socialists and the communists, it is certainly not too late to entertain some reflections and to try to understand the reasons which caused all this stir. The interests of vast sectors of domestic public opinion and international political circles are concentrated on the PSI: for some time now, to tell the truth, it has been Italy who made the news because of everything that is happening here (and it is quite something) and because Italy is a kind of experimental laboratory as to what could happen in other European countries (not too far off in the future). For weeks we have had the honor of turning up on the front pages of authoritative dailies all over the world and particularly from 20 June onward; we have not gotten that much attention since 1948, not even on the occasion of the left-of-center turn, which was just the same considered a fact of great political significance.

There is as a matter of fact no doubt that the opening toward the communists poses problems for the entire Western world, for NATO, and for the difficult balances between Western Europe and Eastern Europe (the barbarous murder of Aldo Moro was only the point of the iceberg); is this not therefore the proper moment for trying to stop this process, for working on what is considered the weakest link in the chain?

Now here we have the PSI, flattered, wooed, urged to put an end to its unity-oriented past (its "frontist" past in Montanellian jargon) in order to move closer and completely toward the European social democratic rules of the game which, let us not forget, is anticomunism as the pillar of their doctrine (the only exception being Mitterrand although we know only too well what relations between the trans-Alpine socialist leaders and the Socialist International really are).

Here are the first neo-Atlantic, Western declarations made by authoritative exponents of the PSI, precisely at a moment when nobody had doubted either the military alliances or the economic alliances. What was the true significance of these statements? By that of course I do not mean to say that the resumption of the harsh polemic of the socialists with the PCI was influenced only by this atmosphere. There are as a matter of fact quite a few good reasons for discussing with the communist comrades, likewise in an animated fashion: the Berlinguer interview itself reminded us of how many points of conflict there still exists, both on strategy and on our judgement of the other political forces.

For a party, such as the PSI, which, at least in words, has confirmed the choice of the left-wing alternative, the PCI's insistence--on considering possible and feasible a transformation of society with the collaboration of the Christian Democratic Party--certainly is not acceptable.

From this therefore springs the need for going into an in-depth examination of the contents of the alternative, the programs which the left must

work out in a united setting in order to propose to the country an alternative to the Christian Democratic administration; these will be occasions for severe debate but the purpose of that debate is the search for unity-oriented positions within the left itself.

What sense does it then make to dwell on abstract topics which have nothing to do with the problems of today, what sense does it make to revive the demand for the notorious "certificates of democraticity," that traditional weapon of the moderates in dealing with the socialists, if not to trouble the waters of a prospective of alternatives? What does it mean today to try to abjure Leninism? That the PCI--in the political practice of recent years (and not just for those years)--renounced the Leninist dogma of the violent conquest of power seems to me something that is so obvious as to constitute no further point of discussion among sensible people. Now, what portion of Leninist teaching must one abjure? Perhaps the judgement on imperialism?

Precisely at the moment when the PSI is again studying its own theoreticians and when meetings are beginning again to be organized and books are again being written about Morandi and Panzieri, it will perhaps be opportune to recall what Morandi said in 1950, in the context of a prospect of political action which would once and for all remove light-headedness and improvisation from party life: "Ideologically speaking, without any reservations, we take Leninism to be an interpretation and development of Marxism. Historically, we confirm the overcoming of social democracy in its twin expression of reformism and maximalism."

One can naturally forget the recent history of the PSI in order to refute the particular position which our party has held and one can perform an operation of plastic surgery on the face which would place us within the area of European social democratic tradition but, if one wishes to do that, one must be honest to the end and one must say that the rules of the game are being accepted and, among them, we repeat, we have the matter of non-collaboration with the communists.

Now, who enjoys ideologically enervating the parties of the Italian left? Who enjoys lowering the level of a debate which, moreover, was initiated with a quite different authoritativeness? (Here we might think, for example, of the question asked by Salvadori on the continuity of PCI policy, from Gramsci until today.)

Unity, which is the basic prerequisite for a policy of alternative, is not built in this fashion, often because we know how strong the animosity toward the socialist is in certain sectors of the PCI and also among the rank and file.

There is the doubt that one does not, in this fashion, wish to serve the cultural interests but rather to engage in some shady deals among which perhaps might be the idea of pushing the PCI back, toward positions of rigid

opposition (in the style of Marchais, to understand what we mean) with advantages to Italian democracy that can easily be imagined.

If this were so, then many of us would not be ready to play this game and that includes not only "those of the small minority" on the left.

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ITALY

MARXISM: NEW IDEOLOGICAL REALIGNMENTS FORGED IN WAKE OF BERLINGUER
INTERVIEW

Analysis of Political, Ideological Undercurrents

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 4 August 78 pp 7,8

[Article by Giorgio Amendola: "But Do We Have Three Cultures?"]

[Text] Emergency and crisis of ideologies? Is the Italy "of reason" only the lay Italy? But there is also a reactionary and nationalist tradition. The difference between Croce and Togliatti: but the latter is no less lay than the former. The role of Gramsci's thought. Significance and value of writing history. Monopolistic expansion and spread of positivistic and sociological tendencies with an American brand on them. The clash is between parties but also inside parties.

In a recent debate, held in Rome at the end of April, during the dramatic days of the Aldo Moro kidnapping ("The Cultural Commitment at the Present Moment in Italy," with the participation of Carlo G. Argan, Fr. Bartolomeo Sorge, Prof. Ernesto Quagliarillo, and Giorgio Amendola, a debate promoted by the People's Bank of Milan), Fr. Sorge asserted that the crisis of Italian culture, which is manifest against the background of the problems created by the emergency, springs from the crisis of the three ideologies, the Marxist ideology, the lay ideology, and the Catholic ideology, considered as separate faiths, divided by insurmountable obstacles. This is a description of the status of Italian culture which I find in a chapter in the book by Giovanni Spadolini ("L'Italia della ragione" [The Italy of Reason], Florence 1978), a chapter devoted precisely to the "Three Cultures." We are rather surprised to find this artificial separation of the "Three Cultures" in a book which seeks to reconstruct the itinerary of the cultural and political struggle in Italy, as it took place in the course of the 20th century. If "the Italy of reason" were only the Italy of a certain lay culture, confined in its own partial and separate expression and therefore exclusively tied to certain political minority forces,

then we would be doomed to not understanding what were the reasons for Italy's jumping out of the fog of a secular [centuries-old] heavy obscurantist oppression.

The sense of the political and cultural struggle during the 20th century would, according to Spadolini, have been supplied by the effort made by an Italy of reason which he identified in a rather restricted fashion with a certain direction of liberal-democratic thought (from Salvemini--and not without some contribution from his enemies, Giolitti and Turati, and not without some heterogeneous contribution from Einaudi all the way to Sturzo--to Croce, and on to Giovanni Amendola and Piero Gobetti, in order to arrive at IL MONDO of Pannunzio and La Malfa). This current supposedly asserted its continuity and superiority in the face of Marxist culture and Catholic culture. I as a matter of fact, for various obvious reasons, do not underestimate the contribution ascribed by that ideological current, although with its own contradictions, to the country's democratic progress; but we would have to despair of Italy's fate if the former were entrusted only to that current which is permanently defeated on the political level. The defeated also make their contribution to a country's culture and history; this is sometimes even an important contribution but one certainly cannot overlook the influence exerted by the victoriously emerging forces. Why did they prevail? This is a question which we cannot help but answer.

Both Spadolini and Fr. Sorge identify the three cultures in the form of three political forces which struggle over the country's political leadership, that is, the Christian Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and a rather vague lay third force of which we do not know whether it also includes the socialists but which nevertheless, in spite of its minority character, is called upon to defend the demands for liberty against the dangers consisting of the non-lay but denominational character of the other two forces which furthermore, due to the initiative of the communists, are persuaded to seek the conditions for a compromise.

These are theses which, quite frankly, seem wrong to me and which become a part of the new, certainly more civil and formally more educated but by no means less destructive--in terms of intentions--polemic presently conducted with respect to the PCI. Through this illustration we above all forget that there is another culture in Italy, if we want to accept this statement provisionally, a nationalist and right-wing culture, which during the first half of the century wielded preeminent influence, even before the advent of fascism, inspired by men such as Pareto, Gentile, Volpe, and D'Annunzio. These are personages whom we cannot forget easily. A right-wing culture still remains here; it is present in ever new forms, sometimes hastily concealed from the left and it should be the end [term] of confrontation among all forces which, although from different positions, intend to fight for the country's democratic and social progress.

The thesis of the three or four cultures, considered as separate faiths, is not convincing because in reality there is a national culture which lives on the contribution, which varies in terms of time, of more directions of thought which, in spite of the persistent integralisms and sectarianisms inherent in each school of thought, confront each other and react to each other and gradually, in a ceaseless exchange, wind up forming a common ground which is the basis of a popular consensus that marks the development of history with all of its changes: and today this common element, this cement of national unity and this requirement for the defense of the republic is the antifascist and democratic sentiment. The exchange between various schools of thought and their reciprocal conditioning become closer and more fertile during periods of more intensive popular participation, when the sectarian barriers, the scholastic and dogmatic pretenses must yield to the wider circulation of ideas in a climate of tolerance and mutual respect. This does not mean a levelling process or eclecticism but rather open and aggressive confrontation. What today may appear as a crisis of the three cultures is instead to a great extent the overcoming of every ideological denominationalism, the capacity for critical investigation, freedom of thought, the understanding that all culture, if it does not wish to be the dogmatic preservation of the past, is by nature lay, that is, free.

This is why I cannot accept the opposition between lay culture and Marxist culture. Certainly, there is a difference and a contrast between Marxism and liberalism but this does not mean that Togliatti is less laic than Croce. With his religion of liberty, the providence of the world, the latter in the end wound up giving his thought a fideistic character which was the premise for his downfall due to the obvious inability to understand the problems confronting the world as a result of imperialist wars and revolutions. If by the lay nature of thought we mean its independence of any extraterrestrial or irrational vision of the world, and the pre-eminence, instead, of man over his work, over his exigencies, then is no more laic thought than Marxist thought which places the premises of historical development upon the development of the production forces and upon the changes of production relationships, upon relations between man and nature. Humanism is still more relevant in Italian Marxism, free from scholastic ashes and positivistic contamination, in other words, Italian Marxism which took shape through the work of Antonio Labriola, Antonio Gramsci, and Palmiro Togliatti, through close relations between the thought and action of the Italian workers.

At a certain point, Spadolini seems to recognize the laic character of Marxism when he speaks (on page 501) of the absence of confrontation during the years of centrism (1948-1953) between lay culture "in its two versions, the Crocian and the Gramscian" and Catholic culture. The charge of failure to pay attention to Catholic culture may be true for those currents who claim to follow Croce and Salvemini, due to their unjustified intellectual arrogance (but also because of their subordinate collaboration with the DC) but it does not apply to Togliatti and the communists who were already

studying the distinctive features of Italian Catholicism with an open mind and who were not held back, in their opposition to centrism, from considerations of tactical opportunity.

Marxist thought in Italy underwent an original development of its own whose continuity one cannot deny. And that does not stop with Gramsci, as quite a few people would have us believe, also inside the PCI. Certainly, Togliatti is disturbing to anybody who wants to conceal the historical relationship existing between Italian Marxism and Lenin. But we cannot forget Togliatti's report to the first convention of Gramscian studies (Rome, June 1958) on "Gramsci's Leninism." We can modify, if we consider it proper, the formulations contained in the statutes but one cannot conceal the reality of historical processes.

During the years of the republic, Italian Marxism in Togliatti found the protagonist of an effort which was made in the course of the work of the Constituent [Assembly] and the study for the implementation of the constitution, aimed at getting the Italian worker movement--which was of anarchic origin and which was spontaneously adverse to any form of government power, to fight for the establishment of a democratic (parliamentary) republic open to all democratic and socialist changes and, in this struggle, to rally the best traditions of Italian liberal and democratic thought.

While the confrontation, during the first few years after Liberation, essentially was between Marxism and liberalism, between Gramsci, as presented by Togliatti, and Croce, Italian Marxism's capacity, especially after the Eighth Congress of the PCI and its liberation from the bonds of Stalinism, was to guide and extend the participation of the workers to the life of the republican state. I could say that the first congress of Gramscian studies was an essential moment in the critical development of Italian Marxism. After that moment, Italian Marxism more directly confronted Catholic thought, which in turn was opened by Vatican II to the need for liberating itself from the traditional integralist and corporative snares.

At the same time, there erupted in Italy, within the context of monopolistic expansion, the sociological tendencies, of American origin, and the new irrationalist currents, all of them intended, from many directions, to strike at the history-oriented direction which fortunately had guided Italian communism through the person of Palmiro Togliatti. The confrontation was opened also in the ranks of the PCI where, in keeping with the character of the new party, there were present, alongside the Marxists, men of all philosophical opinions or religious faiths, who accepted the party's political program. Along with Togliatti or Sereni and Alicata, by virtue of the functions which they had to perform, we also had, during the fifties, men who held different philosophical positions, from Banfi to Geymonat, from Galvano della Volpe to Concetto Marchesi. After Togliatti's death, the internal confrontation if anything became more lively, as demonstrated by the different course of the second Gramscian study

conference (Cagliari, April 1967) and the third one (Florence, December 1977). Today there is also a struggle underway inside the PCI, between Marxist and non-Marxist, certainly legitimate but aimed at striking the cultural heritage, accumulated by Italian Marxism, from several directions.

Togliatti was the valued creator of this heritage. He naturally can be discussed and criticized but he cannot be ignored. He had to tackle the problems of building in Italy a republican (and parliamentary) state which would guarantee liberty and which thus, by safeguarding liberty, would permit the expression of the will of the Italian people who, with its vote, was called upon to assure the country's transformation. Abandoning this position, artificially sustaining oppositions between representative democracy and direct democracy, between parliament and the movement, along with an underestimation of the country's political leadership, in other words, the problem of government and of the evaluation of changes in the balance of forces expressed by the vote--that means trying to obscure the preeminent value of the vote, that is to say, the political clash between parties, it also means playing down the function and character of our party and it means presenting it as blending with the other parties into a kind of undifferentiated and generic unity of the movement, something which is wrong when it is not based on clear relations between participating parties. That also means, in the final analysis, going back to the extremist theses of the double set of powers when, in Italy, the determining character of the parties is given by their capacity to strengthen the democratic state which is already too weak. Through an underestimation of the liberal and guarantee-oriented character of the constitution, we leave room for the liberal-democratic currents which, in the name of liberty, seek to oppose what they call the PCI's totalitarian design and a historical compromise between the two forces, the communist and the Christian Democrats which, according to their wild accusations, would represent the stifling of the liberties guaranteed in the constitution.

In reality, in the midst of a profound crisis of society, which is the Italian manifestation of a worldwide crisis of exceptional historical significance, Italian culture lost ancient and false certainties, experiences a period of search, doubts, and fragmentation whose character we must clearly grasp because it can be a period of fruitful confrontation or dangerous dissolution. A crisis of the prospect of Italian culture took place after World War I and sprang from the weakness of Italian Marxist culture and the presence of a right-wing culture which issued a strong call for law and order. Today, to arrive at a positive conclusion, it is necessary for the cultural commitment of the democratic forces to be aimed at understanding the character of the present worldwide crisis, to look upon the Italian situation not in an isolated fashion but to evaluate the worldwide significance of the phenomena which characterized the emergency.

In this situation, the greater danger does not reside in the cultural confrontation, even though it may be very lively, and in the open struggle

of ideas, but rather in confusion and ambiguity. We should not be astonished or we should not be shocked that a cultural struggle is also going on within the Communist Party. This is what we wanted. One may of course challenge the Gramsci-Togliatti line but it is wrong to try to corrode and distort its character. The cultural struggle in the parties takes away from the value of the theses of the identity between diverse cultures and certain political forces. It is wrong to confuse the battle of ideas with the political struggles of the party, even though the connections may be evident. Right now, the cultural struggle does not exclusively involve the parties but does take place within the parties also. This is true; and we saw it, in the case of the PCI, where, along with the Marxist direction, we have other tendencies which become blocked in an open and often lively clash. This is true of the DC where, along with the traditional integralist and corporative tendencies, we find new directions, open toward the demands of the most advanced currents of European Catholic thinking and a history-oriented interpretation of the struggle among men. This is true of the PSI whose program reveals--juxtaposed rather than blended--very distinct cultural factors, from a certain traditional socialist Marxism to the liberal-democratic, sociological, or technocratic forms. This is true, I believe, in the Italian Republican Party itself where, along with the directions of idealistic history study, we find positivistic and sociological directions. We therefore do not have and we cannot have a laic ideology corresponding to an indeterminate lay-socialist area.

The thesis of the three cultures is very dangerous in addition to being wrong. If you want to deny or obscure the laic and liberal character of the PCI, which yesterday was and today is the essential force in the struggle for liberty and justice, and if you want to push all of the Catholic forces back into the field of political and social conservatism, then the battle for liberty would surely be lost. Unless we reject the thesis of a laic culture, destined to become the conscience of the worker movement, the brain in a body incapable of having a philosophy of its own. Now, 14 years have passed since my polemic with Norberto Bobbio which at the time created a certain stir and from which was taken the thesis of a single and new party for the working class. In that discussion I forcefully rejected the pretense of certain laic intellectuals who wanted to be the brains in a body for which the workers would have supplied the brawn.

The terms of the polemic have not changed much. The fact is that the problems have become much more serious since 1964. The rate at which the problems get worse certainly is much faster than the worker movement's rate of advance.

Future of Italian Marxism

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 5 August 78 pp 1,2

[Text] There is a struggle underway inside the Communist Party between the Marxist and non-Marxist cultural currents, "aimed at striking the cultural

heritage accumulated by Italian Marxism from several directions." This was written by Giorgio Amendola in the last issue of RINASCITA. The assertions of the authoritative communist leader, contain in a long article that is inspired by a book by Spadolini, in reality have stirred up some of the fundamental political themes, thus coming way ahead of the congressional debate.

Who are the exponents of these non-Marxist cultural currents with whom one must go to the mat? Amendola does not mention any names. But it is easy to identify, in some of the exponents of the antihistorical or irrationalist tendencies (Asor Rosa, Tronti, Cacciari, and Luporini himself) the first objective of the polemic of which, by the way, we had clear manifestations also in the course of the last PCI Central Committee meeting.

But is this only a cultural struggle or are perhaps not other aspects and topics, more properly political, involved here? This is not the first time that a political debate has broken out early in the PCI or has been covered up by a cultural or ideological "quarrel."

Nor can the situation improve in view of the stresses to which the Communist Party is subjected during this phase of slow transition from opposition to government. If this is true, then Amendola's target consists not only of the philosophers but, more specifically of those political leaders who, inside the PCI, have demonstrated an open-minded approach and understanding for the most diverse cultural currents, frequently sponsoring their written expressions in the party's magazine. Among those leaders it is easy to identify Aldo Tortorella, the man in charge of culture at the PCI.

Amendola claims for Marxist culture the congruity of the definition of being "laic", if by that we mean "the independence of thought from any extraterrestrial or irrationalist vision of the world and the preeminence given to man and his work." Amendola adds that Togliatti was the interpreter and promoter of this laicity of Italian communism.

The communist leaders who have been challenged here defend themselves by replying that the now definitive recognition of the laicity of Marxist culture must make it possible to admit that there can no longer be any sacred texts for us and even less so any authorized interpreters. Marxism certainly is a part of the PCI's ideological, cultural, and political heritage but it can assert itself only through constant confrontation with all of the various currents of thought, without any preconceived exclusions and even less so without any aprioristic condemnation. The debate must be carried out amid full liberty and must be an authentic debate in which everybody can freely tackle the positions of the others. "Laicity," in summary, as a guarantee of pluralism and liberty. But more pungent comments keep coming out from those who can be identified with the target of Amendola's polemic. Regarding Amendola himself, it

was observed that his "orthodoxy" is contradicted by his positions on economic policy, which are certainly closer to the liberal-democratic traditions than to Marxist doctrine.

The Berlinguer interview and the Amendola article however opened the way to the precongressional debate.

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BERLINGUER'S LENINIST PURGE CREATES IDEOLOGICAL VACUUM

Theoretical Validity of Leninism

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 3 Aug 78 pp 1, 2

[Article by Enzo Forcella: "Berlinguer Interview Revives Debate Within Left"]

[Text] What should our opinion be with regard to the long and exacting interview which Enrico Berlinguer gave to this newspaper's managing editor yesterday? Is this another step forward in the very slow but constant march through the institutions which the Italian Communists have now undertaken for several decades or is this just a harmless repetition of earlier positions, a stop along the way or perhaps even a step backward?

And then, taking into account the fact that the day-to-day concrete and prosaic political battle in Italy always needed to cloak itself in ideological justifications or hide behind theoretical conflicts--what does this interview mean "politically," what adjustments in the targeting does it outline in the attitude of the PCI and, by the same token, in that of the entire left-wing lineup?

These are questions which presumably will be with us throughout the entire summer. It is therefore impossible to answer those questions exhaustively, off the cuff. I will confine myself to an impression of a general character and at the same time I will indicate one of the possible keys to the way one ought to read that interview.

It seems to me that we must make an effort to distinguish rather clearly between what Berlinguer, in his answer, tends--I would not say to confuse--but certainly to keep in a very fluid and interchangeable stage: the theoretical portion, the historical portion and the more strictly political portion.

Leninism's theoretical vitality (the Leninism of today, in the world of mass societies with advanced industrial establishments and superpowers with planetary dimensions) evidently is something very different from its

historical evaluation. And the latter, in turn, does not have much in common with the policy of emergency, the historical compromise, the problem of the South, youth employment, and the other great issues of Italian politics.

We have all of these things, obviously, and there is no break in continuity also between theory, history, and political practice. But the interconnection and links are very much more indirect and complex than Berlinguer's words might make seem them appear. Overlooking the complexity of these interconnections and interrelationships means remaining entangled in the subtle, elegant, but also substantially mystifying operation suggested by the interview. To put it just in a few words, this operation involves accepting the meeting ground proposed by the socialists--the ground having to do with theoretical divergences--in order to conceal or at least to skip over the substantive political divergences.

Lenin--says Berlinguer-- is a teacher for the Italian communists, not a dogma. It is absurd to ask us for condemnation and abjurations but we do know how to distinguish in his teachings that which is alive from that which is dead, and we then behave accordingly.

Its revolutionary perspective, its concept of political activity as an activity directed at overthrowing bourgeois rules and putting together an economic, social, and government establishment which will no longer be capitalist--those things in it are alive. What is dead however is its instrumental concept of democracy and its formal liberties which the Italian communists instead consider to be universal and permanent values, to be made evermore widespread and substantial.

Is this little or is this a lot? It seems to me that we can ask for no more and nothing different, I would not say, from a communist leader, but not from any left-wing leader either who intends to remain within the range of Marxism, that is to say, within the perspective of a strategy committed to the fight against the bourgeoisie and the defeat of capitalism.

But the problems are different. On the one hand, they involve the problems of the judgements to be made and the subsequent political forms of behavior to be assumed with regard to those communist parties and countries where Leninism instead not only remains a dogma but is a dogma that is conjugated in the version of the Stalinist Vulgate. On the other hand, there is the problem of making the revolutionary commitment merge with the permanent values of bourgeois society, in other words, there is the problem of how one could specifically set up the socialist state, the pluralism of the parties, relations between individual rights and social duties, in summary, the entire theme complex with which the old and the new Marxism have been grappling, not just from today on.

It is clear that Berlinguer and the communists have every right to reject the examinations of democratic maturity conducted on this basis and with these arguments. Justifying the rejection of their participation in the government, in the name of bonds with Leninism, of the distance from the model of the West, means going back 10 or 15 years.

But it is furthermore clear that removing from the field all of those pretexts or, as Berlinguer calls them, all of those provocations, does not mean or should not mean saying that the communists are right on all of the other levels, it should not mean approving their present strategy, it should not mean closing one's eyes to their errors, their insufficiencies, the frailty of the theoretical assumptions on which they base their political and program choices.

We are in many ways convinced that the socialist alternative is not practicable on short notice and that the hostility of the communist is not determined by their pretended Leninism, their desire to snuff out individual liberties under the hood of the two churches. But this cannot prevent us from recording the impracticability of the historical compromise, the contradictions in the economic, political, and sociological diagnoses on which it is based, the price which must be paid by the entire lineup of the Italian left--without anything in return.

If Berlinguer is indeed convinced--as he says, in giving Scalfari his authentic interpretation of the compromise--that a profound renewal of the structures, of public morality, and of social organization will not be possible without an accord of the left-wing forces with the Christian Democrats, then it is certainly a good idea for us to be at peace and once and for all to renounce renewal itself. The biggest insolence with regard to the principal partner in the emergency majority, which is announced and hinted at in this interview, either serves only to silence the grumblers in the rank and file with a view to the coming congress or will inevitably, on short notice, lead the Italian communists into the clash which has been started up or postponed several times.

Lenin Loses to Gramsci

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 5 Aug 78 p 6

[Article by Di Gianni Baget Bozzo: "Berlinguer's Long March"]

[Text] The central point in the interview Berlinguer gave to Scalfari is the declaration pertaining to the revision of Article 5 of the PCI Statutes: "The phrase talking about Marxism-Leninism should be replaced with a different formulation which, in a more correct and up-to-date manner, would bring out our entire ideological heritage." That "ideological heritage" was first expanded by Berlinguer until it became a global reading of modern culture in Italy; it tends "to comprehend and transmit the sense and direction of our national history." The Gramscian tradition immediately becomes

a historical reading of the PCI's Leninist roots through a classical quotation from "Il Principe" by Machiavelli. For Berlinguer, the PCI is substantially identified by its history: Leninism represents only the point of origin, the necessary break away from the matrix in order to reach autonomy but it is not the form and the figure of that which is alive. Gramsci is thus utilized to the fullest extent: the PCI aspires to being a cultural figure, before being a political figure and, in that sense, it is as a culture, and not as a party, that the PCI defines itself in first place. And it is in these terms that it poses the problem of hegemony in the Gramscian style.

In the face of the split between culture and politics--which, for example, is being experienced thoroughly and completely by the Christian Democrats--Berlinguer poses the problem of a reading of national tradition, hence, of a culture, as the very foundation of the party's figure. The operation is so unusual as to turn out to be misguiding so that the Berlinguer interview was commented upon primarily because of its less revealing part and more as an opportunity for an immediate polemic with the PCI.

But the problem of how to read this is a different one; it is the problem of how to preserve the party's Leninist shape after Leninism's theoretical content has now become impracticable for decades (in Russia, as elsewhere). The formula of the party, where the proletariat finds its cultural autonomy and proposes it to the country as a national culture is, it seems to me, the Berlinguerian definition. It distinguishes the PCI not only from the electioneering party, which boils down to the political and social interests to be advanced, and from the party which expresses itself exclusively through the control and inspiration of the activities of the state.

The criticism of Berlinguer's formula may come on the cultural level and on the political level. On the cultural level, does not going back to Gramsci so energetically mean going back to an idealistic and history-oriented culture of which no trace is left in Italy? On the political level, the reference to tradition does not tell us much about the effective choices which the PCI is called upon to make. Rather, a call for national tradition which is as clear as all that could be accused of practicing an ecumenism which is so broad as to lose or water down the thing that is specifically "proletarian" in communist tradition.

We must however note that the type of party which the communists have built is one of the forces that best withstood the crisis which, during the sixties and seventies, engulfed the West and which rapidly consumed the institutional dimension. The Communist Party managed to increase and maintain an area of loyalty when all of the loyalties had declined. The type of critical and individualistic culture, which prevails today in the West, makes the consensus rather a slim and unsteady thing and therefore wears down the political dimension, leaving room for pure power. The PCI today, more than any other social gathering, in Italy defends the dimension

of the party as an institution which is a dimension that is essential to the organization of the consensus and hence to the democratic nature of the state.

As for the rest, the PCI's culture is no less disintegrated than Italy's other cultures; the PCI exists thanks to an obscure loyalty of a grass-roots militancy which defends itself from criticism and which is becoming bureaucratized but, in doing so, makes the institutional spaces possible. Undoubtedly, the polemic with Italian socialism is a part of that same definition of a party which was born from a split of the old socialist trunk. Apart from the immediate political motivations, this polemic is included in any definition of the PCI which is based on history and on tradition. This inevitable discussion however confronts the communists permanently with the "socialist issue": what did the PSI save and what did the PCI lose as a result of the Livorno split? Such a debate is destined to remain open today as in the past, in the same terms as in the past: and it is almost moving to see Berlinguer, in 1978, use the same arguments that Gramsci employed in 1921.

Leninism also was the PCI's link with the Communist International and with the Soviet Union. This problem was taken up entirely too laterally in the interview although it is an essential problem. The PCI, especially through Togliatti, represented one of the key points of contact between the Soviet Union and the Communist International.

It is because of this particular authoritarianism of the PCI in the world of Soviet history that the Italian party is obligated to comply with a particular sense of measurement in its formulas. The break with Stalinism has its legitimacy in the Soviet party itself; but for the PCI to deny the socialist character of the Soviet Union would involve the most radical of communist splits and, in the Soviet party, would have consequences that would be much more serious than the Yugoslav break and the Chinese one.

The French Communist Party's Trottskyite sympathies, like the formulas of Santiago Carrillo in "Comunismo e Stato" [Communism and the State], produced no echo in the PCI which alerts us to the responsibility of its particular position in the history of international communism. A split between the PCI and the CPSU would mean the explicit and formalized end of that which remains of the idea of an international communism, different from the imperial sphere of influence of the Soviet Union; that would modify the ideological equilibrium of the CPSU and hence, perhaps, the power balance in the Soviet Union. It is in Italy that the Eurocommunist question could become incandescent; and the German Social Democratic Party is wise in noting that this would not be good for Europe.

This explains Berlinguer's reservation on that score although it is inevitable that the Italian political forces should concentrate their attention and dissent on that. The Scalfari interview is another portion, therefore, in the long Western march of the party to the East: it is seen as having

been written from inside the PCI although it is aimed at the entire Italian left, through LA REPUBBLICA.

Italian Socialism, Capitalism Reanalyzed

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 6-7 Aug 78 p 1

[Article by Eugenio Scalfari: "The Italian Left Between Lenin and Bad Godesberg"]

[Text] The interview of the PCI secretary in LA REPUBBLICA triggered countless comments, as was to be expected. The breadth of the discourse, the half ideological and half political approach, the presumable addressees inside and outside the party, the unusual place of the interview--because it is the practice for the PCI secretary not to give any interviews to newspapers that do not belong to the party, except on the occasion of political election campaigns--all this means that this document is exceptionally juicy and therefore could not go unnoticed and this, in turn, caused political commentators and forces to engage in a careful analysis.

The person who had the professional job of recording Enrico Berlinguer's thinking and therefore to note--beyond the spoken word--also the inflection, the reticence, the boldness, the uncertainty and the underscoring by which the remarks were accompanied, may therefore be permitted to express his own objective and motivated opinion. It seems to me that there is all the more need for that especially since the comments available so far revolved around certain parts and did not involve a serious examination of the problems raised by the interview itself. Thus we saw that the Christian Democratic leaders substantially credited Berlinguer with a noteworthy effort of ideological innovation and democratic responsibility and underscored the irrevocability of his European choice; we saw the republicans and those socialists, who do not follow the Craxian line, adopt a similar attitude. On the other hand it is quite proper that the severest judgments should have come from this latter sector, accompanied by identical estimates from the social democrats, the liberals, and those splinters of the extreme left which for some time have been looking to the PSI as if at an assumption of politically useful work.

Independently of the merit of the theses sustained by Berlinguer, his interview had the effect of identifying two embryonic lineups more clearly than on earlier occasions: DC [Christian Democratic Party]-PCI-PRI [Italian Republic Party], on the one hand, PSI [Italian Socialist Party]-PSDI [Independent Social Democratic Party]-PLI [Italian Liberal Party] and a portion of the new left, on the other hand; these are potential lineups which, on the right and on the left, run through the present parliamentary majority and in various degrees influence its actions and decisions.

On the other hand, the two lineups which we indicated above, in turn, are far from being compact inside and--above all--within the respective parties constituting them. The most ragged from this viewpoint certainly is the Christian Democratic "archipelago," where the assumption of a preferential accord with the socialists now constitutes the more or less explicit cement or almost the signal of recognition of Zaccagnini's adversaries, although the leadership group had greatly strengthened its position, henceforth having stably associated the bulk of the Doroteo current with its own policy.

But there is no lack of critical ferments also in the Socialist Party and, on the extreme left, there is no lack of those who prefer an attempt to get the PCI back to a less reformist and more revolutionary strategy, over the Craxian demand.

Italian politics will have to come to grips during the coming months with these emerging dynamics. And that will not be easy while we are beset with tough situations and serious problems, such as the "plunge" in monetary Europe, the deterioration of detente, the emerging shadows of after-Tito, and, as far as we are concerned right here, the proliferation of the "armed party," the economic and social decline of the South, youth employment, the disaster in public finance, and the growing inefficiency of public administration.

In order to face these problem areas with some hope of success, the national unity majority must put aside its internal rivalries and unsparingly dedicate itself to the tremendous task of rebuilding the state. Beyond the nominalist disputes which divide the experts, this is perhaps the one concrete point which ties the Berlinguerian concept of the historical compromise to our present reality. But in my view the PCI secretary makes the mistake of theorizing on this "moment"--which is certainly destined to last in terms of time because the problems to be solved are by no means few in number, nor are they minor--as a permanent thing although, correcting his original statement, he sets it up in various parliamentary and government formulas. Berlinguer is neither a candidate nor an absent-minded person. He is only too familiar with the resistance which his theory of the lasting situation has caused and will cause. Why, then, does he deliberately make a mistake of this kind? That is the point which the interview will help us understand.

The PCI's central problem--in spite of its secretary's denials--is still the problem of legitimization. Berlinguer asserts--and in my opinion he is right--that the PCI need not go into any examinations of democracy. In the conversation we had he told me at a certain point: "The Constitution of the Republic bears the signature of Umberto Terracini. What kind of democratic legitimization are we supposed to supply? And besides we have the history of half a century behind us which is our witness."

Correct. We must not be afraid of any attacks against the state, against parliament, against democracy from the PCI. Is this certainty sufficient to legitimize it as a governing force? Signorile replies: "Yes; in emergency and national unity government, not in governments of left-wing alternative, where the moderate backing of the DC would be absent."

And Signorile is also right. But what would be necessary so that this legitimization "to govern without moderate backing" could be obtained?

The socialist answer is clear: it is necessary to deny Leninism "in toto." But what does denying Leninism mean? This is the point on which we are debating.

In the interview, Berlinguer "denies" Leninism "if, by that term, we mean a dogmatic body to be applied acritically." In reality, he said much more although he tried to hide it between the lines. He said: "Lenin thought that democracy was one of the superstructure forms of capitalism. We are fighting capitalism and we want to wipe it out, but, in contrast to Lenin, we think that democracy is a permanent value which the working class must defend at all costs." Here is an essential difference between Leninism and the position illustrated by Berlinguer. Can one go further?

Certainly, one can. One can, if one arrives at the declaration that there are no longer any differences between the socialists and the communists and if the communists agree to return to the old channel of the "parent company" abandoned at Livorno in 1921.

The communists as a matter of fact are ready to make a step of such dimensions. But here it is necessary to introduce another question, this time directed at the socialists: Have the socialists remained the same or have they changed their skin between 1921 and today? The answer is entirely too obvious. Halfway along the way there is a general Bad Godesberg, that is to say, halfway, on the socialist side or--to be more precise--on the social democratic side, where we find the acceptance of the capitalist system as the structural base to be reformed and to be managed but not to be torn down. If the Italian communists were "totally" to deny Leninism and if the Italian socialists were once again to include in their specific programs the objective of wiping out capitalism, then there would indeed be no longer any differences between the two parties and they could meet halfway.

But then--and this is something which Signorile did not say although he knew it only too well--a left of this kind would have lost--in spite of the abandonment of Leninism--the legitimization to govern the capitalist system even though it has been reformed. The experiment, if attempted, would probably end up in a manner similar to the Chilean one which is still fresh in our memories.

This is why the problem, as we arrive at this point, is not the problem of answering whether Lenin did or did not have the tail and the horns of the devil. The problem is to find out whether the left-wing alternative is proposed as an "internal" fact in the capitalist system or as an "external" fact.

This is a long debate. To the extent that an information newspaper can do so, we will conduct it every day on specific cases. But it is certainly a more complicated problem than deciding whether to say that the Berlinguer interview was sufficient or insufficient in terms of democracy.

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AFTERMATH OF BERLINGUER INTERVIEW: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HISTORIC COMPROMISE

Historic Compromise With Capitalism

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 13-14 Aug 78 p 6

[Article by Giorgio Ruffolo: "Historical Compromise--But With Capitalism"]

[Text] Is the policy of the left proposed as a fact inside capitalism or as an outside fact? To this question, which Scalfari asks in relation to the Berlinguer interview, Napoleoni responds by observing, in substance, it seems to me, that the traditional question--reforms inside the system or reform of the system--loses much of its significance the moment it is the system itself that is no longer there. Can we still talk of a capitalist system? Perhaps not. If it is true, in fact, that the dominant form of production remains the capitalist form, then it is also true that it is increasingly incapable of self-expansion. And this is so because of the evermore stringent links deriving from the increase in the contract-negotiating power of the wage workers and the producers of raw materials, the uncontrollability of technological development by the enterprises and, above all, the change in "capitalist" values which characterized bourgeois society. In summary, the costs and the risks have gone up and the motivations have gone down. These historical and cultural phenomena are behind the crisis of capitalist accumulation.

However, since these changes are nothing but the logical development of the egalitarian democracy of our time, we may ask ourselves whether capitalism has become incompatible with the development of democracy, and, naturally, viceversa.

This is the question which the wise men of the "Trilateral Conference" asked themselves in a well-known report on the "Crisis of Democracy." Observing, in their ascetic language, that the political demand (that is to say, democracy) is beyond the response capabilities of the institutions (that is to say, capitalism), they arrived at the logical although conservative conclusion that it is necessary to slow down or downright to repress the political demand. In other words, going back to more or less authoritarian solutions.

It seems to me that the otherwise logical response from the left would have to show a different sign: if the political demand has become incompatible with the capitalist institutions, it is the latter that must be changed.

This opens up two problems--the problem of the project draft and the problem of the strategy. The left must sell out a project draft for a new social and institutional setup which would reconcile the democratic and egalitarian aspirations with balanced economic growth. Furthermore, since the project is not carried out instantaneously the moment you take over the "palace," it needs a strategy of change which will make it possible to develop the new institutions without blocking growth. This, in summary--reviving a concept which I have already expressed in this newspaper--calls for a historical compromise with capitalism. And this is what Napoleoni proposes in substance when he asserts the need for giving the market and the enterprises back their functional nature, although within the context of a design for the democratic transformation of the social and political structures which in long-range terms transcends "capitalist culture."

Is this compromise possible? In schematic terms, I believe it is possible, on three conditions: (a) that we are capable of guaranteeing the enterprises an evolution of costs and adequate manpower mobility; and, if we do not want to adopt suicidal, repressive policies, this involves new public manpower supply management institutions; (b) that we be in a position to launch a process of autonomous investments, aimed at the satisfaction of the most urgent social needs; (c) that we be able to promote the major reforms spelled out in the draft from the very beginning. These three conditions, in turn, demand a fourth one: the adoption of a planned direction for the economy, that is to say, an overall, long-term and operational economic policy instead of the fragmentary, daily, and combining policy which is so often implemented and which we swap for "realistic politics."

When Berlinguer points to the elimination of capitalism as an objective of the left and declares that this will be done in a new direction with respect to the Soviet and social democratic experiences, we can then agree that his party should not let it go at these generic declarations and that it commit itself--as the Socialist Party has already begun to do--in the direction toward an explicit definition of the society blueprint and the concrete terms of a "historical compromise with capitalism."

If the communists are so reticent on both of these terms, this is certainly not out of a lack of capacity and intellectual instruments. May we advance an objective explanation of their slowness? With regard to the definition of a society blueprint, that would make it necessary to drop the equivocation of rhetorical (reformist and conservative, Leninist and democratic) phraseology in order to come up with a concrete configuration for the "possible socialism" of the 20th century. As far as strategy is concerned,

the historical compromise with capitalism--which is necessary to make a reformed capitalism effective--would force us to abandon the political' compromise now in progress with the most retrograde capitalism.

Historic Compromise: Further Implications

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 10 Aug 78 p 2

[Article by u. b.: "Polemical Brawling Between Republicans and Social Democrats"]

[Text] Biasini: "The historical compromise is not an accord between the DC and the PCI but an understanding of the communist with the entire constitutional spectrum." Minor debate with Fanfani followers.

"It should henceforth be clear: the historical compromise is not a bi-lateral accord between the DC and the PCI, even with the PRI [Italian Republican Party] as the whipped cream topping on the cake, but rather an understanding between the PCI and the entire constitutional spectrum." This is how PRI secretary Biasini yesterday, in LA REPUBBLICA--in the course of a telephone interview given from Cesena where he was on vacation--replied to those who want "instrumentally to continue an unfounded polemic against a verbal formula, ignoring or concealing the real terms of the debate."

The real problem is the problem of relations between democracy and the left in Italy, continued the republican secretary and that concerns everybody, including the PCI: "Otherwise we run the risk of winding up talking, in one way or another, of the assumption of a more or less camouflaged formula of the left-of-center government. Nevertheless, especially after Berlinguer's interview in LA REPUBBLICA, the accusation which has been made against us, to the effect that we are flirting with the historical compromise, is clearly made in bad faith. Berlinguer had definitely made it clear that the historical compromise is a strategy which does not place the communists in front of the DC alone but in front of all Italian democracy."

With these words, Biasini cut short a series of accusations which had in recent times been made against the PRI especially by the socialists. With regard to the PSI ("I however would not want to feed a polemic between us and the socialists") and the PSDI, Biasini says: "The PSDI seems completely committed to one line, the line of the socialist area, and one cannot really understand what it is and where it leads. The socialist behavior presents wide areas of ambiguity and strategic uncertainty and more in the nature of winks and allusions, rather than clear political indications. Are they for a left-wing alternative, for close unity with the PCI or are they in favor of other solutions? And what is the meaning

of the interest in Craxi as expressed so clearly and often so enthusiastically by certain moderate sectors throughout the country? These are the reasons why the conditions for a laic-socialist understanding collapsed."

Newsmen went out in search of reactions from the socialists along Corso Street, the location of PSI headquarters in Rome, but there they only found the Hon. Colucci whom the agencies call a "most loyal follower of Craxi." Colucci did not have to be coaxed to reply, "it depends on the pulpit from which the sermon comes. These are just summertime things. As far as the PRI is concerned, they evidently believe that not too distant or still present outbursts of enthusiasm from men such as Carli and Agnelli and other Italian big businessmen, illuminated by the party of Ivy, were or are being sustained by a careful re-reading of the writings of Karl Marx with a subsequent self-criticism. It might perhaps be that the politicians at Ferragosto went on vacation in places that cannot be reached by the poor newspaper people."

The heat of August is also the topic of a short lead article which VOCE REPUBBLICANA devotes to PSDI secretary Romita in connection with the bizarre statement released by the former the day before yesterday regarding the serious connections between the succession to Pope Paul VI and the "dialectic inside the left." The republican organ wrote that "as Ferragosto draws closer, the Hon. Romita offers us new and exalting confirmations of his own political genius." But Romita does not let go and in a new, very lengthy and syntactically complicated statement, confirms that "any possibility of getting out of a political situation which, no matter how you look at it, remains characterized by the dominant presence of the DC, the PCI, and their understanding, must involve strengthening an alternative position, which, to be perfectly different from that of the DC, cannot be only laic but must also be progressive and reform-oriented and, to be perfectly different from that of the PCI, must be securely anchored to the democratic values and traditions of the West. In other words, a position inspired by the ideals and objectives of democratic socialism." In substance, one can guess that Romita in 1978 proposes what failed miserably during the sixties--in other words, a PSDI-PSI bloc. But not even Saragat dreams about that any longer. This is however being dreamed--and this can be a consolation for Romita--by the liberal deputy secretary Biondi who, in his statement, proposes that the "bloc" be enlarged also to include the PLI [Italian Liberal Party].

The new DC chairman Piccoli sent a rather voluminous circular to the regional and provincial secretaries. Here we can read a not too allusive polemic with the newly rising Fanfani group where, hoping for complete and strong party unity, it is asserted that we need a renewal (which would exclude the old castling, the personalisms, and which would imply realism and humility, a perception of history and not occasional flashes of lightning, which would expel beyond our walls the apriorisms, the divisions over schemes, and the fiery suggestions."

In connection with the debates on the government, which a recent declaration by Biasini was presumably designed to revive, Biasini himself asserts that he had in effect released the interview in whose course he asserted that the government so far "has done little or nothing" but that he had done so almost 20 days ago, at a completely different political moment, and that those words therefore have no meaning today. That is the fault of the newspaper which only the day before yesterday published that old interview.

Implications for Catholic Vote

Rome AVANTI in Italian 11 Aug 78 p 8

[Article by Ruggero Orfei: "Who and Where Are the Catholics For Enrico Berlinguer?"]

[Text] The interview of the Hon. Berlinguer in LA REPUBBLICA on 2 August would have deserved another thesis in order to give rise to discussions which would not run out in the form of very simple challenges. The PCI secretary's answers contain many questions which are intertwined and which are rather awkward in terms of their specific definition.

I will skip over the polemic with the PCI which, all in all, is less interesting since it is an implicit rather than explicit conclusion for a broader line of reasoning. I will also overlook the question of Leninism because Berlinguer's answers repeat a stereotype which is interesting only to the extent that it reveals the presence of a problem that should be solved.

The problem which in my opinion deserves special attention is the problem pertaining to the idea that Berlinguer--and with him, all communists--have developed for themselves and retain with regard to those Catholics who intend to commit themselves to political action without denying their faith in any choice which they make.

The PCI secretary maintains that the idea of the alternative cannot be sustained and is even impracticable because of the presence of two special issues, the Catholic issue and the communist issue. The repeated insistence on this presumed fact applies generally only to communists who perceive two political presences as special issues, that is to say, as unresolved problems. But the listing by itself would be sterile and there would be no way out if the PCI leader himself later on had not added that reforms in Italy cannot be instituted "without the accord of the major social (workers, productive bourgeoisie, peasants, youth masses, women) and political (communists, socialists, Catholics, lay people) forces."

Now, as a "political force," what significance do the Catholics have or what significance can they assume? The response is there in terms of the context. Since the historical compromise, which is pointed up as the

formula of the unity of all of those components, is specifically expressed in a basic accord with the DC (basic, because the historical compromise is the alternative to the alternative of the left), one must conclude that the DC is "the" party of the Catholics as far as Berlinguer is concerned.

This holds true even if the PCI should surround itself with Catholic sympathizers, even though it may allow some of them to enter parliament with its symbol. This is true to the extent that the PCI seeks to ally itself not with the Catholics, who are interested in change and transformations, but with the party that had given proof of itself (it is not for us to say whether it was good or bad) as nonbeliever in reform, for ideological reasons (which certainly do not involve the Gospel) and which, due to a certain social and historical representation of definite and necessarily partial social interests, is working on a really compromising choice. In practice, the PCI sees to it that its own ideological consistency is not challenged during the phase of formation not only of the leadership framework, which finds its own identity there, but also of the direction.

We obstinately insist on not believing in the DC and on being greatly interested in the success of the left. Personally, moreover, I am not prepared to drop any fragment, even the smallest one, of solidarity inside the Church which I consider different from the DC not only in terms of words.

But then we could also ask ourselves what the DC is in relation to the Christian presence in politics. The DC is one of a number of possible political experiences for Catholic groups. In theory, we could have more Christian parties (as a matter of fact, the Vatican, in 1945, did not establish a dogma on the political unity of the faithful). As a matter of fact, only a portion would recognize itself in the Christian Democratic majority party of De Gasperi.

It is certain that the communists, by not encouraging the Catholics to search for the alternative, are pushing them into the arms of the DC and that the return movement in that direction does exist and is a consistent one. But the PCI cannot entertain any illusions to the effect that it does not have to pay a high price because it has already had some indications of that.

While the topic of the emergency is acceptable, its superposition by the topic of the historical compromise vitiates its roots and opens up a series of contradictions which will work to the advantage of the conservatives and those other forces which are seeking to get out of a division of labor of the kind indicated some time ago by Galloni, who believed in the idea of the worker monopoly of the communists in order, implicitly, to bring out the idea of the monopoly of all the rest.

The communists cannot forget that the "party in arms" is armed also and above all against them. And they cannot forget that the armed party can

be fought peacefully only with a grand alliance of the left which would avoid generic terms such as "popular," "antifascist," and the like.

The communists likewise must make plans (and the debate on Leninism tells us how urgent and how difficult that is) and they must make signals such as those that could tell us that--at least on issues such as very fine gold pensions or the useless agencies that keep going on forever--they display a proven rigidity.

It is not enough for the PCI to accuse everybody of leftism, in the manner of Lenin (the latter talked about leftism and not about extremism in his famous work on the "childhood disease" of communism); it must understand the reasons from which spring certain nonopportunist questions.

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ITALY

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO CRAXI: PSI SECRETARY'S 'ESPRESSO' ARTICLE

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 27 Aug 78 pp 25-29, 98 LD

[Article by Italian Socialist Party Secretary Bettino Craxi]

[Text] Old Proudhon Was Right

The history of socialism is not the history of a homogenous phenomenon. In the course of troubled events, a confused collection of separate but mutually repulsive elements have appeared under the banner of socialism. Stalinism and anti-Stalinism, collectivism and individualism, authoritarianism and anarchy and many other trends have met and opposed each other in the workers movement ever since it first began as a political and class organization. Under certain historical circumstances the various ideological trends have engaged in outright fratricidal war. All the parties, groups and schools of thought claiming to be socialist have taken a hostile stand against capitalism, but this has rarely been enough to overcome the differences and opposition existing among them. The models of society which they put forward as an alternative to capitalist societies were often radically different from each other.

The radical differences between various types of "socialism" became much clearer when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. Opposing views clashed and came to blows. Indeed, some people wanted to unify society by giving the dominant role to the state, while others wanted to strengthen and develop social pluralism and individual freedom. Thus, the old dispute between statist and antistatists, authoritarians and libertarians, collectivists and noncollectivists emerged once again. This split was, broadly speaking, reflected by the existence of two separate international organizations. The first group, in true Jacobin tradition, rallied under the Marxist-Leninist banner, while the second group wanted to stay within the pluralist tradition of Western civilization. From 1919 onward, socialism, even from the organizational viewpoint, had formed into two main streams with many tributaries, and these can be defined more specifically only by an analysis of the history of individual parties. Many people think that the foundations for this split were laid at a very early stage. Some people think it had its roots in the

French Revolution, during which two concepts of the ideal society emerged while the fight against the old regime was being waged: the authoritarian, centralist concept and the libertarian, pluralistic concept. For example, Proudhon tried to isolate the ethicopolitical roots of the latent conflict which was tearing the left apart. In his works Proudhon passionately defends the ideological reasons for the workers' protest against capitalist exploitation and shows an acute awareness of the considerable gap between socialist society and communist society. On the one hand, the communist system tries to suppress the market, establish state control over the whole of society and eliminate any trace of individualism. On the other hand, socialism aims to establish state control of the economy, to strengthen society with regard to the state and to allow full development of the individual personality. Proudhon regarded socialism as the historical successor to liberalism and considered communism to be an "antediluvian absurdity" which, if it took hold, would "Orientalize" European civilization. Proudhon also left a prophetic description of what would happen if the rigid statist and collectivist model became institutionalized: "The public sector would end all private property; association would end all separate associations and absorb them into one single association; competition, turned in on itself, would produce the suppression of competition, and finally collective freedom would swallow up corporative, local and individual freedom." This would give rise to "a compact democracy, apparently based on the dictatorship of the masses, but in which the masses would only have power to guarantee universal servitude according to the formulas and watchwords borrowed from old absolutism, which can be summed up as follows:

"Power sharing;

"Centralization;

"Systematic destruction of any individual, corporative and local views held to be secessionist;

"Inquisitorial police;

"Abolition or at least restriction of the family and, more especially, of inheritance;

"Universal suffrage organized so that it continually supports this sort of anonymous tyranny based on maintaining a predominance of mediocre or even incompetent citizens and stifling independent spirits denounced as suspect and, of course, as a minority group."

These are the terms in which Proudhon describes what socialism ought not to be and what society would become if the collectivist model, based on complete nationalization of the means of production and suppression of the market, were to prevail. History has in fact produced elements which fulfill his prophecy. State socialism set aside all the values, institutions and principles of modern civilization and replaced them with a collectivist,

bureaucratic and authoritarian way of life, in other words, with a premodern system. So much so that many representatives of dissident cultures take their criticism so far as to see in communism, as it has developed historically, a veritable "Oriental restoration."

If the Intellectual Becomes Dictator

But coming to more recent analyses, we would point out that many other intellectuals of the European left have developed this critical line. From Russell to Carlo Rosselli to Cole, we receive a single stimulus which urges us not to confuse socialism with communism, full freedom extended to all men with so-called collective freedom, or the historical transcendence of liberalism with its destruction. The authoritarian nature of what is called "real or mature socialism" is not a deviation from the doctrine, a degeneration stemming from a certain number of errors, but the placing in a specific context of the logical implications of the rigidly collectivist approach originally adopted. An examination of the essential foundations of Leninism can only confirm these theses.

Up until the publication of "What Is To Be Done?" Lenin was essentially an orthodox Marxist: He believed that socialism would be realized only in advanced capitalist societies and only on condition that the working class had reached a high degree of political consciousness and cultural maturity. But in "What Is To Be Done?" these theses are literally turned inside out. From the theory and practice of European democratic socialism he moves on to a revolutionary and Jacobin revolutionary plan. Lenin himself defines the Marxist revolutionary as "a Jacobin at the service of the working class" and proposes the creation of a party composed exclusively of "professional revolutionaries." Thus, from having been the historical task of the working class, socialism becomes something to be thought about, studied and directed by a select elite of individuals placed above the masses.

Lenin begins by identifying two forms or levels of perception of reality: "spontaneity" and "awareness." Only the latter permits the forecasting of the ultimate ends of history. Subsequently, Lenin states peremptorily that the workers cannot have the kind of view of reality that depends on awareness, since they lack philosophical and scientific knowledge. Left to their spontaneous tendencies, they are condemned to move within the context of the laws of the system. At most they can reach a "syndical awareness" of their immediate interests but not a political awareness, which can only be produced outside their class condition. And, still according to Lenin, the "outside bearers" of "correct awareness" are the intellectuals. They therefore have the historical role of organizing and leading the workers movement.

Given these premises, obviously the revolutionary subject cannot be the working class but the chosen body of intellectuals who have devoted themselves to the communist revolution. The danger which the Russian anarchists emphasized most vigorously, namely, of the working class being "colonized" by the

declassé intellectuals who were entering the socialist movement as "tribunes of the people," became a reality with "What Is To Be Done?" Indeed, Lenin theorizes very frankly on the right and duty of the intellectuals, guided by "Marxist science," to place the working class under their own leadership. The historic mission which Marx entrusted to the proletariat was to be taken up by the revolutionary intelligentsia.

It is easy to understand why Trotzkiy, Plekhanov, Martov and Rosa Luxemburg accused Lenin of "substitutism."

In their eyes the Leninist idea of subordinating the working elite appeared to be a reversal of Marxism and a return to the Jacobin tradition. Trotzkiy in particular stigmatized Leninist theory, because it confused the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with "dictatorship over the proletariat" and entrusted the historical task of building socialism not "to the working class endowed with initiative which has taken the future of society in hand, but to a strong, authoritarian organization which dominates the proletariat and, through it, society." It was Trotzkiy the Menshevik who foresaw that the factional spirit and Jacobin Manichaeism which Lenin wanted to introduce into the workers movement would have disastrous consequences.

In effect, "What Is To Be Done?" seemed to many to be an aggressive revival of Robespierre's plan, which many European socialist schools had already described as a kind of pseudosocialist despotism. The party model devised by Lenin is an institution rendered monolithic by the shackles of orthodoxy and the principle of absolute and unconditional subordination of the individual will to the collective will. Right from its birth the Bolshevik Party was an organization characterized by iron discipline and committed to the worldwide dissemination of "scientific socialism," interpreted as a salvation-style doctrine, in other words, a sect of "true believers" who in the name of the proletariat, considered that it had the right and duty to impose its total domination over society in order to regenerate it.

Is Communism Always Totalitarian?

None other than Rosa Luxemburg described the elitist and bureaucratic consequences which stem from such a concept: "A ruthless centralism, whose fundamental principle is, on the one hand, the clear prominence of the organized band of declared, active revolutionaries and their separation from the surrounding environment, which, although active in revolutionary terms, is not organized; and, on the other hand, rigid discipline and the direct, decisive, crucial interference by the central bodies in all the main activities of the party's local organizations... to lock the movement into the shell of bureaucratic centralism, which reduces the militant proletariat to the docile instrument of a committee." This is tantamount to saying that Leninism is not at all, as is often claimed quite wrongly, the ideology of the working class, but a philosophical justification of the historical right of intellectuals to govern the working masses autocratically. Hence the verdict of Russian revolutionary Volodya Smirnov: "Lenin was never the

proletariat's ideologist: from first to last he was never anything but an ideologist of the intelligentsia." A verdict which was reiterated during the period of student protests by Gabriel and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who described "What Is To Be Done?" as "the theoretical justification for the violation of the working class" and saw Stalin as the logical successor to Lenin's work: "To decapitate the proletariat and put the party at the head of the revolution."

In the circumstances it is no wonder that the exercise of power by the Bolshevik Party did not give rise to "the first proletarian state in history," as people often claim, distorting the truth more or less knowingly. Leninist "substitutism"--that is, the principle that the "conscious vanguard" must command and the masses must obey--produced its entirely logical results. As Isaak Deutscher wrote, "Because the working class was not there (where it should have been to exercise leadership), the Bolsheviks decided to act as its lieutenants and trustees until such time as life became more normal and a new working class established itself and developed. This road naturally led to the dictatorship of bureaucracy, uncontrolled power and corruption through power."

But, it must be reiterated, this paradoxical phenomenon--the dictatorship of the proletariat without the proletariat, the "dictatorship by proxy" exercised in the name of and on behalf of that class--cannot be looked upon as an unforeseen and unforeseeable consequence. It was Trotskiy the Menshevik who wrote again in 1904 that if Lenin's plan were achieved "the party would be replaced by the party organization, the organization would in turn be replaced by the Central Committee and the committee would eventually be replaced by the dictator."

With the historical and political success of Leninism, Jacobin logic, with all its old and new ingredients which lead toward revolutionary dictatorship, took predominance over the pluralist, democratic logic of socialism, and Russia moved along the path of bureaucratic, totalitarian collectivism.

Now, given that the ultimate goal indicated by Lenin was the classless, stateless society, one could speak of a "heterogenesis of aims," in the sense that the methods used have swallowed up the ideal. From this viewpoint Leninism in power demonstrates that it is not possible to separate the means from the ends and that history is not "rational" but "ironic" and even "cruel." But in reality the conflict between Bolshevism and democratic socialism was not a simple conflict over the means which must be used to progress toward the ideal society. This conflict undoubtedly was one of the factors responsible for the sharp demarcation within the labor movement, but it certainly was not the decisive one. There is a substantial incompatibility between Leninist communism and socialism which can be summed up in the contrast between collectivism and pluralism. Leninism, like all forms of communism, is dominated by the ideal of a homogeneous, compact, organic, undifferentiated society. Leninism contains the conviction that human nature has been degraded by the emergence of private property, which caused the primitive community to

disintegrate and triggered class war. And above all it contains the desire to recreate this original unity by giving the collective will priority over the individual will and the general interest priority over private interests. In this sense communism is essentially totalitarian in that it postulates the possibility of establishing such a harmonious social system that it can do without the state and its methods of coercion. This "totalitarianism with consent" must, however, be preceded by "totalitarianism with coercion." Lenin had no hesitation in describing the Bolshevik Party's dictatorship as "a system which depends directly on violence and is not bound by any law."

Also, the final goal remains a society without the state, that is, "the earthly paradise" (Lenin) following the "resurrection of mankind" (Bukharin). Therefore, one can say that the final goal indicated by communism is "a kingdom of God without God," that is, the real building of the millenarian kingdom of peace and justice illusorily promised by Judeo-Christian messianism. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Gramsci came to define Marxism as "the religion which will kill Christianity," fulfilling his arousing promises and translating the ideal of a perfect society from a potential into a reality.

If this interpretation of Leninism is correct, then the contrast between socialism and communism is certainly very great. Leninist communism has palingenetic aims: it is a religion, disguised as a science, which claims to have found an answer to all the problems of human life. This is why it has been unable to tolerate rivals and is, in a word, "totalitarian." Milovan Djilas and Gilles Martinet have stressed this convincingly: Leninism, insofar as it aspires to regenerate human nature, create a world purged of everything negative and put an end to the outrage of evil, is a millenarian doctrine which, once in power, cannot fail to produce an ideological state backed by a caste.

Gramsci theorized without circumlocutions on the "totalitarian" and even "divine" nature of the Communist Party, which he deliberately defined as "the focus of faith and the custodian of the doctrine of scientific socialism." The Marxist-Leninist party, inasmuch as it enshrines the plan for the total disalienation of mankind, is a charismatic institution which embodies all the truths and the entire morality of history. It expresses the ethic and the science of the "ideal proletariat," which must guide the "real proletariat" and "indicate" to it "the road to salvation" (as stated in the resolution of the Second Comintern Congress). It holds "the keys of history," since it directs its action in light of the only doctrine which is both scientific and redemptive at the same time. Therefore, communism cannot come to terms with the critical spirit, methodical doubt or the plurality of philosophies--in other words, with everything which represents the cultural heritage of Western, nonconfessional and liberal civilization. As Bertrand Russel used to point out to those who held a mythological view of Marxism-Leninism, it is based on the idea that there must be an ideological authority (the party) which self-critically establishes the borderlines separating good from bad, right from wrong, the useful from the damaging. Hence Marxism's elevation

to an (obligatory) state philosophy, the institutionalization of the revolutionary inquisition and the relentless and pitiless struggle against deviationists, dissidents and heretics.

Compared with communist orthodoxy, socialism is democratic, nonconfessional and pluralist. It does not aim to raise any doctrine to the level orthodoxy, it does not presume to impose limits on scientific research and intellectual debate and it has no absolute recipes to impose. It acknowledges that mankind's most precious right is the right to err. This is because socialism does not intend to stand as an ideological or real surrogate for positive religions. Socialism, in its democratic version, has an ethicopolitical plan which lies within the tradition of reformist illuminism and which can be summed up as follows: The socialization of the values of a liberal civilization, the distribution of power, the equal distribution of wealth and living opportunities, the strengthening and development of the institutions for the working classes' participation in the decisionmaking processes. In fact, Carlo Rosselli defined socialism as an organizing and socializing liberalism.

Lenin and Pluralism Do Not Go Together

The assumption that communism must create "the new man" leads logically to the plan to restructure the entire field of society in accordance with a single and completely binding criterion. The basic principle was formulated by Lenin in unmistakable terms: "The party corrects, plans and directs everything in accordance with a single criterion: in order to replace "the anarchy of the market" with "absolute centralization."

And indeed, quite consistent with his doctrine, as soon as the Bolsheviks had taken hold of the state they began to systematically and methodically destroy every center of autonomous life and worked on concentrating all political, economic and spiritual power in a single command structure: the party apparatus. And apparatus implies the total control of society by the universal administrators. This was what led to the establishment of a state which was master of all things: of economic resources, of the institutions, of people and even of ideas. The autonomy of civic society was deliberately stifled, social spontaneity was restricted or suppressed and individualism reduced to a minimum.

But obviously all this implies the general bureaucratization of society, which thus becomes, as one reads in "The State and Revolution," "a single office and a single industrial establishments" directed from above by the party apparatus, which will supervise people to insure that they do not deviate from the straight path laid down by orthodoxy. Hence stems the definition of the collectivist plan given by Djilas: "The communist state operates in order to attain the complete depersonalization of the individual, of nations and even of its own members. It aspires to transform the whole of society into a society of state employees. It aspires to control--directly or indirectly--salaries and wages, homes and intellectual activities." Similarly, Pierre

Naville has written that "bureaucracy in state socialism enjoys a hitherto unprecedented status: indeed, it controls the whole of economic life and exercises this control from above.... It is in state socialism that bureaucracy finally reveals its real nature: it is hierarchical organization applied to everything, the real framework of social and private life and supervision of everything. It embodies the state in its twofold national dimension and in its international imperialism."

At this point we can draw certain general conclusions. Leninism and pluralism are two antithetical terms: if the former prevails, the latter dies. This is because the specific essence, the motivating principle of the Leninist plan lies in the institutionalization of a "single control" and of "absolute centralization"; this obviously implies the wholesale state control of individual and collective human life. Democracy (liberal or socialist) presupposes the existence of several centers of power (economic, political, religious and so forth) competing with each other, their dialectic preventing the formation of an absorbent and totalitarian power. Hence the possibility of civic society having a degree of autonomy from the state, and of individuals and groups enjoying areas protected from the interference of bureaucracy. Furthermore, a pluralist society is a nonconfessional society in the sense that there is no official state philosophy, no obligatory truth. In a pluralist society the law of competition operates not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and ideological spheres. This implies that the state is nonconfessional only insofar as it does not presume to exercise a monopoly either of violence or over the administration of the economy and scientific production. In short, the essence of pluralism is the absence of a monopoly.

This is entirely the opposite of the trends that have become established in the communist system. True Marxist-Leninists cannot abide alternative power centers or public ideals different from the collectivist ideal. This is why they feel they have the right and duty to impose "scientific socialism" on recalcitrants. This is why Gramsci theorized on the figure of the modern prince as "the sole governor" of human life. The final goal is society without the state, but in order to attain it everything must be placed under state control. This, in short, is the great paradox of Leninism.

But how can total freedom be extracted from total power? Instead of strengthening society against the state, the state has been made omnipotent, with the consequences forecast by all the intellectuals of the revisionist left, who saw in the monopoly over material and intellectual resources the framework of state authoritarianism. Therefore, if we wish to proceed toward socialist pluralism, we must move in the opposite direction from that indicated by Leninism: We must share economic, political and cultural power as much as possible. Socialism; as Norberto Bobbio has pointed out, is fully developed democracy and therefore entails the historical transcendence of liberal pluralism and not its abolition. It is the way to increase and not reduce the degree of freedom, prosperity and equality.



Bettine Cray



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ITALY

SURVEY OF REACTIONS TO CRAXI'S L'ESPRESSO ARTICLE

Editorial Comments

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 25 Aug 78 p 2

[Text] There have been statements and comments--and even some surprises--from the most widely disparate pulpits regarding the recent essay article by SPI [Italian Socialist Party] secretary Bettino Craxi--disparate pulpits (here we might mention for example IL TEMPO, ROMA of Giovannini, and National Democracy) with naturally widely differing tones among each other.

In a lengthy editorial, the managing editor of LA REPUBBLICA, Scalfari, calls Craxian writings "a real and proper recasting of the PSI" which "marks a historical milestone in the life of the PSI." Scalfari says that we could expect Craxi "to accomplish his own Bad Godesberg at the conclusion of a long process of evolution, beginning with the 1956 Venice congress,"--to wit: "Craxi has finally taken the step which has been expected by so many. And he even went outright beyond his teachers and precursors at Bad Godesberg: from the essay published in L'ESPRESSO it emerges as a matter of fact that the PSI secretary does not confine himself to shelving Marx but rejects him completely." Not only that, writes the managing editor of LA REPUBBLICA, but Craxi goes even further and brings in Robespierre and the Great Revolution and "if he had had more room, I swear he would also have included Rousseau in his condemnation, chopping from the tree of European socialism the entire democratic branch and exposing unsuspected liberal and liberatarian roots, at least ever since the Socialist Party in 1892 defined itself by expelling the anarchic movement from its ranks." Scalfari then resumes the Craxian line of thought, concluding that, as far as the PSI secretary is concerned, the following definitely holds true: "(1) The unity of the left in Italy has been broken up forever; (2) a rejection of Leninism by the PSI, if it were likewise to be accomplished in 'dramatic' and general forms, would be entirely insufficient to close the gap between it and socialist thinking because one would still have to sever accounts with Marx and, behind his old prophet's beard, with the subtle lips of Robespierre; (3) the PSI proposes not to liquidate capitalism but to "overcome it"; (4) the PSI considers every form of collectivism to be an evil that must be fought; (5) collectivism and pluralism are irreconcilable positions." All of this

produces "stupefaction full of admiration" in Scalfari who recalls his origins among the liberal left and who, he says, "would never have imagined that, in 1978, the undisputed leader of the PSI could have spoken the same language as Panfilo Gentile."

But there is one objection which Scalfari makes here: "A liberal-socialist party in Italy has never had a mass worker following." La Malfa, the exponents of the old Action Party, and Saragat know that only too well. Finally there is one question: "Is the working class ready now to replace the old hammer and sickle with the radical Phrygian cap, viewed moreover in a Girondine light? Who will the new idols be? Mirabeau, the Marquis de Lafayette? Madame Roland? The oath of Pallacorda?" "I am afraid," is his conclusion, ""that Craxian revisionism is too fast."

It appears unexpectedly fast also to the editorial writers of IL TEMPO in Rome (Domenico Fisichella) and ROMA of Naples (Alberto Giovannini). The former writes that "the acceptance and defense of liberal values and methods have never been as explicit and convincing" as in this piece of writing by the "young PSI secretary." But, worried, Fisichella adds: "It is only to be hoped that the present socialist leadership will be able to move the entire party--where not everything is entirely clear on that score--to the same positions." This is also what Giovannini of ROMA is afraid of; he maintains that the PSI, in spite of everything, "still keeps Karl Marx at home, although hidden in the closet." For Giovannini, Craxi "is one of those politicians who shoot straight"; but will he manage to render "his liberal aspiration" effective and concrete? That strikes at the social democrats. Di Giesi asserts that "if these theses had been accepted by the PSI in 1947, there would have been no split."

He then adds a rather significant point concerning the Craxian theses: "Socialism cannot be limited to running capitalism but must, through the alternative, aim at replacing capitalist society with a socialist society where, along with the irrevocable values of liberty, democracy, and pluralism, new economic structures are asserting themselves and they definitely are the support for those values."

Cerquetti, of National Democracy, obviously does not have these concerns, because for him "the advance of communism in the Western countries is due above all to the docility of the noncommunist left toward communism." Now, "every democratically minded citizen, every layman and Catholic should not be in favor of certain initiatives especially when they come from men of the laic and democratic left, such as the Honorable Craxi."

The comment by Scalfari in LA REPUBBLICA is challenged by the social democrat Puletti who comes out in defense of Craxi and for whom the "essay by Craxi evidences a further approach to the social democratic parties by the PSI."

Historic Rebuttal to Berlinguer

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 24 Aug 78 pp 1,4

[Article by Eugenio Scalfari: "Craxi cut the Prophet's beard"]

[Text] The PSI secretary has at last replied to the now famous Berlinguer interview on Leninism and on the revisionism of the PCI, published several weeks ago by our journal. He responded with a lengthy article in L'ESPRESSO which is something more than a polemical intervention in the debate that has opened up on the left.

Craxi seems to argue with the PCI, the target of his criticisms seems to be Berlinguer, but in reality he uses this form of dialogue for a different purpose: his "essay" is really in effect a recasting of the PSI. From that viewpoint, the article in L'ESPRESSO marks a historical milestone in the life of the Italian Socialist Party.

Until a few days ago, it was expected, by many commentators and politicians, that Craxi's PSI would go through its Bad Godesberg at the conclusion of a long process of evolution, beginning with the 1956 Venice congress which--amid the cannon fire of Budapest and the anti-Stalinist denunciations at the 20th Congress of the CPSU--put an end to the PSI's political-ideological subjugation to the PCI and the Soviet Union itself. But some people have perhaps forgotten the real significance of the social democratic Bad Godesberg: at that time, we were not dealing with a rejection of Leninism which the German and European social democratic parties had never claimed among their matrixes; instead we were dealing with the shelving of Marxism, or scientific socialism, if you will, which indeed had been the original ideological nucleus from which all of the European forms of socialism sprang.

Well, Craxi has finally taken the step that had been expected by so many. He even went beyond his teachers and precursors of Bad Godesberg; from the essay published in L'ESPRESSOR it follows as a matter of fact that the PCI secretary does not confine himself to shelving Marx but instead rejects him completely. It is not by chance that his comments began with praise for and a lengthy quotation from Proudhon whom Marx scorned countless times, labelling him a petty bourgeois who is harmful to the interest of the proletariat.

But, in the lucid iconoclastic passion, which inspires him, the PSI secretary goes even further back: his anti-Marxist polemics takes him all the way back to Robespierre and the Jacobins of the Grand Revolution. If he had had more space, there is every reason to believe that he would have included in his condemnation also Rousseau, chopping the entire democratic branch off the tree of European socialism and exposing unsuspected liberal and liberatarian roots at least ever since the socialist party in 1892 the Socialist Party defined itself by expelling the anarchic movement from its ranks.

The thesis of the socialist secretary is very clear and full of polemical vigor, with intellectual coherence which, if anything, points to some solid reading background.

And here it is: the suppression of the market, the nationalization of capital, wiping out the family and the right to inheritance, universal suffrage organized so as to enable the anonymous tyranny of numbers and mediocrity to prevail--these inevitably lead to the police-state. In a police-state, the rights of the proletarians are trampled upon and violated like the rights of all other members of the community. Nor does it any good--as is typical in Lenin but also in Marx--to predict that the compression of individual liberties--that is to say, the dictatorship of the proletariat--will be a transitory stage leading to the definitive institution of communism and full freedom for all individuals: Craxi strips the mystery away from that assertion, facing himself on experience springing from the facts, on the formation of monstrous government and party bureaucracies in the countries of "real socialism," in order to devise from that a total condemnation of the entire Rousseau-Marx-Lenin line. He contrasts that against the liberal-socialism and the humanitarian socialism of Proudhon, Carlo Rosselli, Bertrand Russell and Cohn-Bendit. Anybody who accused Berlinguer of having mixed Lenin up also with the names of Vico and Antonio Labriola will admit that the broad range of these cultural quotations by the PSI secretary and his ideological miscellany certainly are not inferior to that.

Ideology and culture aside, Craxi's position means this in political terms: (1) the unity of the left in Italy has been broken forever; (2) a rejection of Leninism by the PCI--even if it were to be accomplished in "dramatic" and overall forms--would be entirely insufficient to close the gap with socialist thinking because one would still have to settle accounts with Marx and--behind his old Prophet's beard--with the subtle lips of Robespierre; (3) the PSI proposes not to liquidate capitalism but to "overcome it"; (4) the PSI sees an evil to be fought in any form of collectivism; (5) collectivism and pluralism are irreconcilable positions.

Commenting in this newspaper on the Berlinguer interview and the reactions it had triggered, we put a specific question to the PSI leaders; here it is: should the alternative, on which the socialist built their entire strategy, be understood to exist outside or inside the system?

With his article in L'ESPRESSO, Craxi furnishes an unequivocal reply: this is an "internal" alternative. And it is absolutely superfluous to observe that, along with the rejection of Marxism, the PSI secretary dropped the ideological ax also on the class concept and on what follows from it in terms of political and social struggle.

I must confess that I read Craxi's essay with stupefaction laced with admiration. Personally--for what it is worth--mine is a liberal matrix; I got my first cultural and political experiences in the big rooms of the

editorial offices of IL MONDO at the time of Mario Pannunzio and Ernesto Rossi; the Einaudian doctrine of equality of points of departure in that environment was considered the optimum objective to be attained and the maximum limit which one must not overstep; Marx [was] a fuzzy ideologue and a modest economist; the communists [are] serious and cultured adversaries; the socialists are confusion-mongers, wearing their hearts on their sleeves; the social democrats are a mediocre subspecies of the former, more sensitive to the argument of the pocketbook than the heart.

With these traditions behind me, although corrected and updated in recent years, I could not have imagined that the undisputed leader of the PSI would, in 1978, have talked the same language as Panfilo Gentile. The Hon. Zanone, liberal secretary, was therefore right in scenting an ally. However, we old left-wing liberals have nothing to be happy about: without any need for congresses and central committees, with a simple stroke of the pen, the PSI secretary has wiped out a hundred years of his party's history; he has revolutionized the topography of the Italian political lineup and he has in fact founded a great liberal-socialist party. I believe--and I say that without a trace of irony--that this is an important, very novel, thing full of prospects (and unknowns) for the future. But...

A liberal-socialist party never had a mass worker following in Italy. La Malfa and, with him, all those who went through the experience of the Action Party, know that only too well. Saragat's social democrats know it too.

It would take too long to describe what the causes of this worker disaffection were and besides, everybody knows that, more or less: the workers, the peasants, and wage earners in general were kept outside the institutions throughout the entire century, from unification until today. This is why a "separate" class consciousness has taken shape. This is why they never followed liberal, radical, or liberal-socialist ideals; because experience--to a great part, out of the blindness of the leading classes--gave them an extremely sensitive class consciousness. They followed the socialists when they broke away from the anarchists and discovered Marx. They followed the communists when Lenin joined Marx and the myth of October.

Certainly, society is evolving, capitalism is becoming mature, the revisionism of the left is taking great and fast strides. Soon, perhaps, Lenin will be chucked out. The myth of Gramsci also reveals some signs of fatigue. But is the working class ready to replace the old hammer and sickle with the radical Phrygian cap, moreover viewed in a Girondine tone? Who will the new idols be? Mirabeau? The Marquis de Lafayette? Madame Roland? The oath of Pallacorda?

I am afraid that Craxian revisionism is too fast. But--as I said before--it will have significant effect. A great laic and bourgeois party is springing up in Italy, with its student and even pararevolutionary spirit but in substance profoundly dependent upon the institutions of liberalisms. We'll

see whether it can be coherent in terms of behavior in this, its second ideological childhood. And we will see in what way socialism's Marxist wing will react to this "abrogation" (as Pannella would say) of the Prophet's old beard.

Aldo Tortorella, PCI

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 25 Aug 78 p 4

[Interview with Aldo Tortorella: "The left has never been that much divided."]

[Question] Mr. Tortorella, the article by Bettino Craxi, published in L'ESPRESSO, traces back to Lenin all of the developments that have taken place in the structure of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet state. In your view, is this identification between Lenin and Leninism, on the one hand, and the USSR and the CPSU, on the other hand, realistic?

[Answer] An absolute identification between the thinking and action of Lenin and Soviet society, such as it has been taking shape, is something impossible and beyond history, regardless of whatever viewpoint you might hold. It always takes an enormously complex assembly of factors to determine historical developments. The essential one among these is the factor of the economic structure and the factor of the class struggles deriving from that. This factor cannot be isolated, as happens in certain rather vulgar characterizations of Marxism. But if it is suppressed or if the complexity of historical development is suppressed, then one cannot understand what happened in the world. Among other things, talking about inevitable results and "inevitability" in relationships between ideas and historical development seems spreading darkness over the past, a darkness in which everything becomes indistinct, including responsibilities. According to this method, the white conquerors of Africa, of the Americas, or of Asia carried out their massacres, proclaiming themselves to be Christians and for that same reason all of the blame should be put upon Christianity.

This is the wrong way of stating the problem and it is also entirely too easy with respect to the concrete responsibilities of the economic-social systems, the governments, the churches, and individual human beings.

When Lenin died in 1924, the debate on the prospects of the USSR was in full swing. People at that time accepted Lenin and people accept him now from different and even, in some ways, opposing viewpoints. Craxi's article in L'ESPRESSO presents a simplified story of socialism, to use a gentle euphemism. In this simplified history, Lenin is given the role of the extreme federalist, the theoretician of the absolute rule of the party over the masses, definitely, the role of the tyrant or the head of the clan of tyrants. Gramsci by contrast appears like a kind of party mystic in his capacity as "keeper of the flame of faith"--and that's that.

When the image of a position of thought and political activity (and what activity!) becomes so shrunken, then the process of simplification becomes simplistic and becomes something entirely arbitrary. In this way, Lenin or Gramsci or anybody else become easy targets against whom anybody can triumph, even in the famous duel: "Stop, so I can run you through!"--but is this a real debate on Lenin or on Gramsci's Leninism?

[Question] Lenin however was the theoretician of democratic centralism and of the revolutionary party, the vanguard of the working class. His theories and above all their practical implementation in the end lead to the dictatorship of the party and, within it, of a small and oligarchic bureaucracy. In the article we are discussing, Craxi recalls Rosa Luxemburg's opposition to Lenin's theses. What would you reply to those assertions?

[Answer] Lenin is the party's theoretician but he is also the revolutionary of the soviets [councils]. And if we recall the admonitions of the Luxemburg woman against bureaucratism, we must also recall the tragic defeat of her movement and the murder of her that grand female protagonist of the struggle for socialism under a social democratic ministry.

We do not recognize any depository of Leninist orthodoxy, nor do we claim that function for our party. But a culturally serious debate certainly cannot start with boiling Lenin down to vulgar sectarianism, to the theory of tyranny and the exaltation of bureaucratism.

By that I do not mean to say that the debate on Lenin cannot be of great cultural and also political interest. As a matter of fact we tried, to the extent that we could, to develop such a discussion in order to look at Lenin and Gramsci and the other classical socialist thinkers, certainly not as the prophets of a faith but rather as what they are and wanted to be: laic thinkers, great revolutionary fighters, great because they were fully rooted in their epoch. There is no thinker--just as there is no politician--who is not dated. His greatness resides in discoveries made with relation to the state of knowledge in his time. This is why we say that neither Lenin, nor the other classical personalities provide us with ready-made solutions for the problems of the present. But that does not mean that we should simply chuck out an extraordinary lesson.

[Question] Nevertheless, Craxi does not confine himself to asking the PCI to deny Lenin. His criticism goes much higher; the PSI secretary extends it to Marx, to the Jacobins of the French revolution, to Robespierre, and he then ties in with the pre-Marxist thread of socialism. In your opinion will this position produce specific changes in the Italian political situation?

[Answer] It does not seem to me that the debate, started by the PSI secretary's article, exclusively and essentially concerns relations with the PCI. It seems obvious to me to observe that the question above all concerns the internal affairs of the Socialist Party, its ideal inspiration,

and its history. It is logical to observe that, according to a, so to speak, theoretical approach, the point of reference in this article is pre-Marxist socialism. This is certainly an interesting source of inspiration but it is not yet--if I am not mistaken in my history of the PSI--inherent in the tradition of that entire party. On the other hand, going back all the way to the Jacobins can be a rather transitory point in the debate because, in establishing pernicious ascendancies, one never knows where one winds up: what other blemishes will the communists and socialists, guilty of Marxism, yet have to cleanse themselves of?

Naturally, the debate on the Jacobins and on Jacobinism is a part of the theoretical debate between the socialist and the communists. However, boiling the history of socialism down to Jacobinism and anti-Jacobinism here likewise seems to me to be definitely unfounded. This is true also because this anti-Jacobin tradition would appear to be entirely too close to the reactionaries of the restoration during the last century. One can attack Marx through Proudhon but it does not seem fair to me--because of my good memory of pre-Marxist socialism--to marry him off so badly. At the same time, boiling Marxist socialism or the Italian communists down to pure Jacobinism could not in any way explain what these grand idea currents were in the country's history.

If the problem essentially concerns the PSI, this does not mean that it does not involve issues that are of concern to the entire worker movement. If, in fact, the debate against the communist-inspired worker movement's thread goes all the way to the identification, in Italy, of evil in the pure state, then in what way can one find a road to united action? The communists are not trying to impose their viewpoint on anybody; but that viewpoint is entitled to being discussed for what it is.

We need no lessons from guaranteeism because we fought on the ideal and practical terrain to blend the idea of socialism in with the idea of democracy and, representative democracy specifically. And we fought to build a fully laic party which nevertheless would not smuggle laicity in through the pure and simple acceptance of that which exists. Because this is the true drama of the communist and socialist worker movement: how to avoid the double danger of an escape forward or fearful tailism, extremism, or opportunism.

Socialism must be capable of safeguarding all liberties gained so far. But at the same time it must be capable of extending the liberties of man, of being precisely a new phase in the history of human civilization.

Communist Perspective Clarified

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 25 Aug 78 p 2

[Article] Is the identification between Lenin and Leninism, on the one hand, and the USSR and the CPSU, presented by Bettino Craxi, in the article in L'ESPRESSO, really correct?

To this first question which he addressed to LA REPUBBLICA, comrade Aldo Tortorella, chief of the party's cultural section, replied (the interview is being published today) that such an identification "is something impossible and beyond the sphere of history." The development of history is always determined by an enormous number of factors, says Tortorella, and the essential one among them is the factor of the economic structure and the factor of the class struggles deriving from it. "This factor cannot be isolated, as happens in certain vulgar characterizations of Marxism; but if it is suppressed and if the complexity of historical development is suppressed, then one cannot understand what happened in the world."

Tortorella recalls that, when Lenin died in 1924, the debate on the prospects in the USSR was in full swing. There were people at that time who accepted Lenin and who accept him now from diverse and, in some ways, even opposing viewpoints. "Craxi's article presents a simplified history of socialism, to use a kind euphemism, and Lenin is given the role of the extreme federalist, the theoretician of the absolute rule of the party over the masses."

But is there some basis of truth in all that? LA REPUBBLICA asks later one; is it not perhaps that Lenin's theories later on lead to the dictatorship of the party? And is not perhaps that Luxemburg's opposition to the theses of Lenin, which Craxi accepts true? "Lenin is the theoretician of the party but he is also the revolutionary of the soviets [councils]. And if we then recall the admonitions of the Luxemburg woman against bureaucratism, we must also recall the tragic defeat of her movement and the murder of that great female protagonist in the struggle for socialism under a social democratic ministry."

The PCI, Tortorella emphasizes, does not recognize any depository of Leninist orthodoxy, nor does it claim that function for itself, "but a culturally serious debate certainly cannot spring from the reduction of Lenin down to vulgar sectarianism, to the theory of tyranny, to the exaltation of bureaucratism." That naturally does not mean that the cultural and also political debate should not be continued freely, without thinking that there are any "ready-made solutions" supplied by one thinker or another; it only means that we are not going to jettison an extraordinary lesson.

Tortorella later on asserts that the debate started by Craxi does not exclusively or even essentially concern relations with the PCI but rather involves the entire socialist party as a whole, its inspiration and its

history. Then he adds: "If the problem essentially concerns the PSI, this does not mean that it does not involve problems that are of interest to the entire worker movement. If, indeed, the polemics against the communist-inspired worker movement thread finally comes to identifying in it evil in the pure state, in what way can one find a road to united action? The communists do not seek to impose their viewpoint on anybody; but that viewpoint is entitled to being discussed for what it is. We need no lessons from guaranteeism because we fought on the ideal and practical terrain to tie the idea of socialism into the idea of democracy, of representative democracy, specifically. And we fought to build a completely laic party which however would not smuggle laicity in through the pure and simple acceptance of that which exists. This is why--concludes Tortorella--the real drama of the communist and socialist worker movement is this: "How to avoid the double danger of a flight forward or timid tailism, extremism, or opportunism."

Pierluigi Romita, PSDI Secretary

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 26 Aug 78 p 5

[Interview with Pierluigi Romita by Beppe Lopez]

[Question] What does PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party] secretary Pierluigi Romita think of the "social democratic turn" and the "liberal-socialist turn" which supposedly was made by the PSI secretariat through Craxi's essay on Leninism published in L'ESPRESSO this week?

[Answer] The essay under discussion contains some traditional theses of the social democratic movement, which some people quite wrongly consider a kind of subspecies of socialism. The theses are nothing new but it is politically significant that they were put out officially by the secretary of the Italian Socialist Party.

[Question] Did you expect Craxi to make this move or were you taken by surprise?

[Answer] I always considered Craxi a convinced autonomist. And, in the PSI autonomism is bound coherently to lead to the positions sustained by him in L'ESPRESSO. But what is objectively surprising is the speed with which he managed to propose these positions to the PSI.

[Question] What, in the more properly political context, does Craxi's initiative mean at this moment?

[Answer] One cannot yet say. I ask myself how the PSI will react, as a whole, and who will, day after day, coordinate the party's specific political action with the theses advocated in the article.

[Question] In this sense, do you not also believe that the solidity of the secretariat and the majority, headed by Craxi, constitute a guarantee?

[Answer] Sure, I too have the impression that Craxi's control over the party is very strong. But certain positions in the PSI are not entirely new. What does Lombardi say? What will Monca do? What is Mancini's opinion? And will De Martino, especially on other positions, continue to look out the window? It is difficult to predict all that. We are fighting along similar positions, seeking a solid base of conversion between the forces of the socialist area for a number of decades. But, for example, we realize that there is a noteworthy difference between the things advocated by the socialists at the Turin congress and in the draft itself, on the one hand, and what Craxi has written just now. The same rejection of Leninism, not entirely new in the PSI, has never been advocated so evidently, with so much force, and with so many organic motivations.

[Question] Apart from what he rejects, what do you think Craxi does accept and what does it all boil down to?

[Answer] We are already celebrating the birth of the new liberal-socialist party. We do not think that this is the way to go and we hope that this was not the road which the socialist comrades had in mind. We believe and we hope that we are at last building a European-type socialism in Italy.

[Question] So, you do not share the opinion of those who interpreted Craxi's essay as an abandonment of the "class" party?

[Answer] Some of the concerns expressed by comrade Achilli along these lines seem well-founded to us. It is necessary to avoid dangerous (and possible) skids toward neoliberal positions.

[Question] Would it really be something if as Achilli himself said, "Romita in some way were to turn out to be more to the left" than Craxi?

[Answer] Let us look at what Achilli really said.


[Question] If Craxi's article cannot be interpreted in a liberal-socialist light, as you maintain, and if the view of society's problems, that links you to Craxi, remains fundamentally tied to the interest of the working class, does this mean that the PSI and the PSDI will continue to think in terms of a strong "socialist area" and that the PLI [Italian Liberal Party] (not to mention the PRI [Italian Republican Party]) are substantially outside that search for an understanding?

Answer We are resolutely and coherently aiming at the creation of a strong socialist area and Craxi's essay seems to us to be a big contribution in that direction. Whether the liberals will get involved in all this is something I do not know. We are working on the typical positions and objectives of

the democratic socialists. The discourse with the liberals is already underway on the issues of liberty and civil rights. We will see whether it can be developed in the economic and social fields. Some positions recently adopted by Zanone's party (fair standard, [economical] planning, company management, etc.) however will make us think that this discourse will be difficult or that it will at least have to be checked out.

[Question] Conclusions...

[Answer] We are undoubtedly facing something new which is why political forces and press organs must comment on that with clear and coherent positions. I am above all referring here to the "stupefaction laced with admiration" with which Scalfari received Craxi's essay: how can one reconcile that reaction with his well-known positions on the need for unity among the left-wing forces and the transition of the PCI into the government area? More than ever before, however, in our opinion, one can rather usefully aim at the strengthening of the socialist area by stimulating the further democratic evolution of the PCI. Only after the communists have definitely abandoned Leninism will we be able to arrive at a real unity of the left and at an alternation [change] in power.



Pierluigi Romita, segretario del Psdi.

Milan Mayor Carlo Tognoli

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 26 Aug 78 p 5

[Interview with Milan Mayor Carlo Tognoli by Stefano Jesurum]

[Text] After having read the "Socialist Gospel" of his secretary, Mr. Craxi, Milan Mayor Carlo Tognoli must have felt stronger than ever before. Right away, he wanted to tell a little anecdote. With a smile he recalled that, a year and a half ago, there were some people in the PSI who attacked him violently because he had "dared" refer to himself as liberal-socialist and had quoted a phrase from Rosselli. With ill-disguised satisfaction, he commented: "Well, I could not have gotten closer to the line chosen by my secretary today." He had just returned from his vacation in Sardinia and had taken a book to his office which he would finish whenever he had some time left; it was the study of the Popular Front in France. For Tognoli--mayor of one of Italy's biggest red city councils for the past 2 years--Craxi's essay, published by L'ESPRESSO, is better than just good. "I had been expecting it," he said. "I asked myself only in what journal it would be published." We asked him whether, in reading the essay, he had thought of the complications which could have arisen in relations with the communists and whether he was afraid of any repercussions on his own city council. The reply was instant: "No, I am not at all afraid. Also because anybody who read the socialist draft carefully knows how to take these things the way they should be taken. Basically, this involves an ideological revision which the PSI began some time ago."

[Question] Agreed--but what about relations with the communists?

[Answer] There is an evident confrontation here. But for the time being it is only ideological. It could become political. And I hope it will because, if it all were to remain just on paper, it would be a little bit abstract.

[Question] What do you mean by political confrontation since after all you are a man who must work with the communists everyday?

[Answer] I am talking about a confrontation on things that are being done. But I am an optimist, I am relatively optimistic. The objective which we socialists have is not a break with the PCI; we certainly do not want to embark upon roads that lead to a return to alliances of the left-of-center type. Instead, we want overall clarification which will take into account the positions which the communists assumed in recent times. They tried to

establish their credibility as a democratic party; they said they are reformists; they proved ready to go into alliances even with conservative forces. Now they have to draw the proper conclusions from that.

[Question] And what about the historical compromise?

[Answer] That does not figure here. There are those who share the idea and there are those who do not, but today the confrontation is much broader.

[Question] Well, Mayor, your party opened fire in some of the left-wing councils. This is also a way of conducting the political confrontation you hope for.

[Answer] The events in Parma and Venice are objectively particular and isolated. There were things there which did not work but that is not a strategy.

[Question] In your council there are also things that do not work. Last year there have been some real brawls between you and the communists. At one time there was even a blast of crisis--and you were always the mediator.

[Answer] A mediator by virtue of my institutional function.

(Tognoli's reply was dry and almost irritated. He would prefer to forget the 4 months of trouble between the PSI and the PCI on the issues of the ATM [expansion unknown].)

[Question] Institutional function or not, last year, in Milan, you were able to fight the war, knowing that the two parties were going arm in arm in Rome. Now things are going a little bit differently.

[Answer] I would like to reply right away that there are no longer any issues in the administrative area which involve any profound conflict. And let me make this clear once and for all: we do not want any local breakups for the purpose of pointing up our differences with the communists.

[Question] Is the unity of the left important to you and your people?

[Answer] Certainly. It is, for the left, in general, and for us socialists, in particular. One cannot talk of an alternative if the left-wing parties are not united. And this unity gives us the ability to move even more freely.

[Question] Let us talk about the communists, the ones in Milan. Have you been working well together over the past 2 years?

[Answer] Yes, certainly. Relations here have been very sincere. That does not mean that we did not think differently on some things but in the end we did agree.

[Question] Well, there is no shortage of criticisms. The Christian democrats, on the one hand, and the new left, on the other hand, are certainly bullying you. They say that you did not finish anything at all.

[Answer] The DC has been doing that ever since it found itself in the opposition; the others are doing it from time to time. However, what they say is wrong. We got things done; we got a lot of things done. Even in the most difficult sector, low-cost housing, we achieved good results.

(At this point, Tognoli was called to the phone. From Reggio Calabria he was told that a TNT charge blew up the car belonging to Pedrazzoli of the PSI directorate. He says: "This is very serious" and then he lights up a Tuscan cigar. He resumes talking about Milan. He recalls that his city often has been the proving ground for national political experiments. He says that the Craxi line sprang up in Milan a long time ago. He rules out the possibility that, on the socialist side, it might come to a war with the communists of Lombardi.)

[Question] In other words, the red city council is in the best of health?

[Answer] As far as we are concerned, yes. That depends on the communist party however. It is they who often started bitter debates. Cossutta began those debates on the local entities with the story about the open boards. And let us not forget that Lombardi is the first region which experimented with this formula and which still uses it. Cossutta asked that his party be admitted into those open governments and accused us of duplicity. Now it is up to them. If they read a meaning of "breakup" into our desire for a confrontation, then it is anybody's guess.

[Question] Otherwise?

[Answer] Otherwise I believe that it would be difficult to have any breaks.

[Question] Let us leave the communists aside. Let us talk about the PSI, the PSI in Milan. Here the opposition to your internal majority is rather strong. There is Michele Achilli with his group.

[Answer] That is no problem. I understand Achilli and I also find it positive that he is in the opposition. But he is wrong in making himself the defender of socialist orthodoxy. He certainly is not orthodox; he comes from the Carrista left and then, let us be quite frank, everytime there is a debate between us and the PCI, Achilli and his people get scared.

[Question] Now, Tognoli, is your immediate future calm? Do you not feel a little bit tight in the robes of a mayor of a red city council now that this squall with the communists has come up.

[Answer] It will be a difficult year also--let us not forget--because the elections are close. But I have no fears for my council.



Carlo Tognoli, sindaco di Milano.

Carlo Tognoli, Mayor of Milan.

Liberal Party Secretary Valerio Zanone

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27-28 Aug 78 p 4

[Interview with PLI secretary Valerio Zanone]

[Text] "Bertrand Russell is not just by accident quoted by Craxi in his 'essay' on Leninism; I consider him more within the camp of neoliberalism, rather than socialism. Once upon a time he wrote: 'I do not want all men to be equal.' Here, I believe that the PSI secretary, through his initiative, definitely made it clear that he prefers that type of socialism, the libertarian socialism to egalitarian socialism." PLI secretary Valerio Zanone, who for some time has expressed a certain sympathy for Craxi (which seems to be returned) does not manage to hide his own satisfaction. He is still on vacation on the Island of Elba. But he was only too glad to comment--by phone--on the prospects opened up by the Craxian initiative.

[Question] What is your impression of the debates triggered by the "essay's" publication?

[Answer] That liberals and socialists today are closer than yesterday. Apart from the understandable demand of the socialists that the problem of the

definition of a socialism more adequate to contemporary society be resolved, it seems that Craxi wants to go beyond the option for a democratic version of socialism, if not almost explicitly to move toward liberal-socialism.

[Question] Do you then think that there is a clear difference between Berlinguer's communism and Craxi's socialism?

[Answer] In his famous interview, the PCI secretary was unable to do anything but defend the party's Leninist tradition, although he interpreted it historically and did not take it dogmatically. But Berlinguer's line of argument had a weak point: he did not explain--nor could he explain--how Leninism can be reconciled with democratic pluralism. For Craxi, on the other hand, Leninism and pluralism are definitely antithetical. So, the pluralism which the communists are thinking of is profoundly different from the one for which we and the socialists are fighting.

[Question] Does this mean that the "orientation toward convergence"--which is attributed to secretary Craxi and secretary Zanone--is becoming more concrete?

[Answer] It will be necessary to check out the theories expressed during the August holidays against the initiatives that will be taken in September and thereafter. One thing is certain: the problem of a working political connection between liberal democracy and socialist democracy is at last moving toward maturity. In November, like the European liberals, we will have a conference on neoliberalism. For the first time on that occasion there will be a confrontation, with Italian socialism, among diverse approaches, no longer among adversaries.

[Question] What basic difference would then remain between the liberals, such as you, and the socialists, such as Craxi?

[Answer] A difference not of orientation, but of degrees. Let me explain what I mean. The liberals are just that because they believe that real progress can be promoted on the basis of individual liberties; the socialists are socialists because they emphasize the factor of social solidarity as propedeutic for individual liberties. In substance, we remain different not with regard to the choices of value but in the specific application of those values and on political problems.

[Question] Putting the question this way, the PSI would seem to lose any "class" connotation.

[Answer] One must never put the cart before the horse. There is a great evolution taking place objectively in the PSI. The new fact, which seems to wish to accelerate this evolution, is the rapid and explicit choice made by Craxi in favor of the libertarian line of socialism, with an implicit abjuration of the most traditional class tendency, the egalitarian one. It is not by chance that the socialist secretary goes back to the typical

arguments of the liberal debate against the communists. It is impossible precisely to predict where the PSI might wind up on that road but it is certain that it has begun to move on that road.

"Generation Gap in Leadership"

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 29 Aug 78 p6

[Editorial by Giorgio Galli: "Socialists without alternative"]

[Text] The class struggle is becoming intertwined with the generation gap, according to socialist leader Guido Mazzali, in whose school during the fifties draw up Bettino Craxi whose rise to the position of PSI secretary was hailed as the advent of the 40-year olds. The generation factor seems to me to help us understand the change in direction assumed by the PSI.

Moving up to the party's leadership at a young age--without any competitors, to all appearances--Craxi could afford to wait. He could also devote some years to building a political instrument quite different from the worn-out party of 1976. He only has to avoid election defeats which have always constituted a drama for the party.

The secretary has some plausible target dates in view: the 1979 European elections and the 1980 general administrative elections are occasions which are more favorable for the PSI than the political elections. On the administrative level, the consensus has always been broad and the first duty in election history looked good for a party which can boast of bigger and better connections in Europe than any other Italian party. Good results during the next 2 year term, could therefore create a situation that would be propitious also for the 1981 political elections.

Here is another consideration: Craxi experienced the gradually less pleasant years of the left-of-center [government] side by side with Nenni. It seems difficult to understand why he would want to put himself in the same situation which caused so much bitterness for the old leader of Italian socialism. In other words, a participation that would be subordinate to the DC [Christian Democratic Party] government, having to face the opposition, on the left, of a PCI holding a hegemony in the worker movement.

I believe that Craxi is thinking of waiting for conditions for a different solution to ripen. What kind [of solution] is something that I do not find easy to understand. But I emphasize the assumption that we must not wait for a short-term strategy. Between the ideological turnabout of the social democrats at Bad Godesberg (1959) and Brandt's rise to the position of chancellor (1969) 10 years past. I am not saying that as many years would have to pass before we can see what the PSI secretary's strategy is leading to--but it will at any rate be a long-term thing.

In the short-run, however, this possible layout presents serious problems for our political system. Representative democracy as a matter of fact is not only a system of civil liberties and social pluralism. It is also and above all a method of political management of the tensions through the periodic change in the governing group and the possibility for the representatives of the subordinate social strata to get there, particularly the representatives of industrial workers.

One can renounce the Marxist interpretation of the class concept but there is no doubt that the permanent alliance with the labor unions of the industrial workers is the basis of the social bloc which guarantees massive political representation for the British Labourites and the German and Swedish social democrats. When Callaghan, Schmidt or Palme became prime ministers, the industrial workers of those countries felt that they were represented in the government. This is the cultural and experiential premise through which we get political control over the social tensions inherent in industrial societies.

Earlier I recalled that Italy is the only country in Western Europe which has never, in this century, had a prime minister who was an expression of the worker movement. And this situation makes Italian representative democracy imperfect and hence unable to control social tensions. These can be expressed in the most diverse manifestations, from the armed struggle to labor union corporativism and to youth insubordination.

Craxi's recent approach does not solve this problem because it removes any alternative to the government monopoly held by the DC. The socialist leaders deny that they are breaking up the unity of the left and they reject the label "anticommunist." We can believe those statements precisely because they do not want to place the party back into the long dry spell of the sixties. But the only way to get the left to bring its weight to bear in unison was the utilization of the 44 percent of the votes cast on 20 June with respect to the proposal for an emergency government with communist participation.

With this possibility out of the running, the DC continues to monopolize the government with 40 percent of the votes. After 20 June, this looks like a big joke and this is where the root of the social tension lies. And just exactly how an imperfect representative democracy is supposed to cope with that situation, not within 2 or 5 years but as of this autumn is something that cannot be deduced from the ideological premises in the essay published in L'ESPRESSO.

I would really like to find out how the 40-year olds in the PSI are planning to tackle that situation while their long-term design ripens.

Reaction of Andreotti Government

Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 30 Aug 78 p 1

[Article by Danilo Granchi]

[Text] Rome, 29 August. According to prime minister Andreotti, the government this very day has not directly come to feel the bitter debates between the PCI and the PSI; there is no cooling of relations between the communists and the government; conflict between parties over positions on the second level of government will be resolved during September; no serious difficulties have arisen because one minister or another happened to have reared up; there are no repercussions on the ministerial team from the preparatory debate prior to the Christian Democratic Congress for next spring. An active but positive situation, in other words.

Andreotti did not speak directly but revealed his thinking through the faithful undersecretary in the office of the prime minister, Evangelisti, who was interviewed by a weekly. The spokesman admitted however that "we are all of us a little bit in a wait-and-see attitude"; we will see what will happen in autumn.

In the interview, the undersecretary provided definite confirmation of the fact that Andreotti and his friends had switched to the camp of those who support Christian democratic secretary Zaccagnini; and he added the hope that, at the next DC Congress, all those who believe in the policy of "confrontation," will form a homogeneous majority and will push into the domestic opposition all those who do not believe in the confrontation, such as Forlani and Fanfani. As for appointments, Evangelisti defended the appointment of General Dalla Chiesa, announcing that it was Andreotti in person who wanted him and emphasizing that appointments for the Armed Forces are not made at random or by lot; "they are reported to the parties, they are not negotiated." On one crucial point, the prime minister's aide did not wish to say anything: the possible participation of the PCI in the government without political elections being held first. "I do not know," he said, "we will have to wait for the DC Congress."

It is a fact that the PCI is running into growing difficulties as it remains "in midstream," in other words, in the parliamentary majority but without direct access to the ministerial levers. More discomfort sprang from the election results in a community in the province of Sassari, Ittiri: nothing much in itself, but full confirmation of a constant tendency from 14 May on. The DC jumped ahead by 8.5 percentage points from about 39 percent to 47.5 percent; and the PCI lost 10.5 percentage points, from 42 down to 31.5 percent. If we add to that the recruiting difficulties which were admitted by L'UNITA in recent days, we can understand that some hefty and specific issues are behind the ideological debates both inside the PCI and between the communists and socialists.

The socialists realize that the moment is favorable for reshuffling the cards on the left and secretary Craxi is not toning down his polemical attitude toward the communists. For tomorrow's issue of AVANTI! he wrote an article energetically confirming the theses presented in the essay published the other week on "Leninism and Pluralism" which can be summarized in the observation that, between democratic and libertarian socialism on the one hand, and Leninist communism, on the other hand, there is an unalterable antithesis. The PSI secretary responded to critics in various places, observing that the ideas in his article are nothing but the focusing on ideas already manifested by the party's majority at the last national congress in Turin.

His intention is not to move out "of the historical and class terrain of the left" but to abandon the errors of Marx and Engels in the light of historical experience. De Martino once again came out in defense of Marxist orthodoxy, admitting however that the PCI's "democratic centralism" (in substance, the Leninist heritage on the topic of organization) is not working well; nor is the struggle of the currents working well and we need a third way which has not yet been found. On that point, the communist Cervetti, in charge of PCI organization, instead claimed the function of democratic centralism although denying the party's "totalitarian" character. It should be noted that Craxi--according to a journalist--wrote his essay precisely in order to challenge--also in the light of the latest Berlinguer interview--a certain Leninist inheritance of the PCI, reasoning thus: "If the communists go to the congress on this basis, with Leninism reaffirmed, even though only in terms of its historical validity; in terms of its value as a body of teaching, etc., then we are certainly in for it!"

An Historian's Perspective

Rome AVANTI in Italian 30 Aug 78 p 2

[Excerpts] The discussion that has begun on Craxi's article in L'ESPRESSO has involved important sectors of the cultural establishment in addition to the politicians.

Early yesterday, Valiani observed in CORRIERE DELLA SERA that "Craxi remains on the track of international democratic socialism when he puts on the agenda the historical relationship between Jacobinism (understood in its most dictatorial form as embodied by Robespierre) and Leninist communism."

According to Valiani "the principal proving ground for Italian reformism is the achievement of full employment. We cannot get there without the cooperation, especially not in Italy since unemployment hereabouts also has profound structural causes."

"The old socialist reformism has already gotten underway on that road. Then it stopped in the face of its implications which are not always popular and after that it pulled back. The new reformism will be a vital one if it dares go forward."

ITALY

CRAXI'S IDEOLOGICAL ESSAY: SUMMARY OF REACTION WITHIN PSI

Reaction in Northern Italy

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 25 Aug 78 p 4

[Text] Rome--The initial reactions in the socialist "environs" to Craxi's "essay" were substantially positive. Naturally there is no lack of perplexity and fears, particularly as to just how much of the party's tradition the new "socialist gospel" appears to be designed to be reopened for discussion. In Milan, Nuccio Abbondanza, the party's provincial secretary, states: "We can no longer keep going under mummified banners. We will do very well to return to ideological and political battles, using even pamphlets and essays, as we did many years ago." Abbondanza gives the impression of being not at all displeased by the political climate that was ushered in after Berlinguer's now famous interview and Craxi's reply in the form of an essay. He says, however, that there is after all nothing so new here. "Basically, this is nothing more than a further development of the concepts and positions already present in our socialist project."

Abbondanza even wards off foreseeable charges. "Anyone who says that Marxism has been renounced shows that he is not at all familiar with it," says Abbondanza. "Examine pre-Marxist trends, criticisms and revisions.... Craxi's trend is an act of courage, the courage of the utopia in which we socialists have invested heavily in recent times."

We put the question: Are these perhaps ideological ploys for a new launching of the Center-Left type of politics, of cultural additions to the battle that you [socialists] are engaged in with the communists in many municipal councils? Abbondanza replies gruffly: "It is absolutely not a devious ploy, we are not going back to the Center-Left." In short, at the Milan socialist federation, they are most categorically ruling out a vertical break with the PCI. They say: "In the final analysis, we are calling for a true debate with the Communist Party, a debate that will not be concerned merely with formulas but above all with substance." Between quoting Bucharin and making an historic recollection, Nuccio Abbondanza made this statement about the rank and file: "This summer, I took part in some 30 AVANTI festivals; the atmosphere is completely new. After Pertini's election, there was great enthusiasm. But above all, writers and sympathizers are beginning to exhibit a bolder rapport with communists, a

psychological attitude that is leading to a restoration of the balance in the relationships of the Left and not at all to a rekindling of pro-Christian Democrat sentiment."

Those taking part in the AVANTI festivals tell how after years have gone by, the party's newspaper is once more being distributed with joy and the party emblems are being passed out with pride. "And our comrades are now asking questions," a leader says, "they want to know more about it and are reading what we are saying and what the Communist Party is replying." It is easy to predict what will come about in the coming days. They [will] say to the PSI: "The comrades will ask us to go and discuss with them in the sections what significance there is in quoting Proudhon and speaking of liberal socialism. And we shall go there gladly."

For Franco Rolandi, secretary of the FILP-CGIL in Genoa, what Craxi has written "should be meditated on carefully, above all by the party. I have some uncertainty. I want to understand fully whether it is possible to make a clean sweep of Marxism in this way. I also wonder whether the liberal socialist foundation that even Scalfari is talking about is politically useful. However, I believe that a confrontation should be set in motion and that we must go forward in search of a new role for the Socialist Party."

Renato Pezzoli, secretary of the Genoa Chamber of Labor, feels that Craxi's contribution "should be considered within the framework of an ideological debate that should not influence immediate political choices. In short, there should be a clear separation between the question of Leninism and the problem of municipal councils, which is being discussed nowadays. I am satisfied that Craxi's essay represents an attempt to define what we want to be and what Leninism is, that the secretary's thesis is a re-examination of socialist positions that are not new. I believe we must discuss more thoroughly and with greater care the risk we are running of having a different sectarianism. Moreover, I view it clearly as a problem of defining what the relationship of the Socialist Party is to Marxism: it probably should be a critical relationship, but all the same there must be some relationship.

"Craxi's article was not a thunderbolt in a calm sky, if we take into account the theoretical, ideological and political debate which has been engaged in for several years now by MONDO OPERAIO and which is being continued within the left and the PSI." That is the opinion held [also] by Sergio Cartofassi, PSI provincial secretary in Pisa: "Craxi's article poses questions for the socialists and the left that cannot be ignored any more." Is the unity among Leftists in jeopardy? "I do not think that that is what Craxi's intention is."

According to Cartofassi, "it is not a question of whether or not to soften the controversy with the communists. The problem is that of knowing what the confrontation between the two parties of the historic left is being based on. That is why Craxi has raised questions and given indications that will have to be extensively and thoroughly debated in the PSI. There is no doubt that giving the party a new foundation is not only an organizing action but is also--and especially--linked to a critical revision of the theoretical and political heritage of Italian socialism, aimed at building and elaborating a new socialist theory suited to the Western reality in which we are operating."

Internal Pressures, Dissent

Rome IL POPOLO in Italian 30 Aug 78 p 1

[Text] The effort that Craxi is making to lead the PSI along the line [of thought] of the great European social democracies--particularly, that of Germany, from what we can understand--could not but meet with heavy resistance within his party, where the points of agreement noted at the Turin congress had, in the light of events, already appeared to consist more of form than substance, and at any rate always rather unconvincing. It is a resistance that is taking the form of a decisive rejection of Craxi's basic theses by some socialist sectors which may not be sizable in numbers but can certainly create difficulties for the PSI secretary, perhaps more difficulties than the very harsh (though taken for granted) communist reactions can.

In the eyes of such authoritative party spokesmen as De Martino, Querci and Achilli, the "essay" on Leninism comes across essentially as a criticism and consequent refutation of the substance of Marxism that has nurtured the currents of thought of Italian socialism, though not exclusively so. In point of fact, this is the charge made by Craxi's opponents against the PSI secretary, thereby transferring the dispute from the general area of the left to the more limited confines of the Socialist Party. However, Craxi in an article in AVANTI, and Vice Secretary Signorile, firmly reject this interpretation of the "essay," confirming that no one can cast doubt on the fact that the trunk of the PSI is Marxist. The truth is that with regard to the social reality of our times, many of Marx's positions are outdated and obsolete, so that to speak in Italy today of a "Marxist" socialism is in a strict sense as inappropriate as to speak of a purely Leninist communism. Craxi's treatise begins far off, with the affirmation of an autonomy of Italian socialism that is not being passively determined by the mere contesting of some form of ideological or political suggestion but is intended to activate a process of revision and re-elaboration of the PSI strategy.

De Martino himself acknowledges that "there is no model of a true and correct socialism in existence that is based on democracy." It is therefore understandable that Craxi, pursuing the prospect of a "governing left,"

is attempting to consider precisely the problem as to why this can be so. The confirmation that Leninism is incompatible with democratic pluralism also becomes a test as to what in the Marxist pronouncements can be effectively applied to the present economic and social situation without entailing a renunciation of the greater or lesser Marxist heritage that unquestionably is part of the history and tradition of Italian socialism.

One cannot, of course, imagine that Craxi was led to write his "essay" only by some wholly intellectual desire for an abstract exercise: he obviously has precise short- and long-term aims in mind with regard to both Europe and Italy, such as enlarging the consensus round the PSI and regaining a more significant role for the party, marking its distance from the PCI and DC and not rejecting a priori any overtures toward the lay/liberal segment. It is too soon to say what political consequences that may have. But whatever Craxi's aims may be, it will be well to retain a correct view of present problems and to relate every initiative to them that ought to result from the ideological clarification now taking place in the Italian left.

Ideological Debate Continues

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 3 Sep 78 pp 12-13

[Text] Rome--And now? A week after the publication of Craxi's essay in L'ESPRESSO, it is now certain that the debate will bounce from the front pages of newspapers to the upper reaches of the parties of the left. The socialists will discuss it among the leadership and perhaps also in their central committee (Michele Achilli, leader of the minority wing, has already requested it convening). Craxi has indicated that he will not remain aloof from the battle. Its risks are in fact few, whereas there would be many advantages deriving from the encounter on these theses with the communists and with internal adversaries.

This was understood by the communists, who through statements by RINASCITA Vice Director Fabio Mussi, Claudio Petruccioli and on up to Aldo Tortorella and Giorgio Napolitano, have shown that they want to soften the tones of the controversy. Meanwhile, all the other political spokesmen, with the exception of the cautious reactions of Republicans and the Democratic left, were urging Craxi to keep on going. In fact, it is evident that even more than Craxi himself, an exacerbation of the debate on the theme "Is the PSI to become a liberal socialist party?" can cause embarrassment to Lombardi's and Signorile's left, leaving the secretary as the sole, undisputed leader of the internal life of the PSI. By statements that are very benevolent compared to those of Craxi, Enrico Manca, who in the past had headed the group of internal opponents, has let it be known that he is ready to support the secretary whenever some fringe of the left withdraws from the majority. And anyone who hopes that the socialist intellectuals or indeed the Socialist International will leave Craxi in the lurch at such a delicate time has probably added up things wrong.

The themes of the essay published by L'ESPRESSO last week had in fact been discussed by the Association for the Socialist Project (Norberto Bobbio, president, and Giorgio Ruffolo, secretary) and then among all the intellectuals who head up the magazine MONDO OPERAIO. Luciano Pellicani, Craxi's advisor on theoretical questions, had reminded the socialist secretary that even his French colleague Francois Mitterand had instituted a "salutary controversy with the communists," declaring that he "preferred Proudhon to Marx." Thus, Craxi's essay, which has been reproduced in its entirety in AVANTI, will be published on the front page of the next issue of the party's review MONDO OPERAIO, followed by an essay by Pellicani entitled "Communism as a Political Religion." In the autumn, it will be published again (along with statements by all the secretaries of the European socialist parties) in a book that the Socialist International will dedicate to Willy Brandt's 65th birthday. The investiture of the PSI "gospel" could not be more solemn.

How will the socialist rank-and-file react to this turning point that Eugenio Scalfari has defined in REPUBBLICA as being "too rapid?" For the moment, enthusiastic reactions are being observed in the periphery of the organization. As for the "rank-and-file," some sign of disagreement is appearing from the debates taking place in the many AVANTI festivals.

Some members are wondering whether it is not inadvisable to declare that the communists must be kept out of the government until they have renounced Leninism (and perhaps at the present time, Marxism-Leninism). "Isn't our policy of past years thus being contradicted?"

The person called on to reply once again was Pellicani, who wrote in last Sunday's issue of AVANTI: "The PCI is a two-faced party: it participates in the operation of the system but ideally is outside the system because its positive model is the Soviet Union, a "socialist" country, even if it has illiberal features. For this reason, the PCI is not a party entitled to govern. The communist comrades are angered by this discrimination. But they are wrong to feel that way since it is a matter of self-discrimination. One cannot have his brains in the West and his heart in Moscow; one cannot be in favor of pluralism and at the same time keep Soviet totalitarianism as a ideal model." "These are Cold War tones," retort angry persons at the Botteghe Oscure. The controversy goes on.

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CSO: 3104

ITALY

ENRICO MANCA INTERVIEW: SOCIALIST VERSION

Rome AVANTI in Italian 27-28 Aug 78 p 20

[Report on interview with Enrico Manca as published in LA REPUBBLICA on 28 August 1978; original interview by Beppe Lopez]

[Text] Within the scope of the discussion that took place on Craxi's article in the ESPRESSO, Comrade Manca intervened by way of an interview with LA REPUBBLICA. The following are the significant points of that interview.

"In reference to the current discussion taking place within the left," Manca began, "I do not count myself among those who treat Craxi's article on Leninism as a 'scandal.' On the contrary, I consider it a conscientious effort to render the current political and cultural debate livelier and richer. The article poses problems for us and for the others; and we should face up to those problems, whether we are in agreement or have a difference of opinion. Nor do I believe that the article subverts the theoretical fundamental principles of the PSI and, much less, that it negates Marxism."

[Question] But do not Craxi's reference to Proudhon and pre-Marxist experiences as well as the controversy with Jacobinism in fact signify a contesting of Marx in addition to Lenin?

[Answer] This seems to me to be an unjustified forced interpretation. To solicit and reopen a cultural and political discussion on the pre-Marxist trend does not mean negating Marx but, rather, refuting a dogmatic and priestly vision that makes Marx and Marxism the alpha and omega of every discourse on socialism. A dangerous dogmatism is erroneous. But this detracts nothing from a complete awareness--which, as far as I am personally concerned, is a well-reasoned and carefully considered conviction--that it is with Marx that we see the effectiveness of that decisive historical about face in analysis, criticism and knowledge that renders socialism fully recognizable as a radical change in middle-class society, setting it apart as a general aspiration to greater social justice. It is with Marx, on the basis of the permanent validity of his inspiration, that full value is given to the historical knowledge that the future of the world is and remains branded by class struggle.

[Question] What, then, is the meaning of the overall criticism leveled at Leninist communism?

[Answer] This is the point: although Berlinguer is right--and from his point of view as a communist that he probably is--to assert that a plain and simple abandonment of Leninism by the PCI would mean severing the historical reasons at the roots for its birth as a party. The socialists are also right in vindicating, with great firmness and force, at a time when an idealistic discussion of such relevance is begun, the profound, decisive, and historical reasons for their existence, that is, for the fact that they did not become communists in 1921 but, rather, preserved the existence and identity of the Italian Socialist Party. We are now driven in that direction all the more, inasmuch as the experience of history shows how well-founded many of the critical predictions of the socialists were relative to the "authoritarian regression" of the October Revolution. Vindicating the "reasons for socialism" signifies contesting Lenin and Leninism as a whole: but that does not mean underrating the complexity and influence such an eminent "revolutionary" as Lenin had in his time not only on the history of the Russian labor movement but also on the European labor movement--an influence and role that most assuredly does not escape militants. We are such of the Socialist Party that from the beginning of the 20th century until now, we have counted among our most eminent leaders men such as Serrati, Turati, Morandi and Nenni.

[Question] Meanwhile, moderates and conservatives are rejoicing over the quarrel between the PSI and the PCI and foresee possible changes in the political picture.

[Answer] The moderates and conservatives--whether in good faith or bad is of little importance--are deceiving themselves, if they expect the controversial confrontation between socialists and communists to open the way for a return to moderate solutions or to result in a vertical break in the left. Moreover, in the fury of the controversy alone, progress has been made in clarifying and working out mutual convictions.

[Question] Then there is no basis for the fears of those who think they see in the controversy on Leninism an attempt to provoke a head-on collision between the socialists and communists so as to enable the PSI to obtain a privileged relationship with the DC [Christian Democratic Party]?

[Answer] Those are surely unfounded fears. I would advise the moderates and conservatives to curb their enthusiasm, for it is badly placed. The socialists have no intentions of returning to the past. Moreover, it is too easily forgotten that the current policy of national unity, necessary for confronting a crisis of such broad proportions as that in Italy, which is destined to be prolonged, owes its existence to binding political options.

[Question] Then the controversy over Lenin and Leninism is not just a pretense?

[Answer] If the problem of reckoning with Lenin were not real, why would Berlinguer have announced the revision of Article 5 of the PCI statutes, which specifically refers to the party's Leninist aspect? And how can we forget that within recent months the Spanish communists have held a meeting in which they confronted each other and split on the question of abandoning the party's Leninist identity? Thus, there is no pretense in the socialist controversy but, rather, an awareness of the determination that the will and capability of Eurocommunism have relative to a renewal of the Italian and European left, a determination to go forward with coherence on the path of revision and modernization.

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ENRICO MANCA (PSI) DEFENDS CRAXI IN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 28 Aug 78 p 4

[Interview with PSI Secretariat Member Enrico Manca by Beppe Lopez: date and place not given]

[Text] Rome--"Those who interpret Craxi's 'essay' on Leninism as a sort of theoretical definition of the 'social-democratic' aboutface allegedly under way in the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] are wrong. On the contrary, that essay is compatible with traditional Italian socialism, with the PSI's characteristics as a 'class party' and with its objective of unity of the left." This statement is from Enrico Manca, the socialist director, who, 2 years ago, with Craxi and Signorile, had established the "Midas aboutface," which had been relegated into the minority by the two allies 6 months ago at the congress in Turin and which, since then--apart from a controversial sally for the attitude assumed by the secretariat in the Moro affair--had withdrawn into silence.



L'onorevole Enrico Manca

Honorable Enrico Manca

[Question] What is your position concerning Craxi's "essay" and the reactions it has aroused?

[Answer] I am not among those who treat the party secretary's article as a scandal. It poses problems, but it is with these problems that we should deal, whether we are in agreement or have a difference of opinion. I do not believe the article subverts the PSI's theoretical fundamental principles or, even less, that it negates Marxism.

[Question] Do not the appeal to Proudhon and pre-Marxist experiences and the controversy with Jacobinism in fact signify a contesting of Marx in addition to Lenin?

[Answer] This seems to me to be a forced interpretation. To urge a reopening of the discussion on the pre-Marxist trend can only mean refuting a dogmatic and priestly vision that makes Marx and Marxism the alpha and omega of every discourse on socialism. However, this detracts nothing from a complete awareness--which, as far as I am personally concerned, is a well-reasoned and carefully considered conviction--that it is with Marx that we see the effectiveness of that decisive historical aboutface in analysis, criticism and knowledge that renders socialism fully recognizable as a radical change in middle-class society, setting it apart as a general aspiration to greater social justice. It is with Marx that full value is given to the historical knowledge that the future of the world is and remains branded by class struggle.

[Question] What, then, is the meaning of the overall criticism leveled at communism?

[Answer] This is the point: although Berlinguer is right in asserting that a plain and simple abandonment of Leninism by the PCI would mean severing the historical reasons for its birth as a party at the roots, the socialists are also right in vindicating, with great firmness, the historical reasons for their existence, that is, for the fact that they did not become communists in 1921 but, rather, preserved the identity of the Italian Socialist Party. We are now driven in that direction all the more by the historical evidence of how well-founded many of the critical predictions of the socialists were relative to the "authoritarian regression" of the October Revolution. Vindicating the "reasons for socialism" signifies contesting Lenin and Leninism as a whole; but that does not mean underrating the complexity and influence such an eminent "revolutionary" as Lenin had in his time on the history of the Russian labor movement and also the European labor movement.

[Question] This political-cultural discussion often gets carried away and seems to have a tendency to degenerate into a brawl rather than remaining an objective discussion. Does that not risk widening the gap that separates the two largest parties of the Italian Left?

[Answer] I do not agree with those who underrate these dangers. The confrontation between socialists and communists still bears the psychological imprints of 1921: they discuss (and quarrel) as though they were still a single party divided in two instead of separate parties, even though both are of the left and represent the same class interests. I continue to consider the unity of the leftist forces essential to every strategy of change, and that is precisely why I heave a sigh of relief these days in noting that discussion between socialists and communists has become more realistic and less diplomatic.

[Question] Meanwhile, however, moderates and conservatives are rejoicing over the quarrel between the PSI and the PCI and foresee possible changes in the political picture.

[Answer] I would advise the moderates and conservatives to curb their enthusiasm. The socialists have no intentions of returning to the past. It is too easily forgotten, even by the left, that the current policy of national unity owes its existence to binding political options made and confirmed by the socialists.

[Question] Of what value is it then, at this time, to get into controversy over Lenin and Leninism?

[Answer] If the problem of reckoning with Lenin were not real, why would Berlinguer have announced the revision of Article 5 of the PCI statutes? It should be remembered that, within recent months, the Spanish communists have held a meeting in which they confronted each other and split on the question of abandoning the party's Leninist identity. There is no pretense in the socialist controversy but, rather, an awareness of how influential the will and capability of Eurocommunism are relative to a renewal of the Italian and European left, the will to go forward with coherence on the path of change.

[Question] In what areas should Eurocommunists still make "changes" and "modernizations"?

[Answer] I have said that I consider the criticism of Leninism in Craxi's writing accurate. I also find his writing correct in exalting the principles of freedom, pluralism and equality, thus characterizing socialism in regard to communism, as we have "always and everywhere" known. I also believe that the problem is not to eliminate "liberal pluralism" but to surmount it in the only way in which that is historically possible: interweaving freedom and pluralism with socialism, which, being such, cannot limit itself to a mere aspiration for freedom and greater justice. We are well-aware that in no Western country, even in those where government has been in the hands of social-democratic parties over a long period of time, has a pattern of society been achieved that can be considered socialist. That induces the Italian and European left, in all its components, to make an effort in the form of analysis and thorough renewal to find a new road to socialism. Moreover, we socialists would be committing an unpardonable error, if we left the monopoly of this discussion up to Berlinguer, since we have always considered that the "third way" is an integral part of our deliberations.

[Question] What do you think of the opinion attributed to Signorile to the effect that the PCI is not yet mature as a government party?

[Answer] It is precisely the PSI that carried on a long and difficult battle, at extremely high costs, to help put the PCI into the government. This is not the problem, and it will be all the less so on the European level during the next few years. The real problem, also indicated by Signorile, is that of having the left take the proper steps to obtain sufficient support to become a government force: therefore, not a problem of the "legitimacy" of the PCI but, rather, one of the "adequacy" of the entire left.

ITALY

PSI OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON CRAXI 'L'ESPRESSO' ARTICLE

Political, Ideological Perspective

Rome AVANTI in Italian 27-28 Aug 78 pp 1, 2

[Article by Claudio Signorile, Vice Secretary of the PSI]

[Text] One hundred years of history have taught us to be patient. And we will be patient, too, in these circumstances, in the face of the tone and quality of the communist polemic; the sloppy remarks of the Christian Democrats; the infantile opportunism of some Social Democrats; and the hasty willingness of some Socialists to be complacent in the light of the arguments and polemics directed against the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] by others. And, finally, we will be patient with the intelligent perfidy of the director of REPUBBLICA, who is always busily weaving an anti-socialist web, using various threads which are quickly interchanged for each other as occasion arises--a web whose pattern he does not seem to be able to bring to completion.

In fact, the questions involved are big ones, and they are such as to bring under discussion a system of relationships between the parties and a balance of forces which had seemed to be consolidated for a long time. The reactions to the socialist initiatives, although they were violent, did not surprise us as much as did the fact that they were presented as unforeseen novelties, disturbing modifications and iconoclastic overturnings of traditions and principles. Craxi's picture, which with one stroke of the pen cancels the past and makes ready the future, may gratify Scalfari's taste for middle-class theatricality (or, with firmer popular roots, call up reminiscences of the work of children in Macaluso's heart of hearts). That is not the way things are.

Craxi's essay was not the first and will not be the last contribution of reflexions and analysis which the group at the head of the PSI and a considerable group of intellectuals, trade unionists and socialist technicians are making to the working out of a socialist strategy aimed at creating a reinvigorated and restructured left.

The fact that the secretary of the party gets right into the debate himself is a sign both of the importance we assign to this work and of the great amount of democracy which prevails. The socialist project that was discussed and approved at the 41st Congress is the moment of synthesis which has brought the first phase to a conclusion. Now a second phase is beginning in which the themes and the substance of the project are developed and enriched in militant political work by the entire party, representing the combination into one element of all the actions and political and ideological positions through which the socialist presence is brought into existence in this country.

We are working to build up a governing left in Italy which is capable of assuming its position on the same level of representativeness and political importance as that occupied by the left in other European industrial nations against which we will have to be measured in the coming years in the political and economic structure of Europe.

Consequently, we do not mean a left that is capable of cooperating in coalition governments; that is a condition that is already familiar in Italian politics. The center left and the historical compromise, in reality, were strategies which were set in motion on the basis of this constant element of cooperation. They produced important but unsatisfactory--much less definitive--results. In any case, they no longer suffice, at present, to give political shape to social relationships, to the new values and to the institutional tensions which are being made evident in Italian society.

The PCI stuck, with evident uncomfortableness, with the strategy of the historic compromise. The PSI left the center left and laid down the strategy of the alternative as a unifying ideological image of its political and theoretical activities, not because it moved away from the Christian Democrats and came closer to the PCI but because it opposed the Christian Democratic hegemony over the government and the state and brought the hegemony of the PCI over the left under discussion. That is, acting as an autonomous force, it has raised the question of a far-reaching renovation of the Italian left as a phenomenon accompanying its rise to the status of a force in the government of a Western industrial democracy, and of a renovation of and a clearer identification of Christian Democracy as a force which represents, in a strategy of enlightened democracy, the majority of the moderate interests of the country, and even those of popular derivation.

Thus, if one desires to seek out the political boundaries of the PSI's renewed ideological initiative, they are quite clear. Within the government, there is an absolute commitment to the policy of national unity and to carrying out its program. We have already expressed our dissatisfaction with the way things are going, since we consider that a behavior by the government which must be much more rigid and ambitious if it wants to reach the goals which the majority has set up for itself is too closely linked to a daily emergency policy.

The qualitative switch from the emergency policy to the policy of national unity has actually not yet taken place, and the impending discussion of the 3-year plan will also provide an occasion for a confrontation regarding the fact that the critical economic and social conditions continue to worsen. Our commitment to the policy of national unity is all the firmer since we are not interested in returning to governments involving cooperation with the Christian Democrats. We say it once again, although frankly there would not be any need for it any longer now. We are interested in a calm and committed confrontation with the Christian Democrats on the subject of the development of Italian democracy, the big, strategic problems of our country and the economic and military alliances which are a feature of the international presence of Italy. We are also interested in such a confrontation because we are convinced that the conditions for a possible rotation also pass through basic choices which are common to the entire spectrum of political forces. We want to get to the bottom, with the seriousness and the respect we demand for ourselves, of the question of the relationship, on the left, between the socialists and the communists.

Why must this desire be presented as constituting a danger of an irreparable breach? Let us just leave the sermons and invocations to our zealous traveling companions. Facts are what count. In mass politics and in the politics of the local institutions, which are the two crucial sectors in relations on the left, there are no signs of a breach. The necessary check on the efficiency of various committees of the left and their ability to get things done does not lead to a crisis in the local political picture. And the continual confrontation in the trade union, which is even bitter at times, strengthens unitary relations rather than weakening them. To put it briefly, we must understand that there are several forces on the left, and not just one, and that discussing things, making comparisons and checking up on things are democratic necessities. Consequently, the question returns to its starting point: how can a governing left be built up in Italy in the next few years? We are attempting to explain to ourselves and to the country who the socialists are and what they want. But what does it mean to be a communist in Italy and in the Europe of the 1980s?

Craxi poses problems which we all know exist. In the debate on Leninism, there actually is an awareness of the need for new ideological and scientific tools in order to be able to understand the existing situation and change it. There are no such tools for making a "choice guided by emotion" either within or outside of capitalism. The capitalist system as it actually exists can be changed by changing the social relationships which justify its historical importance and not by changing the controlling class and its instruments of coercion. There lies the profound difference between Marx and Lenin. But that is also the difference between pluralist democracy and hegemony--not a squabble among scholars but a practical problem for the militant socialists and the militant communists in the Italian left.

Commentary on Signorile's Remarks

Milan UNITA in Italian 28 Aug 78 pp 1, 2

[Text] Rome--There are discordant voices and even opposing opinions in the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] in regard to Craxi's article in L'ESPRESSO. After an initial intervention by Cicchitto, who is close to Craxi, after the harsh polemic by Achilli, of the internal minority, and after the "conciliatory" intervention by Manca, Labriola (a De Martinian) and Signorile, who is a devoted friend of Craxi, now make their contributions. The first of these confirms, in responsible terms, the criticisms of certain more surprising aspects of Craxi's gospel; the second--accepting Manca's implicit invitation--attempts to "interpret" Craxi himself, muffling his tones.

Labriola, in the CORRIERE DELLA SERA, puts the PSI on its guard against "serenades under its balcony for not very romantic elopements," and then says, "The controversy on Leninism cannot and must not stop.... But the socialists must act within the left, not outside of it, in order to have any rights in the debate." Labriola rejects the attempt to "pursue positions which are not proper positions for the PSI" and the "equal sign" which somebody wants to write between the economic system of the society of free competition and the socialist doctrine and policy in Italy." And, he adds, "Socialism without freedom is an authoritarian regime; socialism and free competition constitute a marriage which is neither prudent nor chaste. And then it is an illusion."

Claudio Signorile tends--let us say--to reduce the noise stirred up by Craxi's unexpected sortie, taking the debate into a cultural-political channel which, he writes in AVANTI, "is not a squabble among scholars but a practical problem for the militant socialists and the militant communists."

Craxi's article is brought back--Cicchitto, too, had already written this--into the framework of a "contribution," which "was not the first and will not be the last," for "working out a socialist strategy." Also, where the problem of communists in the government is concerned, Signorile accepts the interpretation of his famous phrase of late July ("the PCI is not ready for the government") which Manca quoted the day before yesterday for conciliatory purposes. The question, in effect, he writes, is one of "building up a governing left in Italy."

In other words, the problem concerns the entire left: the socialists, who have left the center-left, and the PCI, which has left--Signorile writes--the historic compromise--that is, they have abandoned policies which "produced important but unsatisfactory results." Both parties must raise the question of "a far-reaching renovation of the Italian left" with themselves. That is all. There is nothing else, affirms Signorile, and the fact that "in mass politics and in the politics of local institutions,

which are the two crucial sectors in relations on the left, there are no signs of a breach" proves it. And the same is also true in the trade union, where "the continual confrontation, which is even bitter at times, strengthens unitary relations rather than weakening them."

Thus, the "dramatizations" which were carried out in Craxi's article appear entirely inopportune to Signorile. On the other hand, it must be said that Signorile does not repeat much of the contents of that article and that, instead, he insists on the necessity of "changing" the capitalist system and on defending Marx, all of which are subjects which Craxi, for his part, treated in a very different way (and that is what caused the "noise").

On the other hand, the Social Democrat Di Giesi returns, point by point, to the actual text of the secretary of the PSI, saying that "it may be more or less easy to persuade the workers to abandon the hammer and sickle for the carnation, but certainly not socialism for capitalism and neo-capitalism." The president of the Christian Democrats, Piccoli, too, makes his contribution on the entire question, affirming that the Christian Democrats certainly do not intend to "stand at the window" while a cultural debate as important as the present one on "Leninism and pluralism" is going on, but they want to separate that debate ("the conversation will be long because the situation is much more complex than the controversy makes it appear.... No one can become unconscious from the effects of just one blow") and the need to carry on, according to Moro's conception, "a patient confrontation between unlike forces" in order to bring the "third stage" of Italian society into being. And, says Piccoli, "ideological barricades" do not serve that purpose.

Signorile Interview

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 3 Sep 78 pp 15, 17, 114

[Interview of Claudio Signorile by F. D. V.--date and place not given]

[Text] Question: In Craxi's article, which was part of a program, some people saw an attempt to provide Italian socialism with a theoretical basis again--a Bad Godesberg that was really more extemporaneous than that of the German social democrats. Is that true?

Answer: Craxi's article was not the first and it will not be the last one contributing some of our deliberations and some of the analyses we are making in the process of working out a socialist strategy for a renovated and restructured left. This effort involves the adoption of new ideological and scientific tools necessary for understanding the present situation and changing it, and consequently it also involves a need to regenerate, and subject to criticism, the entire theoretical tradition and political experience of the movement of the Italian and European workers. The fact that the secretary of the party intervenes in the debate shows the importance we assign to this work.

Question: But doesn't this controversy with Marx through Proudhon cut you off from the ideological tradition of Italian socialism?

Answer: To look at these things in that way would be like evaluating the entire complex of problems agitating the Catholic world on the basis of the controversy between the fathers of the church. It seems very pedantic to me to believe that Proudhon and Marx can be used as antagonists today without an attempt being made to synthesize that which is contained in the theories of Proudhon which can be restored to the Marxian formulation. The polemic between Proudhon and Marx is historically dated. To present it today as an element of leftover, or excess, Marxism is a sign of insufficient investigation of the facts. There has never been an exclusive ideology of the PSI, but no one can question the fact that the main body of the PSI is Marxist.

Question: Are more concerns of a domestic or of an international nature, such as the coming European elections and the need to discover a soldier ideological communion with the Western social democrats reflected in Craxi's article?

Answer: I would say that our principal, fundamental concern, for the intermediate period, is to build a governing left in Italy which is capable of assuming a position on the same level of representativeness and political importance as that occupied by the left in other industrialized European nations. Thus, not merely a left which is capable of cooperating in coalition governments (as was done with the center-left and now is being proposed with the historic compromise). A strong programmatic and ideological pressure results from this effort. It found its first moment of synthesis in the socialist plan, but now it is entering a second phase involving more direct contact with everyday questions.

Question: The communists assert that Craxi selected a convenient adversary for himself--briefly, that he is quarreling with a Leninism of which there is no trace in the PCI.

Answer: We do not say that the communists have locked themselves into an orthodox Leninism. They are attempting to insert elements of pluralist democracy into the fundamental Gramscian interpretation of Lenin. But the political category of hegemony which justifies the organization of the PCI, its centralism, the quality of its internationalism and their view of relations with the other parties and with the social and cultural forces are in direct continuity and coherency with the Leninist matrix. No one expects abjurations, but stating the problems as they actually are must not cause a lot of excitement.

Question: However, one gets the impression of an open controversy, not for the sake of coming to an understanding but for the sake of quarreling. Even Pierluigi Romita says he fears a neoliberist slide.

Answer: We can assure the Honorable Mr Romita straight away that the danger he fears does not exist and we will allow him to finish his vacation in peace. For the rest, it is not we who have used harsh and aggressive language. For our part, we are trying to act in such a way that the left finally will be able to hold discussions without fear of ideological condemnations and excommunications. We will never become anticomunists, and perhaps it is really this which people find annoying. That is, the fact that a great political force, having entirely recovered its autonomy, is operating on the left without any sort of opportunism and without any collaborationist disbandments is found to be annoying.

Question: So, what do you ask of the PCI, in practice?

Answer: To state clearly what it means to be a communist in Italy and in Europe in the 1980s. Specifically, to explain what a governing force of the left is in a Western industrial democracy. Eurocommunism was a formula which raised many hopes, but it has not provided the results that were promised. I would like to say, in response to Berlinguer, that there are no examinations to pass but there are roles to be played and political spaces to be filled.

Question: So, according to you, there is no contradiction between the controversy with the communists and the declared goal of working for the alternative of the left?

Answer: We initiated this controversy specifically because we want to work toward changing the political direction being taken by the country, and we want so much to do this that we confirm our refusal to return to governments involving cooperation with the Christian Democrats and our commitment to the policy of national unity. A confrontation with the Christian Democrats on the development of Italian democracy is necessary because the conditions for a possible alternation with them pass through basic choices which are common to the entire spectrum of political forces. But the question which is being investigated resolutely, seriously and with all due respect is the question concerning relations between socialists and communists on the left, because the problem of a governing left will be decided within that relationship.

Question: Can Craxi's positions create disorientation in the party and reopen a struggle among factions?

Answer: Craxi posed real problems. There are others, and they, too, will be posed. In the course of its history, the PSI has succeeded in bringing various contributions into unitary synthesis: from the liberal socialism of Rosselli to the libertarian socialism of Luxemburg, the class themes of Morandi and the profound feeling for the people of Turati and Treves. If, in this stage of our history, one tries to apply the arrangement involving contrasts between groups and factions, the calculation turns out to be incorrect. Anyone who wants to do that inside of or outside of the PSI will soon realize his error.

Question: But you Lombardians do not feel embarrassed over supporting a secretary who is accused of thrusting the party into liberal socialist positions?

Answer: I do not see how something that does not exist can cause embarrassment. The actual behavior of the PSI gives the lie to any inference of a thrust toward liberal socialist positions. The truth is that most of the members of the party have learned to engage in discussions without splitting apart and to understand that the copiousness of the debate strengthens rather than weakens if it leads to a political synthesis.

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ITALY

RICCARDO LOMBARDI (PSI) ANALYZES CRAXI'S L'ESPRESSO IDEOLOGY

Rome PAESE SERA in Italian 31 Aug 78 p 1, 3

Interview with Riccardo Lombardi, PSI leftist leader, by Giorgio Fanti, of PAESE SERA]

[Text] Lombardi: We polemize with the PCI [Italian Communist Party], but with the same aims in view. He rectifies the theoretical structure of Craxi's essay.

Is the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] changing its outlook and its strategy? The question has been asked in Italian political circles ever since Craxi's "ideological" article that was published by ESPRESSO. What is left of the leftist alternative, on which the Midas agreement was established, that led Bettino Craxi to the PSI secretariat, with the guarantee of a socialist left? I spoke at length of this with Riccardo Lombardi, leftist leader, who was the true and constant inspirer of the alternative. Lombardi's answers take a completely different direction from Craxi's reflections. Avoiding excessively direct polemics, Lombardi explains Craxi's article almost as if he wanted to "rescue" it. No, the left has not "completely disappeared," as commented with somewhat hurried satisfaction LA REPUBBLICA. It is a plan--the prospect of socialism in Italy can only be considered a plan, a dialectical one, one that is also resisted by the parties of the workers' movement--that is substantially and necessarily unitary. Riccardo Lombardi, perhaps the only socialist leader who has never stopped taking the entire history of the various aspects of the workers' movement into account, repeated to me one of his old, but also very current, theses: the vicissitudes of the PSI and of the PCI as such are not what matter. Rather, they matter only to the extent that they are instruments of a socialism that is to be realized. This is what counts, well beyond party or group polemics and rivalries, on which one dwells a little too much.

Riccardo Lombardi, socialist leftist leader, has also decided to intervene in the discussion that was started within the PSI and the left by Bettino Craxi's "theoretical essay." He did this by means of an interview with our newspaper (the text is on page 3) which appears very discreet in form,



Riccardo Lombardi

but quite strict with respect to the substance of the argumentations. The theoretical structure of Craxi's essay ("it is not free of simplification and one-sidedness," says Lombardi) has been completely rectified by the leader of the socialist left. It is not a question, he says, of trying to seek stainless ideological ancestors. Both the PSI and the PCI, from an ideological and cultural point of view, are glorious mixtures."

However, Lombardi defends Craxi's political intentions: "I exclude that there is any desire for rupture...to clarify, or to try to clarify, leftist ideological relations should serve to promote unity among diverse currents... There is no credible lot in Italy for a left that is split vertically. But I add that it would not likely exist for an indifferent left, one that is devoid of the guarantees for genuine internal dialectics."

Lombardi's proposal is based on this premise. The left must "provide an explicit and credible" plan which will furnish a new, non-capitalist model for development: thus, a joint program. "I well know," adds Lombardi, "that the proposal of a joint program is opposed because it is deemed to be an option for the alternative, therefore incompatible with the "historical compromise" plan. And yet, if one wants that "third way" out for freedom from capitalism that is sought by both the PCI and the PSI, this is where one must begin."

On the basis of this stand of Riccardo Lombardi--which follows the much harsher and polemical one of Francesco De Martino--one may perhaps better understand the motives of Craxi's "restrained" position in his recent interventions, with respect to the contents and the tone of the "theoretical essay" of mid-August. Troubled by the effects provoked not only in other parties, but within the PSI, itself, the socialist secretary has preferred to give a different dimension to the significance of his essay (defined by Lombardi as "a pamphlet," while the followers of Craxi had characterized it as a new PSI ideological platform).

Today communist historian Paolo Spriano also intervened in RINASCITA. He complains in particular about the way the discussion has been carried out: "It is not with a sub-machine gun burst against Lenin's thinking; it is not with a sharpshooter's shot against Gramsci that progress will be made. Perhaps, the biggest error that we communists could make," adds Spriano, "would be to submit to the certain trouble that is generated by those intimidating techniques. There are indeed matters to be discussed, immense theoretical and cultural problems to be dealt with, without fictitious contrapositions. We will do this, even if Craxi does not help us."

Fanti: After Berlinguer's interview came Craxi's article. One might think that the parties of the workers' movement are taking stock of their ideological baggage. Colletti has spoken of a "cultural Upim" [expansion unknown]. What do you think of that?

Lombardi: Craxi had recourse to a pamphlet--because it is a question of a pamphlet--in order to establish the ideological identity of the PSI, because he was spurred on, I believe, by Berlinguer's derogatory appraisal of the supposed cultural general confusion of the socialists. One can therefore understand why both Berlinguer and Craxi have chosen to refer to ancestors--Berlinguer, to Cavour, with incursions as far back as Vico; Craxi, to Proudhon, with incursions as far back as Robespierre--in the vain effort to show, through a search for paternity, the stainless purity and the four-fourths legitimacy of their present being.

Vain effort: the marriages of our ancestors have included many mixtures of blood, so that one may realize that both we socialists and our communist comrades, from an ideological and cultural point of view, are glorious mixtures. The difference perhaps is that we are aware of it and consider the plurality--which is not eclecticism--of inspirations to be positive.

Fanti: Craxi's article seems to be motivated by a priority objective, opposition to the PCI. What is left of the strategy of the alternative and of unity with the PCI which is its presupposition?

Lombardi: Precisely because it is in the form of a pamphlet, Craxi's essay is not free of simplification and one-sidedness--hence the questions about his political intention in the near and intermediate future. I exclude that there is any desire for rupture, which furthermore has been contradicted by the almost contemporaneous interventions of Signorile and Cicchitto in AVANTI! To clarify, or to try to clarify, leftist ideological relations should serve to promote unity among diverse currents, while to obscure them leads to confusion and to subjection, not to unity. There is no credible lot in Italy for a left that is split vertically. But I add that it would not likely exist for an indifferent left, one that is devoid of the guarantees for genuine internal dialectics.

Fanti: Craxi at any rate presents almost a century of Italian socialist history. The PSI that emerges is a liberal-democratic party, or a libertarian-democratic one...

Lombardi: Let us keep out of the matter of intentions. The characteristic of simplification to which I alluded before seems very clear in the context of the almost exclusive reference to an umbilical cord from Proudhon to Italian socialism, when instead Italy's "democratic socialism" stemmed precisely from the rupture with "libertarian socialism" during the Constituent Congress of 1892. Everyone knows how greatly the Italian party was influenced by the German social-democratic model--as furthermore were all the other socialist parties of that period--a model that was anything but anti-Stalinist. And neither did the work and the activity of the followers of Merlino and of Bernieri have an important influence on this.

The libertarian, anarchist, trade union, revolutionary, etc. currents were formed and operated outside, or against, this. Let us tell the truth. The proper priority with respect to matters of freedom and of pluralism in a society where the means of capitalist production also were suppressed was imposed on our generation following the experience of leftist totalitarian despotisms. And it is also with a fresh look, and in the context of a society that is much more complex than that in existence when Proudhon made his forecasts, that we must review and bring up to date, as is now being done with difficulty, the theoretical and ideological patrimony of the left.

Fanti: Is it possible to reduce socialism to a guarantor democracy and to pluralism, as Craxi does? And have the structures of capitalism, the "free" market, goods, etc. become "values" to be preserved?

Lombardi: Pluralism cannot be a value in itself without reducing itself to a mere liberal guarantee. Neither does the presence of the market offer it structural support unless within a still capitalist hypothesis. Socialism cannot be the only impartial guarantor of the plurality of the political and social forces. A state socialist administration must aim not at the glorification of the market, but at the reduction of commercial production and trade relations, first of all by removing the characteristic of material things from the work force. It is in the difficult relationship of market, planning, and self-management, extended progressively to all levels, that the future of socialism is decided today.

Fanti: Let us return to ideology. In addition to history, Craxi also deals with theory. I am speaking of Marxism and of Marx, who was not even mentioned...

Lombardi: You indeed know that within the PSI, during the most recent congress, the problem of the unique Marxist ancestors was a topic of discussion, and it still is. I will therefore repeat to you my personal position, which I also do not believe to be an isolated one. Marxism is certainly a scientific theory; that is, a verifiable generalization at the empirical level. It was inevitable that it experience the lot of all scientific theories; that is, that of being overtaken by the research which it, itself, unleashed. As a theory, it has a proper place in the history of theories, without calling into question the results that we have inherited. Today we cannot use it exclusively without risking, as has occurred for 40 years, making only an ideological use of it, in the second of the Marxist senses of the term; that is, of an adulterated reality. This does not at all signify repudiation of Marx and Marxism, or Marxists.

Fanti: If Marx is ignored, Lenin is reviled. Is it not too rash to reduce him to a total bugaboo? And where will we put the Lenin of concrete analysis and of imperialism?

Lombardi" With Leninism also we must take stock without excessive simplification. Let us not forget that a good part of Lenin's thinking was inherited from the ideology of the II International. The rupture with Kautski occurred as a result of the October decision. The dictatorship of the proletariat was not invented by him. Leon Blum, himself, upheld it at the Congress of Tours as a temporary democratic dictatorship. That the temporariness was cancelled not only by proletarian unpreparedness, but also by the violent conquest of power, we all learned later! Also, the introduction of class consciousness on the part of bourgeois intellectuals. Lenin inherited this from Kautsky.

And, finally, the part that today is most subjected to leftist criticism, and also ours, of Lenin's thinking, that is, the presumed already socialist nature of the bourgeois productive structure, for which it would be enough to socialize the means of production, that is to nationalize them, in order to go on to socialism, maintaining hierarchies and centralization ("to speak of abolishing the hierarchies and of self-management is the thinking of the small bourgeoisie") stems from the ideology of the II International.

Much of the "Leninism" that is rejected today is part of a great revolutionary's policy that was directed toward modelling communist parties according to a plan in support of a revolution that was obliged to retire within itself, in the USSR. I do not believe that the theories concerning imperialism, certainly to be brought up to date, merit the same judgment. Having said this, I believe that the review of this subject in course within the PCI is progressing and, I think, irreversible. I believe that to compel the PCI to advance in this direction is to wage a good fight in the interest of the entire left. But the communist heresy with respect to the dogmatism of the heirs of Lenin is of more concern to me than Lenin, himself. Heresy generally leads to schism, but what concerns me is that it has a profound basis. Luther interests me even without the placarding of the theses on the door of the Wittemberg cathedral.

Fanti: The Italian left, according to Craxi's written commentary, has "definitively disappeared." Is there nothing more for socialists and communists to do together?

Lombardi: If the socialists and communists, and I would add all the forces of the leftist class, truly believe in a leftist way out of the crisis, they have a primary duty: to provide an explicit and credible plan to show how they intend to implement their objective, with what intermediate stages, towards what model of development. Capitalism certainly is not extinct. We must analyze the spontaneous tendencies toward revival and intervene with a plan.

Fanti: Speaking of the "revival of capitalism," are you perhaps alluding to the possibility of extending the area of social benefits, health, sports, leisure time to the capitalist market?

Lombardi: It is the hypothesis that I personally brought forth at the recent socialist congress. I see that in a recently published book by Jacques Attali this hypothesis is backed by a convincing analysis and, what is more important, a strategic plan to face and to deal in a democratic and socialist manner with the spontaneous implications of a society that is enslaved both nationally and internationally. Whether the hypothesis is good or not, we have to compete with today's capitalism if we want to be credible. A careful analysis of contemporary capitalism, of its evolution, of its international conditionings, should be the presumption of any strategy for anyone who has really learned Marx's lesson.

Fanti: Something has been achieved, it seems to me...

Lombardi: Yes. Even some significant progress; for example, with the "socialist plan," especially with respect to defining the institutional channels to guarantee a procedure leading to a self-administrative socialism. But in order to be credible a commitment by the entire left is needed--one that will show how it intends to overcome the problem that has existed since the rejection of the "dictatorship of the proletariat": that is, how to assure the endurance of a reformer government with respect to socialism during the time needed for the first real reforms to produce benefits for the masses, and how to make sure of such endurance without restricting freedom--rather, by increasing freedom and participation.

Lombardi: The real crux of the ideological contention, in my opinion, is the party's concept that the communists are still considered the only socialist-type "legitimizer" of any reformer or revolutionary undertaking. This is the heredity that is most questionable in the "Marxist-Leninist" dialectics, which ends by clashing with the Hegelian dialectics in the sense that both assume the rationality of the historical process to be their own and therefore their aim, an aim to be attained by communists through the guidance of the party, which possesses the theoretical keys to interpret the course of history. We have recently seen how great the influence of this theory is in practice by the communists' explanation of the motivation for the different behavior regarding the intervention of the Soviets in Prague and in Budapest; an intervention that was approved in the case of Budapest because "the movement there had slipped from party control"; condemned, instead, in Prague because "the party completely controlled it." A very disquieting criterion should another Budapest materialize.

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ITALY

FORMER PSI SECRETARY DE MARTINO LASHES OUT AT CRAXI

Text of L'ESPRESSO Interview

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 3 Sep. 78 pp 12-15

[Interview with former Italian Socialist Party Secretary Francesco De Martino by Paolo Mieli]

[Text] De Martino accuses Craxi: (1) of breaking with Socialist tradition; (2) of venturing into risky polemics; (3) of flirting with the right wing of the DC [Christian Democratic Party]; (4) of engaging in anticomunism--in sum, a declaration of war.

Naples. For many months, Francesco De Martino had not been giving any interviews. Often in recent times he had also deserted the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] summit meetings, in other words, the party whose secretary he was until the end of 1976. But when, last week, he read Craxi's article published in L'ESPRESSO, Francesco De Martino decided to break his silence and received me on the terrace of the villa at Monte de Procida where he spends his vacation.

Question: Mr. De Martino, during the debate prior to the socialist congress, you admonished everybody not to leave Marx up in the attic. What do you think of the piece written by Craxi who does not seem to listen to your admonition?

Answer: Well, I was afraid that the attenuation of the Marxist character of the Socialist Party would imply negative consequences not only for doctrinaire reasons but because of the party's political and social struggles and the inevitable transformation in the concept of socialism itself. This would also have hindered us in proceeding to a serious in-depth study of the problems of socialism in our time which cannot be tackled with the help of doctrines harking back to other epochs but which can receive from them valid guidance in terms of methodology and the always up-to-date vigor, in spite of the vicissitudes of more than a century, in spite of the maximally liberating concept of man. This is why, during the congress debate, I particularly dwelled on the topic of Marxism's up-to-date character, of course, a critical Marxism confronted

with historical experience, not something schematic or dogmatic and certainly not an ivory-tower Marxism, as they said. But my fears were well-founded. It was said then that Marxism continued to be one of the various currents of thought that inspired the PSI but today it is being rejected in a more or less implicit fashion. In criticizing Lenin, what sense does it make to bring up Proudhon if not to refute Marx' concept of socialism? Proudhon as a matter of fact was not a contemporary of Lenin but rather of Marx and Engels, with whom he had some bitter polemics.

Question: But does this not seem to you to be a rejection expressed in exclusively doctrinaire terms, without any immediate political consequences?

Answer: From this rejection springs the consequence that economic pluralism, understood as a plurality of economic power centers, is democracy's only safeguard and that socialism consists in expanding democracy. But without the abolition of the material interconnections existing in a system dominated by private interest groups, no kind of full liberty can be completely achieved. The permanent existence of the capitalist economic system was not theorized by the champions of social democracy during the last century, not by Bauer or Kautsky, nor--to remain in Italy--by Turati in his time or by Saragat, in our time. Only Bernstein--after Engels' death--refuted Marx' doctrine and even went so far as to admit the need for the private enterprise system--and from that developed the tendencies of a portion of modern social democracy. The latter however can never become the PSI's position, unless we want to break with all of its history, not only with the history of recent years, and unless we want to turn it into an entirely different party.

Naturally, reaffirming a Marxist socialism does not mean sustaining a bureaucratized collectivism with all of the consequences, nor any kind of revolutionary dogmatism. We are quite aware of the fact that it takes a long period of time for the transition to socialism in whose course--on the basis of growing popular consensus--one can proceed to the necessary reforms in the economic system in a gradual fashion and step by step experimenting with new means of system organization because there is no real and proper model of socialism that is based on democracy; it is therefore necessary to invent the whole thing within the social reality of our time.

Question: You do not find that PSI--in the light of its past--has been permeated by Leninist culture?

Answer: I would not say that the PSI is permeated with Leninist culture. The party experienced a moment in its life over the past 30 years when it did engage in Leninism. That happened at a time when Morandi, together with Nenni, was the party's top leader. It was a fleeting moment, originating to a great extent from the social democratic split. But Leninism had even then been criticized by Lelio Basso who was inspired by the doctrine of Rosa Luxemburg. I am not even sure that the Leninism, whose standard bearer Morandi had become, was theoretically well rooted in the very convictions of the man who proposed it. That position however was done away with at the 1957 Turin congress and

the PSI asserted its autonomy within the Italian labor movement. The party at that time undertook a critical revision of its concept, clearly tackling the problems posed by the development of the October Revolution and the construction of a social economic system in which not only political liberty had been destroyed but where an economic structure, dominated by an oppressive bureaucracy, had been built.

Question: In your opinion, is there still something valid in the lesson of Lenin?

Answer: As far as Lenin is concerned, his revolutionary theory has rather little to offer to the countries of the West. In particular, it has little to offer to Italy in terms of its current development conditions, in spite of its permanent and profound inequalities, including geographical ones. However, it remains the doctrine of a grand revolutionary who adapted Marxism to the conditions of tsarist Russia and who seized the opportunity of the break up of absolute power, presented by the war, in order to open the road of liberation to the ravaged oppressed masses of the Russia of that day. It is true that the germs of authoritarianism were contained in Lenin's position but it is also true that it was certain that the state was destined to wither away as a coercive power and this turned out to be historically a big illusion.

However, responsibility for the successive Stalinist distortions to a great extent cannot be blamed upon Lenin's doctrine and even less so on Marxism but upon the objective and subjective conditions among which one cannot help but include the attempts at counterrevolution and international encirclement, the country's level of development, its history down through the centuries, and the personality of its major protagonists, starting with Stalin.

Question: More generally speaking, Mr. De Martino, what do you think of the present cultural offensive of the socialists with regard to the communists?

Answer: The topics under discussion are real and have not been invented. They were present in our debate also in the past. The cliche of a party which is sometimes lazy, inert, and subordinated and which, at another time, is active and fully aware of itself--that is nothing but propaganda. Nenni, more than all the others, but I, too, had bitter debates with the communists and with Togliatti on the topic of socialist democracy. But we were guided not by a kind of spirit of competition but rather by the conviction that it was in the interest of the worker movement as a whole to resolve its own problems. Our inspiration was aimed at unity and even during periods of utmost political tension--such as at the time of the communist attack against the left-of-center government--that preoccupation never left us.

Question: But do you not think that a frank debate between the two biggest parties on the left would be useful?

Answer: Today one can be alarmed over the tone of the debate and the manner in which it is being conducted. Did the French experience not teach us anything at all? The more bitter the polemic becomes, the more advantage will

the moderate and conservative forces derive from it. It is not without reason that we feel that there is a core of consensus around the PSI, not just among the social democrats, which is entirely legitimate, but rather also of right-wing forces--and that constitutes reason enough for worry. It is clear that many expect a grave and irreparable break in order then together to beat the socialists and the communists and thus to stop the process of revision which is underway among the latter and to push them back into closed and sectarian positions.

Question: And do you share Craxi's criticism of democratic centralism?

Answer: As far as democratic centralism is concerned, I do not believe that this is an acceptable way of internal organization but neither is a party divided up into opposing currents, with the consequence of permanently having a majority and a minority: it is even worse to relegate the latter to a function of pure control over the majority. The problem of assuring maximum internal democracy--without weakening the united strength of a fighting party--has not yet been solved.

Question: The socialists have in recent times been raising evermore severe objections to the policy pursued by the PCI over the past decades, to Togliattism, in short.

Answer: Togliatti had tried to tie in again with the grand classical currents of liberalism, particularly Francesco De Sanctis, and he understood the peculiarity of the Italian political system, with the existence of a mass party of Catholics. His choices are debatable, like any other. But one cannot deny their originality and importance if one realizes that the Communist Party's theoretical character was not blurred by them. On the political side, one must not forget that the Nenni-Togliatti tandem was for several years the symbol of a great common hope for millions of workers.

Question: What do you think of the PSI's initiatives during the Moro kidnapping and on the occasion of the referendums?

Answer: The PSI's decision in connection with the Moro kidnapping was correct. This was the only possible thing to do for a party that supports humanitarian socialism. The ways may be debated but the thing that counts in matters such as these is the substance of things. As far as the socialist position on the referendums is concerned, I did not manage to understand what coherence there might be in supporting a "no" for the repeal of the two challenged laws and at the same time going for a "yes" regarding one of them, the Royal Law.

Question: And what about the PSI's performance during the presidential election?

Answer: The exigency for electing a socialist president of the republic was more than legitimate. The possibility of success sprang from the very policy of national unity. The accord with the other political forces made the choice

fall upon Sandro Pertini and it was a happy choice because Italian democracy had a debt to pay to a man of integrity and courage who had devoted his life to the intransigent struggle for liberty. As far as I am concerned, my candidacy was proposed by the party without any request on my part and I withdrew from the race the moment Pertini's name came up.

Question: In some of the [city] councils, the socialists preferred to ally themselves with the DC although they could have chosen to put a left-wing majority together. As you see it, is there any danger of a return to the preferential DC-PSI axis or to the left-of-center setup?

Answer: I do not think that a return to the left-of-center setup is possible. That policy belongs to a period of time that is very much different from the present one. The cases involving these councils however reveal that, along the periphery, relations between socialists and communists are difficult and are negatively influenced by the climate of the national polemic. The danger which I see is rather the danger of isolation or of becoming the center of attraction for right-wing forces. These forces are trying to turn the PSI into the most suitable instrument for beating the communists. We must be more aware of that risk and we must therefore employ political means to dispel it.

Question: After the congress, you did not hamper the work of the PSI leadership group. Does that mean that you are completely in accord with Craxi or do you think that something is going well in the party's policy?

Answer: I thought that it was the duty of a military man--to whom the party had in the past entrusted great responsibilities--to help strengthen its internal unity. That also implies the decision to release the minority current which had rallied around my positions. That does not mean renouncing theoretical and political convictions going way back, nor does it mean renouncing the intention of expressing disagreement or criticisms when necessary, without of course introducing anything prejudicial. I do not agree with the present majority on important issues, as you can see from what I said before. I am alarmed by the sometimes capricious search for differentiation; I am worried about the tone, the method, and the topics selected for the polemic within the left, as well as the hasty and summary judgments on the DC. I cannot understand how any of the present leaders would prefer right-wing forces in the DC--considered more sensitive to the requirements of the socialists--over the present Christian democratic leadership which expresses the most progressive portion of that project. That is one way to weaken the national unity policy which on the other hand is strengthened and implemented with great rigor and coherence because the Italian crisis is far from having been resolved. The Socialist Party--which was the first to lay down the premises of such a policy and to pursue such a policy--has been fighting for many years and should be the one that would be more interested than all the others in the success of that policy. From that national unity policy's success springs the only certainty for safeguarding democracy from the many pitfalls to which it is exposed and from the foreseeable effects of a prolongation of the economic crisis.



Francesco De Martino

Francesco De Martino

EPOCA Interview

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 29 Aug 78 pp 1-2

[Text] The polemics between socialists and the communists--triggered by Craxi's article-essay on Leninism--is now shifting also inside the PSI itself. After the first skirmishes, those of the socialist "new left" of Achilli and Codignola, the old boss, Francesco De Martino, took to the field against the theses of the young secretary.

The conflicts between De Martino and Craxi are nothing new; even before the Turin congress, as a matter of fact, the former secretary frontally attacked the "socialist draft" drawn up by theoreticians close to the positions of the new, overwhelming majority which can see the autonomists of Craxi united with the Lombardians of Signorile. These groups, by the way, during the congress phase, were joined by many former "followers of De Martino" and former "followers of Mancini." One therefore does not know what the opposition, lead by De Martino--from whom Enrico Manca dissociated himself officially and instead moved "dialecticallly" close to Craxi--can count on today in the PSI. But (and until such time as we know what moves men such as Giacomo Mancini will make) one can certainly say that the tough anti-Craxi remarks from the former secretary can constitute a reference point for all of those who are dissatisfied with the new course.

De Martino, whose positions [are always supported by] Nevol Querci (who had intentionally requested a meeting of the leadership to reconfirm the party "line") is thus renewing his accusations and aiming straight at Craxi's liberal socialism." And he hints at the possibility of splits--looking to the PSIUP [Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity], just to understand what we mean--which, if such a policy were to persist, could spring from the party. And then, in a more or less conspicuous manner, the former leader calls for a "line" which is the exact opposite of the one advanced by Craxi. And if the bitter debates with the PCI are not terminated, De Martino adds, there will also be the risk of early elections.

De Martino--who says all these things in an interview which EPOCA is about to publish--tends to depersonalize his charges. Even in the light of the possibility of a split, he says, he will not change parties "at his age." But Querci, his faithful follower, is secretly talking about the "integralist" design of the new majority. He asserts that Craxi and Signorile "cannot pretend to be, at the same time, the right, the center, and the left of the PSI." Thus, the former De Martino followers are trying at least to recover the former Lombardian left which presently has barely been replaced by that of Achilli (a scant 6 percent in the party).

What does Craxi, the secretary, reply to the opposition's criticisms? He replies by denying the proposal for a break up on the left. If anything, as Signorile underscored yesterday, the problem is to give the PSI a strength, "a strategy and a program" which would be less "meager" than those it had so

far. Craxi, Signorile emphasizes, wants to give the PSI the "concrete capacity to implement a different political design, as an alternative to that of the ruling classes." But that does not convince the opponents of the new socialist course. Here, in summary, are the charges made by Francesco De Martino against the PSI secretariat.

(1) Craxi jettisons overboard the PSI's Marxist tradition and, as De Martino observes, "a party which rejects its own history probably does not have a future either."

(2) The PSI's future on the other hand--regardless of what the young secretary might think--cannot be blended into the confusion of a "generic democraticism and the recognition of so-called economic pluralism." The PSI must maintain its own basic perspective which "means replacing the system of private ownership of the means of production with a socialized [nationalized] system."

(3) The polemic opened up against the PCI's Leninism is incongruous also because--as De Martino notes with malice (obviously referring to Nenni, Craxi's illustrious mentor)--"it would be truly inconceivable if the PSI--which sustained a policy of unity of action with the PCI during the times of Stalinism--were today to assume a bitterly polemical position toward the communists, when there is no longer any Stalin and when the PCI is on the road of revision."

(4) If things go on the way they are going now, there is the risk of transforming the PSI into a social democratic party. Hence, "there is a risk that a portion of the PSI, which is more sensitive to the need for maintaining its original mold, might leave the party."

(5) From the new course one cannot expect any opening toward the liberals but rather more breaks on the left, between the PCI and the PSI. The assumptions as to connections with the PLI, De Martino says, are as a matter of fact "phenomena that are picturesque, rather than political, taking into account the forces which are involved and considering what the liberals represent." The danger, instead, is that the right wing might exploit those polemics in order to break up the front of the left-wing forces.

(6) The PSI's strategy--in spite of everything and regardless of what Signorile says (De Martino does not say so but he is obviously referring to the recent interview given by the vice secretary)--resides in bringing the PCI, now no longer Leninist, into the government. De Martino makes it clear that this would be "a useful thing. Naturally, I know"--the former secretary continues--"that there are difficulties here which partly come from the DC and which partly spring from motives of an international order which we cannot overlook. Our demand therefore is to push toward the overcoming of these obstacles, promoting the process now underway among the communists, a process of achieving autonomy from the Soviet Bloc and opposing the Christian Democratic lockout."

And if the PSI does not move along that road, if instead it continues along the path charted by Craxi, initially, during and after the congress, then there are going to be bitter debates not only inside the PSI. De Martino as a matter of fact says that he is "afraid" also of the possibility of early elections, considering them to be a danger to the country.

There will however be another danger: the former socialist secretary as a matter of fact concludes by saying that "the polemic now underway within the left" causes him to fear also the possibility of early elections "although seeing the dangers to the country as a whole."

EPOCA Interview Analyzed

Rome UNITA in Italian 29 Aug 78 pp 1,11

[Text] The discussion on Craxi's article-essay last week is continuing and taking shape and the polemics are emerging in more precise outline. The protagonists increasingly are the socialists themselves, among whom there is considerable worry over the abrupt "turn" advertised by the PSI secretary. Former socialist secretary Francesco De Martino spoke out authoritatively yesterday in an interview given to the weekly magazine EPOCA which was released early by the news agencies. But others continue to speak out on the socialist side: Nevol Querci, who is close to Manca, challenged Craxi rather sharply; and Signorile, who--in contrast to the Craxi text--continues to come up with more moderate and conciliatory interpretations. De Martino's interview so far is the most important and well-considered reply to the theses and "theories" of Craxi with the PSI. A very broad conversation of which, with authority and sturdy culture, is worthy of certain statements made by the PSI secretary and which concludes with preoccupying admonitions as to the possible consequences of certain new and surprising posture statements by the present socialist leadership group.

The parties always need to revitalize themselves, De Martino said in the interview, but that does not imply the need for "a break" with their tradition. "As I see, on the other hand, the prevailing direction of the current majority is aimed at a break, a very radical break, with the party's history, rather than a renewal of continuity." And that is grave because: "A party which rejects its own history probably has no future either."

In Craxi's article, De Martino detects a "more explicit definition of a concept that had emerged already at the time of the Turin congress when the party's Marxist character began to become attenuated." De Martino recalls that Craxi, in his article, in reality never mentions Marx directly but what he wrote is directed not only "against Lenin" but also against Marx, implicitly, through the "references to Proudhon" who had a bitter debate with Marx and with Engels. De Martino does not agree with that attack, nor does he agree with the concept of socialism, stated by Craxi, as a "generic democraticism and a recognition of the so-called economic pluralism which signifies the permanent continuation of economic power centers, including private one." The need now is to maintain the fundamental features "of a

socialist theory worthy of that name": a theory that must naturally be updated to the present but always sticking firmly to the fact that "the socialist idea means replacing the system of private ownership of the means of production with a nationalized system."

The interviewer then asked De Martino for a judgment on the PCI. "The PCI of today is certainly different not only from what it was 30 years ago but also from what it was 10 years ago," said the former PSI secretary. The PCI is being encouraged on the road of "revisionism in a democratic direction" while "I get the impression that the way in which some socialist leaders conduct this debate will in the end have consequences different from those that we hope for." De Martino added that he did not think that a general attack on the PCI was fair: "Among other things, it would really be incredible for the PSI--which sustained a policy of unity of action with the PCI at the time of Stalinism--today to assume a bitterly polemical position toward the communists, at a time when there is no longer an Stalin and when the PCI is on the road of revision." De Martino emphasizes that while the need for a debate between the two parties is justified, "the tone is wrong" and it seems that it is especially the PSI which is trying "to take up more space." Responding to another question, De Martino said that today we in effect have a "rejection of the traditional principles of the PSI" and there is a risk that one might wish to repeat the unfortunate experience made by Saragat of "transforming the PSI into a social democratic party." And this "in the face of a Communist Party which has adopted many socialist theses as its own, this could mean that the portion of the PSI which is most sensitive to the need for maintaining its original mold, might leave the party." If the PSI were increasingly to become the party of "democraticism"--the next question went--what then would your party be? "I would feel very bitter," was the reply, "to see such a phenomenon. What can I say? My party, in the ideal sense of the term, would no longer be my party. In the political sense, yes, because I do not believe that, at my age, one can switch parties."

The former socialist leader then listed the points of agreement and disagreement with Craxi's leadership of the PSI: agreement on the attitude in connection with the Moro affair, the choice of the chief of state, the line of national unity expressed at the Turin congress; disagreement "on the rejection of principles rooted in the party's history" and on the method pursued in implementing the, albeit legitimate and meaningful demand for increasing the strength of the PSI in the internal relations of the left. But this strengthening has a positive meaning only if it comes within a context of "not weakening the entire left." De Martino then said that he was alarmed "by a certain consensus that comes to the PSI from the right, a consensus that involves the long-standing attempt of Italian conservative forces to push the party into positions leading to a break up of the left-wing front."

What is his judgment of Lombardi's silence during this phase? Ask him, De Martino replied, and then he added: "It certainly seems to me that many

of the exponents of this current have been pouring water into the wine with regard to the positions of the past."

De Martino then took up the topic of Leninism which, he says, is properly charged on the historical level but which "is not a current political topic in the sense that the PCI in fact is not Leninist; in other words, having accepted the democratic method, the constitution, and having faithfully practiced those procedures for more than 30 years, I do not see how one could accuse the PCI now of being Leninist." De Martino then at length and with well-arranged arguments took up the issue of the judgment on Leninism: "Leninism has very little--if nothing--to offer to a socialist party or even a communist party in the West. Leninism is not Lenin's entire political concept throughout his life. It is his theory at the time of the October Revolution or shortly before. It is an adaptation to the conditions prevailing at that time; it is not a philosophy. It is a revolutionary theory elaborated in order to push a people into revolution under certain conditions, that is to say, war, the break up of absolute power, etc. From that angle, the judgment of a consistent socialist is bound to be in substance positive regarding Lenin's revolutionary action under the conditions prevailing at that time and it is certainly not to be taken as a universal model for political action." The development of Leninism in the USSR, De Martino then maintained, is also tied to the development of the reality in that country and it is therefore "somewhat far-fetched to assert that, if the USSR adopted the political and social system which we criticize and which we do not accept, this is due to Lenin's theories and to them alone, disregarding the influence of other factors."

As far as Marx is concerned and "as far as whatever is alive in Marx is concerned," De Martino asserts that--beyond all of the things that are certainly outdated because they are tied to his times--"that which remains valid is the idea of the class struggle which, in our time, naturally has features different from what they were in those days." "But," he added, "the class struggle, also in the field which democracy renders more civil, is a point which remains strong."

De Martino then talked about the current political situations. He expressed a "rather positive" judgment on the positions recently also concerned by Lama, adding that he would have wished the similar positions "had been adopted at the time of the left-of-center [administration].". Regarding the historical compromise, he said that he always considered correct "a policy of accord between the DC, the socialists, and the communists" but "not as a phenomenon to which one should give a permanent historical character." As far as PCI participation in the administration is concerned, De Martino said that "this would be a useful thing." There are obstacles of an internal and international character but "our need is to push for overcoming those obstacles, promoting the process now underway among the communists for achieving autonomy from the Soviet Bloc and opposing the Christian Democratic bloc lockout." As for the possibility of early elections, De Martino said: "The polemic now underway in the left makes me fear that possibility also,

although I do see the dangers to the country." Does he intend once again to plunge into party affairs? This is one of those conclusive questions: "I will certainly be active although in a manner slightly different from the usual way. But I do not want again to become involved in the interplay of currents. I do however wish to express my opinion on things that happen."

The De Martino interview certainly is destined to open, without any further reticence, the basic debate which the type of article written by Craxi for L'ESPRESSO triggered. A debate in which so far neither the "historical leaders" nor, with adequate force of reply, all of the other major socialist leaders have become involved (with the exception of Achilli and Manca). But challenges to Craxi in the PSI continue to be registered also independently of (that is to say, before) the De Martino interview. Yesterday, Nevol Querci of the Manca group spoke out resolutely, saying among other things that, if the confrontation within the left and its evolution are useful, "then one is starting off on the wrong foot by pretending to speak for the PSI, in this confrontation, identifying it with one of its historical components which traditionally however was in the minority--that is, the liberal-democratic component." That way you wind up "stripping the PSI of the fundamental aspects of its traditions: Morandi, Basso, Lombardi; democratic participation as a way to overcome liberal democracy and economic planning as a way to overcome the capitalist market." One thus risks the "expulsion of the PSI from the area of the historical left, making it a competitor, not of the PCI, as was said, but of the DC." If "the ideological gap which is today being created should become unbridgeable, then the consequence will be a political breakup of the left and that will be something irreversible"--and, this, in spite of any good intentions of unity-oriented flag-waving.

The unity intention, Signorile emphasized in a speech at Rimini, is beyond discussion; what is asked by the socialists side today is "a left in government which means building, in the country, a lineup, a strategy, and a program of the left which will express an alternate design with respect to that of the ruling classes and the political leadership which has governed since the Resistance and until today."

From faraway Brazil, where he is on vacation, PSDI [Independent Social Democratic Party] deputy secretary Pietro Longo sent a statement indicating, among other things, that the Andreotti cabinet should "last another 2 or 3 years" and that it "would not survive a single day without the support from the PCI, the PSI, and the PSDI"--parties which, together with the DC, are "even more united, after Moro's tragic death, in the effort to save Italy from chaos."

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ITALY

CRAXI RESPONDS TO 'AVANTI!' EDITORIAL

Text of 'AVANTI!' Clarification

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 30 Aug 78 pp 1, 2

[Article by Bettino Craxi]

[Text] The tempest of speeches and statements unleashed on a recent article challenging Leninism leaves us, to tell the truth, more than a little taken aback.

When I was asked for an opinion on Leninism, I thought it proper to express it freely through a rereading of Marxian and non-Marxian critical writings, in which there is absolutely nothing new. The challenge that emerged from that rereading is clear: its roots have long drawn their sustenance from where they are nourished today, and subsequent and more recent events have merely served to prove their soundness. There is nothing behind so simple an act as this in the way of crafty maneuvers such as some people have claimed to descry, nor yet in the way of sneaky Macchiavellian calculation. Nor was it an about-face, as some have mistakenly charged, if it is true -- and true it is -- that even the "Socialist Proposal" adopted by the Turin congress spelled out in black and white the reasons why our Party stands "at the antipodes of Leninism." Neither was it a political attack on the Italian Communist Party [PCI]. The fact is that, in the article in question, the matter for analysis -- admittedly incomplete and therefore demanding further and still more probing exploration -- is the essential theoretical core of Leninism, which laid the earliest foundations for the Soviet power in the construction of that society which today calls itself "real socialism."

The direct target in this case was not the PCI, nor yet the PCI's Leninism, which calls, if anything, for further specific treatment and raises still other questions. In any case, the question of the "validity of Lenin's lesson" was not raised by us.

Many of the ideological proclamations which, in a few lines dictated in the shade of the beach umbrellas -- some of them picking up on the theme of "Leninism and pluralism, but most of them missing it -- traced the ancestry of the good and the bad, and amount to nothing more than polemical junk in which ignorance and bad faith are seasoned with a little pinch of betrayal. To my eye, the remarks of a few communist intellectuals seemed more worthy of attention, when they tried to dig deeper and came up with arguments that will be helpful in moving the debate forward, and admirably eschewed the devices of excommunication and intimidation.

What I did find troubling, though, was the continuing attempt to distort, even now, the general orientation of the Italian Socialist Party [PSI]. In the first place, the hypothesis -- more extravagant than malicious -- that holds that our theoretical challenge to Leninism is designed to implement a plan for the establishment of a "great non-confessional bourgeois party," whereas the Socialist criticism emerges from solid domestic and European worker-movement tradition, and depicts, as an alternative to Leninist communism, a non-confessional, democratic, and pluralistic concept of socialism. It is not straying from the historical and class ground of the left to reject the identification of socialism with statism; to reject the patterns of bureaucratic and illiberal collectivism; to challenge the totalitarianism of "real socialism"; to assert that the "transition" to a socialist society is not a transition toward a total state takeover of the economy, with all that would entail at the level of social institutions and organizations; to argue that the democratic transformation of our capitalist society in the direction of socialism will not, by any known necessity, mean the destruction of our patterns of pluralism, even in the economic area. The assizes of the Turin congress had had occasion to state that, "with our feet on the ground, [we must] raise the issue of a gradual transition toward forms of socialism in Italian society as a rational response, one consistent with the general interests of the collectivity, to the decadence and crisis of capitalist society and its traditional values. A socialism in democracy and in freedom, within which everyone who works for a living, as well as those who work as responsible entrepreneurs in the private sector of the economy both for their own living and for others, can meet and recognize one another."

Is it this that gives such offense? Is it recognition of the compatibility between a socialist transformation and retention of a regulated market and of private sectors of the economy? True, the 1848 Communist Manifesto does rule that out but since those days the working-class movement has accumulated a multiplicity of experience, all of which must be looked at critically. History's experience tells us clearly that total state takeover of the means of production opens the way to a bureaucracy-ridden totalitarian society.

We are not alone in our belief that on this particular point Marx and Engels were wrong. Is saying so tantamount to severing our umbilical cord with socialism? To argue that it is either to parrot an attitude both awkward and dogmatic, or to grasp at a theoretical straw. Marxism is still, in fact, part of democratic socialism's intellectual and moral dowry, precisely because it has proclaimed, loud and clear, the right of every man -- no matter what his class, his religion, or his race -- to substantial freedom. In this sense, contemporary socialism can call itself Marxian, but it must also admit that it is revisionist. The great effort at research and intellectual inquiry now being put forth by the socialist culture both inside and outside the instruments of the Party is not directed at severing the Party's ties with its history, but, if anything, at separating, for an overall critical view, the various strands of a multifaceted and complex tradition, laying out clearly all that is still valid and timely, and separating it from whatever is obsolete and outdated. If, as a result, ideas begin to circulate with greater clarity and impartiality, and if at last the books are dusted off and read, then the end result will be anything but untoward.

We are asked whether discussing such issues having to do with the future of socialism is good or bad for relations among the parties of the left. At the Turin congress, one of our slogans was "unity in clarification." It is still timely, and it is still the arena in which we shall take our stand.

If clarification gains ground, so will unity. It was the lack of quick and timely clarification that precipitated relations between socialists and communists in France into a devastating crisis. There are those who ask us whether perhaps a debate on fundamental principles might not distract the political forces from their day-to-day responsibilities, which are burdensome, difficult, and fraught with unknowns. In our view, this will not happen. We have our feet firmly planted on the ground, and we know what our responsibilities are toward our country, toward the workers, toward democracy, and toward the political parties. In our national unity policy we shall not renounce our role as a party of progress and of reform. Within the left, we shall not leave off pushing the ideas of democratic, non-confessional, pluralistic socialism.

At the Turin congress we said that we viewed as "foreign to the reality and acceptability of the socialist transformation in our country all principles postulated by Leninist theory, and as totally outdated the historical implications deriving from them for so great a part of the Italian left," and we emphasized the way in which "socialist criticism has become more pressing" precisely because "it aims at stimulating the stagnating communist process of revision."

The PCI congress, already imminent, is a good occasion to allow the Socialists, too, to take part in a debate that concerns the entire left, and from which, if we were motivated by a prejudicial desire to make a break, we should withdraw; whereas, on the contrary, our intention is to contribute to clarification with critical minds, with well-founded opinions, and also with our irreverence toward dogma, fetishes, and myths of whatever sort.

And that is, indeed, a contribution that runs in a direction opposite to that of Leninism.

Reasons for Issuing Clarification

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 31 Aug 78 pp 1,2

[Article by Beppe Lopez]

[Excerpts] Polemical trash, bad faith, just a pinch of betrayal, distortions, extravagant hypotheses: these are the expressions Bettino Craxi uses, in the front-page editorial in this morning's AVANTI! to describe most of the statements and articles evoked by his "essay" on Leninism. The PSI secretary might not have plunged into the fray so quickly and directly, had he not found himself the target when he returned yesterday from a holiday in Tunisia, of a merciless attack from Francesco De Martino, the man he replaced as PSI leader in 1976.

Until that time, only Achilli had taken a really drastic stance against him (while his ex-opponents, Manca and Macini, were saying -- or letting it be known -- that they more or less agreed with him). The steely challenge of the former party secretary convinced Craxi that he must explain himself immediately -- and look to his defenses. And that is what he has done, denying that his aim was to build "a great non-confessional bourgeois party" or to liquidate Marxism. He says that all he did was to express an "opinion on Leninism," and that "behind so simple a thing there is none of the maneuvering people have claimed to see, nor yet any Macchiavellian calculation." He is particularly intent on making it clear that his essay is "not a political attack on the PCI, either."

Analysis of Other Alternatives

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 30 Aug 78 pp 1, 2

[Article: "The Prophet's Beard Is Growing Back"]

[Text] The Psi secretary, coming home from a well-earned vacation, found the air reeking with gunsmoke over his "essay" that appeared a fortnight ago in ESPRESSO. He must have been disconcerted by the searing attack De Martino launched against him --

to which yesterday's AVANTI!, in the interests of pluralism, devoted a total of 15 lines -- and even more by the fulsome praise heaped upon him by Italian moderates in the hope that the Socialist Party is at last going to break its mooring-lines to the left and venture into navigation on the high seas.

Contemplating the contradictory reactions crowding in upon him from all sides, Craxi had two possible ways to reply: he could drive home the arguments set forth in his essay, or he could water them down a little. He chose the latter. That is a sign that he had gone too far in his iconoclastic campaign against the greybeards of Marxian socialism. The excuse that he was misunderstood or maliciously misinterpreted hardly stands up: both rightwing and leftwing interpreters read the essay in the same way, some of them to agree with it, others to take issue with it.

And what happened to him was the thundering misfortune of finding himself unhorsed by an attack from the left by the Special Democrat [PSDI] secretary: a thing unheard of, even in the notoriously unpredictable annals of Italian socialism.

We, in any case, are sticking by the authentic interpretation of the PSI secretary himself: he had not intended to reject Marx at all; he has no intention of advocating an ideological recasting of his party; he has no desire to transform it into a non-confessional bourgeois party.

Well, then: is that little ideological and political midsummer storm over, and has the left simmered down?

Despite Craxi's reassurances, that is not the way things stand. On the other side of the smokescreen of theoretical debate lie two practical issues which are still unresolved.

1. The Socialist secretary has, in the past 6 months, won the Oscar for publicity, hands down; now he urgently needs to capture another award, this time at the polls. If all this publicity does not turn into votes very soon, the new PSI leadership will have its hands full trying to hold onto its solid control of the Party. That is why Craxi's newly unveiled "hard nose" -- despite today's semi-retraction -- dare not soften. This fact generates an element of weakness in the national unity majority, which will, beyond any doubt, have to put in some very hard overtime thinking in connection with the tremendous task of breaking out of the crisis.

2. The Socialist Party, ideology apart, seems to have chosen its new device, and it is guaranteeism, meaning the protection of individual rights, so often trampled upon in a mass society and by the democratic drive toward access. It is a choice that enriches the subject matter of the political debate in our country where, until now, guaranteeism was the exclusive -- and wistful -- banner of the tiny liberal minorities. But whatever the

actual opinions of Craxi and of the authors of the Socialist Plan may be, their opting for guaranteeism undermines some of the very foundations of Italian and European socialism. It is a major decision. But, if they follow it through consistently, it will change the nature of the Party and of the consensus around it. Maybe it will prove to be a sound venture. But was the Party consulted on so momentous and delicate a matter? Has the Party given its consent? Or are they, as they attack Leninism down there on the Via del Corso, embracing the methods of Leninist centralism? There are indications that such may well be the case.

Possible Effects, Implications

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 30 Aug 78 p. 1

[Article: "Craxi Reaffirms PSI's Commitments"]

[Text] Craxi replies to all his exegetes, friendly and otherwise, who, following publication of his essay on pluralism and Leninism, have filled up the political columns of the newspapers with their articles and statements. The Socialist secretary replies, in an editorial in AVANTI! this morning, mainly to those who, like Ugo La Malfa, fear that this squabbling between the PSI and PCI may damage implementation of the governing platform.

Craxi also responds to those who glimpsed, in his position, a more subtle intent, even perhaps that of a new convergence with the DC outside the national unity policy.

"Thunderstruck" by the "rain" of comment and statements triggered by his essay (the latest of which was De Martino's global challenge of every word Craxi had written), Craxi now says that "back of so simple a thing" as his critical rereading of Leninism, "there is nothing of the maneuvering people have claimed to see there, nor yet anything akin to Macchiavellian scheming." On the contrary -- as he reads the admissions pouring in from all sides not to let himself be "distracted" from the real issues -- he repeats emphatically: "We have our feet firmly on the ground, and we are aware of our responsibilities to the country, to the workers, to democracy, and to the political parties."

These statements from Craxi should clear the ground of the doubts and suspicions set afoot mainly by those who, annoyed at his challenge to Leninism, attributed to the Socialist secretary sinister designs for the immediate future. And, as for the Party, Craxi's reply to his own internal De Martino-Achilli left wing (both are prominent spokesmen for the PSI who have come out against him) denies any intention of building "a big non-confessional bourgeois party." If anything, he says, the plan lies in building "socialism in democracy and in freedom, within which, as they support it with their contributions, all those who work for

a living can meet with and be recognized by those who, acting with entrepreneurial responsibility in the private sector of the economy, work both for themselves and for others."

Again, brushing off De Martino's criticism charging that Craxi had severed the PSI's ties with its traditions (a criticism repeated yesterday in an interview with communist Gianni Cervetti) the secretary points out that contemporary socialism is "both Marxist and revisionist" at one and the same time. And he adds that "the effort at research and intellectual elaboration" upon which the PSI is now engaged "is aimed not at severing the Party's links with its history, but, if anything, at spreading it all out for an overall critical look at all the strands of a multifaceted and complex tradition, singling out and distinguishing between what is still valid and timely in it, and what is outmoded and superseded."

Lastly, insofar as his argument with the PCI is concerned, Craxi has no trouble noting that "socialist criticism has become more cogent precisely because it aims at stirring up the revisionist process, which is stagnating among the communists."

In this sense, that is, the socialists are seeking to contribute to the current process of clarification within the PCI, rather than, as some charge, to halt the process of clarification which may well receive formal sanction at the coming communist congress.

There is no way of knowing whether or not Craxi's remarks will soothe the unrest stirred up by his essay. Ugo La Malfa speaks, in an article in today's VOCE, which of course cannot have taken Craxi's own latest remarks into account, for all who have felt that unrest.

The Republican leader recognizes the fact, as did philosopher Lucio Colletti the other day, that the left, as a whole, is "practically flat on the ground" when it comes to practical issues. He reminds us that back in 1965 he taxed Amendola and Ingrao with "the question of what attitude the communists might take with respect to an advanced industrial society," and, says La Malfa, while this uncertainty in the PCI is no less than in the PSI, "the bitter truth is that neither the PSI nor the PCI, though in their programs they implicitly or explicitly reject the experience of real socialism, has entirely grasped either the potential or the tasks of a left wing in a modern industrial society."

Therefore, again in La Malfa's view, "the gravity of the crisis our country is going through is attributable to the mistaken or inadequate knowledge of the real conditions of which Colletti speaks, for which the DC is one of the forces responsible."

In substance, given the crisis -- actually the state of emergency in which we live, La Malfa is, in the main, calling on the left to be practical. "Without narrowing the scope of ideological debate," he writes, "emergency politics should demonstrate a radical change in programmatic action. Thus far, no such turn-about has occurred." Therefore, the Republic leader concludes, "when Parliament reconvenes the Republicans will be expecting the communists, the socialists, the Christian Democrats, and the labor unions to provide that decisive proof by spelling out a policy for combatting the crisis, one which will bring us back closer to Europe again, or, failing that, to persist in a policy that increasingly alienates us from it."

This deep concern of La Malfa's should be laid to rest by Craxi's article; and in any case the PSI's pledge to come up with a program within the next few weeks will be the test case for Craxi's real intentions.

We must, on the contrary, wait and see how the secretary's words are clarified in the debate they have touched off inside his own party. In an interview in L'ESPRESSO, De Martino, who earlier accused Craxi of trying to banish Marx to a garret, now says that "the more bitter the polemics, the more advantage the moderate and conservative forces can draw from them." De Martino also perceives the risk of "isolation, or of becoming a magnet for the rightwing forces." And he goes so far as to accuse the PSI leadership of preferring, "to the present DC leadership, which speaks for the more progressive portion of that party, the powers on the right wing of that same party, which it sees as more sensitive to the Socialists' problems."

The former secretary once more says emphatically that he is against resurrecting internation factions, although this does not mean waiving his right to voice his own personal dissent. And, for his part, the leader of the tiny "new left" faction, Michele Achilli, says that Craxi's views are actually the "majority slate program." Therefore, argues Achilli, Craxi will find arrayed against him "sectors of the militant rank and file, comrades of the left who, at the congress, joined with the majority." Therefore, while on the one hand he rules out a return to factions, on the other hand that seems to be the only way to canalize dissent from Craxi's line. Unless, of course, he is contemplating the schisms to which De Martino referred yesterday.

From this angle, obviously, the Communists look better: their organization man, Cervetti, also in an ESPRESSO interview, reaffirms the validity of his party's democratic centralism, as a "rejection of the habit of factionalism which," he says, "does not allow a real truth, or even a free discussion of ideas." As for polemics with the PSI, Cervetti resorts, as usual, to the carrot-and-stick tactic. First he reminds his readers that "the uniqueness of Italian socialism cannot be maintained with silences, not to mention officious erasures, in relation to its past. Then,

after this reference to the PSI's frontist experience, Cervetti comes back to emphasize "the need for strengthening unity between socialists and communists."

So the argument between PSI and PCI goes on, with its highs and its lows and, as it continues, it is forcing the other parties, too, to take note. In the Social Democrat Party [PSDI], Di Giesi's suspicious attitude is overlaid by that of Preti, who "approves" Craxi's efforts, and then turns to attack De Martino's "frivolous allegations." In the PSDI spokesman's view, the former Socialist secretary is falling back to "old positions" -- a reference to state ownership of the means of production -- which "not even the Eurocommunists" support any more.

The Liberals are obviously keenly interested in this whole debate. "The idea," says Costa, "is to find out whether the internal and external pressures on the PSI will merely manage to rein in Craxi's initiative, or whether they can actually stop the PSI secretary from sandblasting away layers of ancient incrustation." This possibility, however, is emphatically denied by Neo-fascist [MSI] spokesman Servello, who says that "Italian socialism cannot be compared with the continental-style socialdemocracies, because it lacks the courage to jettison Marxism."

Survey of Reactions

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 31 Aug 78 p 2

[Text] Craxi's "clarification" in the wake of the "cloudburst" of polemic that beat down on his anti-Leninism essay, has helped give us the measure of the power enjoyed by the young socialist leadership. In fact, while his article in yesterday's AVANTI! repeated and sharpened Craxi's criticism of PCI policy -- albeit more cautiously, as UNITA' notes, with satisfaction -- the fact is that his "clarification" was designed for internal use only.

This was the front along which De Martino's savage attack was launched, incorporating coarser ones from Achilli (whose "new left" accounts for 6 percent of the PSI) and Querci (a dyed-in-the-wool De Martino backer). And, in the words of the aging leader, custodian of the PSI's ideological traditions, in addition to threats of schism along the fault-line of the PSIUP split, there was a glimpse, at least, of an inevitable reopening of debate over the Party line. There were even those who cried out that the Socialist program adopted in the Turin Party congress had been betrayed.

Things have not, however, yet come to any such pass: none of the PSI's front-line spokesman seconded De Martino. Not even those like Mancini and Manca who, although on opposite sides, have not thus far been recognized within the new Craxi-S. gnorile majority. And, since the Craxi article was perceived as an attack "from the right" on the PCI, its critics, inside and out of

the Party, where hoping until yesterday that Roberto Lombardi, the "noble father" of the agreement from which sprung the so-called axis, would disavow Signorile, Cicchitto, et al., or the young comrades in factions allied with Craxi. That, however, is not the way things turned out.

Riccadro Lombardi, like Mancini and like Manca, further clarified the meaning of Craxi's essay, and staunchly defended its substance and soundness. So there are no major splits inside the PSI. The Craxi line thus emerges even stronger from this testing. That means that the communists will have to reckon, and not only ideologically, with a PSI that is not "split down the middle" but is still more actively reaching out for room of its own. And, on the horizon, for the left alternative -- with the PCI itself -- which, however, as Macaluso confirmed yesterday in an interview in IL GIORNO, the communists have "valid reasons" not to welcome.

Riccardo Lombardi, the undisputed leader of the Socialist left, in an interview in PAESE SERA, thus asserts that the "pamphlet" (his description of Craxi's essay) is a specific response to "Berlinguer's disdainful assessment of the socialists' cultural confusionism." And, as to the references to "forbears" (ranging from Proudhon to Marx) cited both by Berlinguer (in his REPUBBLICA interview) and by Craxi, Lombardi observes that: "One would think that both we Socialists and our Communist comrades are, from an ideological and cultural point of view, glorious halfbreeds. The difference," Lombardi adds, "is that we are become such by consciously considering plurality as a good thing, which is not inspirational eclecticism." Lombardi goes on to dismiss the notion that the Craxi article "is a cover for an intention to make a break, and to emphasize the point that "to clarify things, or try to clarify them, in the ideological relations of the left, must perforce make it easier for those who differ to achieve unity." Then, after challenging the renunciation of Marxism, which is in any case not the PSI's "only ancestry," Lombardi returned to the difficult matter of the joint Socialist-Communist program to transform the capitalist society. The old leader of the Socialist left admits, in this connection, that "the proposal for a joint program is encountering resistance because people believe it means opting for the alternative, and is therefore incompatible with the historic compromise. And yet," he grants, "if we want that third way out of capitalism, which both PSI and PSI are seeking, this is where we must make a beginning."

Finally, after defending the Craxi line, and after once more urging the "joint program" which the PCI will not hear of, Lombardi ends his interview with some more serious criticism levelled at the PCI. He charges the PCI, in fact, with persisting in its view of the Party as "the sole authority empowered to attest to the socialist character of any undertaking." And he says: "Just

how burdensome that theory is, in practical terms, we have seen just recently in the motivation the communists ascribe to differing forms of behavior toward Soviet intervention in Prague and in Budapest: "That intervention was approved," Lombardi reminds us, "in the case of Budapest, because the movement there had broken away from Party control; it was condemned in Prague, because the Party there was in full control of it. And that," argues the veteran leader, "is a frightening criterion, should there be another Budapest."

Lombardi's statement will probably be used to heat up the polemics between Communists and Socialists. And, this time, the PCI will have no advocate within the PSI to give weight to its countercharges. Only yesterday, in fact, we read an interview with Giacomo Mancini, another of those not completely "aligned" with Craxi's secretariat, who, addressing a rally at Maola, openly defended the young leader.

Mancini observed -- just as Lombardi does -- that Craxi was not out to write "a new Bible: he merely set out -- as he has every right to do -- a stimulating argument, and thus touched off a debate which may well prove useful and productive." And, as for the Communists' responses, Mancini observed that "It is certainly true that for some time now the initiatives, the suggestions, and the general behavior of the PSI have been subjected to exaggerated critical assessment and to suspicious, nitpicking scrutiny."

At this point, then, we may expect still further exaggeratedly critical assessments from the communist side. One of these "assessments" is already to be found in the forthcoming issue of the PCI's ideological weekly RINASCITA. It is written by Spriano, one of the Party's leaders and its official historian, and it is a pitiless dissection of Craxi's essay. In it, Spriano says: "Such flimsy foundations admit of very little substance to discuss. This, however, will not cause us to flag in telling our Socialist comrades," Spriano goes on, "that the kind of tone and expedients we see with increasing frequency in their press, while suitable as training material for skinhead commandos, are not fit for cultural debate; they in no way further the open comparison of ideas, political democracy, or pluralism. It is not with a burst of machinegun fire directed at Lenin's writings, nor yet with sniper fire aimed at Gramsci, that we shall make progress."

Obviously, tougher than that you can hardly get.

Meanwhile, over on the right, the "national democrat" deputy secretary, Cerullo, says it is certain that De Martino's attack on Craxi is an indication of how difficult it will be for the PSI to achieve internal clarification and break away from "Communist hegemony." To make this goal more readily obtainable, says Cerullo, "we need a fourth liberal-democratic party to be born at the same time."

Craxi



— Non ti preoccupano le reazioni dei comunisti?

— No, mi preoccupano le reazioni dei socialisti.

Citizen (looking at Craxi's statement that "socialism is irreconcilable with communism")

"Aren't you worried about the communists' reaction?"

Craxi: "No. What worries me is the socialists' reaction."

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ITALY

CRAXI CONTINUES IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE WITH TV INTERVIEW

Excerpts From Interview

Rome AVANTI in Italian 1 Sep 78 p 2

[Text] Some of the discussion topics brought up in the article in the L'ESPRESSO were taken up again by comrade Craxi in an interview on TG2[television channel].

"I believe," Craxi observed, "that I have said some rather obvious things; I believe that nobody can deny that illiberal societies sprang from Leninism, where the basic liberties are in bad trouble, and that socialism instead is the exaltation of liberty."

The issue of Leninism's timeliness, Craxi pointed out, "was not brought up by me; that issue was raised and I was asked for an opinion and I expressed it, as was my duty."

"If you blow a little bit of the dust away from the books and if you get your brain to work, if you get the ideas to work, the whole thing," Craxi maintained, "is not a malignant and bad thing; it all depends on where those things can lead. A well-stated and well-conducted debate, above all taking place in good faith, among the principal conversation partners, can in the end produce useful results. In this sense, I am not at all worried that an ideological war has started. This is a discussion which by the way is being conducted throughout the entire European left."

In response to the question as to the more general political level, regarding the government, the present balance of power, and the emergency majority, there can be repercussions and Craxi replied: "It seems to me that Andreotti is not getting far with Leninism, nor with the policy of national unity, in the sense that we have a very clear picture of the discussion, a clear view of the general principles and the prospects of socialism in Italy and Europe as well as the contingent responsibilities, closely tied to a reality that is very complex and very difficult. But, with regard to that, I do not believe that there will be any effects, there must not be any negative and immediate effects for us."

Regarding the judgment on the PCI, Craxi said: "We are on the eve of a debate which is opening up in the Communist Party with a view to its congress and it is perhaps not entirely fair to express a judgment today; it is better to judge and to participate in this debate with respect to which we are not indifferent and it is better to reserve our judgment on the decisions which the Communist Party's congress will make, decisions which we hope will not only be decisions tied to present time but which will also involve an ideological revision which has been hinted at or advanced in several ways and which we hope will be further advanced by the Italian communists with courage."

"We think," Craxi explained, "that the prospects of socialism in Western Europe and in Italy are tied to the advance of the ideas of a democratic, lay, reform-oriented and progressive socialism, moving in a direction that is not the direction of Leninism."

"I do not wish to be lacking in respect for a personality of contemporary history who played a great revolutionary role. But I think that his teachings no longer have any validity for society today and for the prospects for socialism in this part of the world."

Asked whether the communists could get into the government without this revision, the party secretary observed: "It was the Christian Democrats who turned thumbs down on the idea of letting the communists into the government, I believe, for reasons which have little to do with the debate on Marxism and Leninism."

The political debate continues to assign broad space to the problems raised by comrade Craxi and within the PCI likewise, the first irritated and nervous reactions leave room for more placated remarks and more careful reflections.

In PAESE SERA, Aniello Coppola talks of the "happy provocation by the socialist secretary" thanks to which "the Italian left continues to have discussions." "Craxi," Coppola wrote, "had stated a real problem and it was necessary to clarify it completely." And he added: "Although the Italian left must take into account not only its own ideal tradition, but rather a credible program of transition to socialism, no one can simply stand by with his arms crossed, every party must come to grips with the problems posed by the crisis."

In an interview given to a weekly, devoted mostly to international problems, Pajetta said that he hoped that, in the debate opened on the left, "everybody would take a good look at things" and that the confrontation should not come about "on pretexts." But that we are not dealing with pretexts here is demonstrated precisely by Pajetta's repeated assertions on Leninism, absolved in a block following prior cataloguing in a "historically-oriented" dimension (where historical orientation, for the PCI, often signifies "justification" of everything one cannot or does not wish to subject to critical analysis and ideological revision).

The Hon. Romita, the social democratic secretary, also took part in the debate; he declared that he was "of one mind" with Craxi's position "from the political angle." Romita however expressed some "ideological" reservations regarding "the Marxist interpretation of history." Romita observes that one can accept the invitation to moderation in the debate on the left "so long as moderation does not mean the choice of half-truths which wind up being half-lies."

Summary of Press Reaction

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 3-4 Sep 78 p 2

[Article by Giorgio Rossi]

[Text] On the TV screens, Craxi honed his polemic with the PCI to a fine point and the communists yesterday came out swinging, in force. Cossutta in L'UNITA, Ingrao in a speech, and Tortorella in an interview on TV responded to the socialist leader with quite different tones and accents--a signal that a broad debate is very probably going on within the PCI on this score. Other politicians also became involved, including La Malfa and Piccoli (this is the first time the DC officially adopted a position on the polemic).

"We have not the slightest intention of concealing," said Ingrao, talking at the L'UNITA festivities in Genoa, "the errors of integralism, the illusory Jacobin sallies, the authoritarian solutions with which, in certain countries and at certain moments, the class movement--and we, in it--mistakenly tried to come up with a response to the tremendous crises that shook capitalist society." But the severe self-criticism, which must not be developed, must be turned "into a necessary weapon for moving ahead."

Ingrao recalled "the fundamental historical fact of life"--the mistakes that were made and the heavy price that had to be paid did not stop the worker movement's advance, the awakening of the vast masses, the emergence of "a richer and more complete concept of modern democracy." "We are the children of that history," said Ingrao, "and we do not in the slightest intend to downgrade" the bond which constitutes "the prime source of our roots in Italian and European society and in our modern age." The great topics of self-government for the working class and the masses had not yet been resolved in the countries of the East; the social democracies have been aiming at a state which would correct but which would not change the production structures: this is why people are looking for a third way.

Tortorella, the cultural officer of the PCI, took up the "ideological" aspect of the polemic. The Italian communists are not tied to the USSR by any kind of umbilical cord; they have many criticisms to express but they do not wish to "unleash anathemas" against the Soviets, nor "lower themselves to a kind of crusade." According to Tortorella, "Leninism is not historically accomplished [complete] and one therefore cannot identify Soviet society with Leninist society."

The PCI is "for a pluralist society; it is for reading the lesson of Lenin which is our reading, which was given by Gramsci and by Togliatti" and which therefore is different from that of the other communist parties or the other scholars. Lenin is "a great revolutionary who opened up a new road on the path of humanity; but he is not a Bible, he is not a Gospel, and neither is Marx. But that does not mean throwing him overboard; let a debate come, but let it not be instrumental."

In an article in the party's daily, Cossutta is very tough and shows that he wants to cut the whole thing short. He maintains that these "noisy and often rather pretentious disputes" can "weaken the unity-oriented commitment of the working and popular masses." The polemic now underway "has struck a blow at the image of the left-wing forces. Their unity and the validity of their policy has been obscured; here we might think of the rather unfair and unfounded attack against the lack of maturity on the part of the PCI as a governing party." The "line of differentiation" between the left-wing parties, according to Cossutta, can only help promote plans for "new-type" political lineups which "would only be travesties of an old and mistaken policy, a kind of up-to-date center-left."

If the polemic is not merely slanted toward the elections--La Malfa for his part writes in VOCE REPUBBLICANA--then we will see that during the coming discussions on the character of the program; there are too many contradictions between those who profess Western ideologies but who specifically act in a different way.

La Malfa recalls that some of the courageous positions of Lama, the austerity policy proposed by Berlinguer, the firmness of the communists in the defense of the authority of the state were rejected, ridiculed, or viewed with suspicion by those who claimed to be more "Western" than they. If the polemic now underway removes these contradictions, it will have been useful and in good faith; but if this does not come about, "it would be useless to talk of national unity policy and a common struggle against the emergency."

Piccoli, who signed a long article in POPOLO, informed the PCI about the "effort" which it is making about its "ardent commitment"--he does so by historically presenting the Marxist lesson as "an unpublished experiment," a project different from the one implemented in the countries of the East and different also from social democracy. In this context, Craxi's entire polemic "is pervaded," writes the DC chairman, "by the anxiety of alternately claiming the features of democracy of laicity, and of anti-ideological pragmatism, and finally, the pluralism which the PCI is seeking to regain." It is perhaps because of this that, in Craxi's polemic, there is no constructive part, although the debate seems to be opening up toward prospects "of a completely European democratic socialism."

DC, PSDI, PCI Reaction

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 1 Sep 78 pp 1, 15

[Text] The "ideological war"--as Craxi calls it--between the communists and the socialists will have no effect on the governing majority. The PSI secretary himself said that in a television interview. "It seems to me," said Craxi, "that Andreotti is not getting far with Leninism nor with the policy of national unity, in the sense that we have a very clear picture of the discussion framework, of the general principles, and of the prospects of socialism in Italy and Europe as well as the contingent responsibilities, closely tied to a very complex and difficult reality; but with respect to that," the PSI secretary pointed out, "I do not believe that there will be any effects; there must not be any negative or immediate or political effect."

This is precisely what the DC wants, for its part. In an article published in today's issue of IL POPOLO, Zaccagnini reaffirms his conviction that, in view of the serious problems to be solved in the immediate future, "the present political equilibrium shared by the democratic forces, which are united in a serious emergency situation, makes it possible to find suitable methods and instruments and permits the government to give the necessary rhythm to the implementation of the program commitments."

The DC secretary then reveals that the DC is aware of the "debate on the principles, on the ideas, on the social and political doctrine," in summary, everything that can contribute to clarity, "to the search for its own peculiarity and its own role, fighting against what Moro referred to as the conspiracy of mediocrity and lack of culture." But, observes Zaccagnini, this must not become an occasion for "factional conflicts but rather for serious confrontation, constructive investigations, and honest, long-range, coherent, and precise political choices."

The invitation to a "confrontation on the things to be done," the reference to concreteness, the idea of not "talking about anything else" thus overlooking the problems of the emergency, an idea which by the way is shared by all of the parties of the majority (and an idea which, as we have seen, was fully accepted by the PSI), all this is underscored also by the "Doroteo" co-leader Bisaglia. In an interview given to IL GIORNO, the minister for enterprises with government participation says as a matter of fact that it is not conceivable "to white-wash" relations between the parties or to let the debate and the polemic simply run out, nor is it true that one must think of the present and not "compromise the present political situation." Bisaglia adds that he is certain that "neither Berlinguer nor Craxi" failed to note this problem "because they know only too well that, if the so-called political framework is to be turned around by this debate or by any other motive of strong tension between the parties, then nobody else would have an alternate solution with greater stability to propose."

As a matter of fact, the search for an alternative to this situation is still an object of operations in terms of political architecture. There are

those who, like Lombardi, insist on a common program between the PSI and the communists, in juxtaposition to a possible moderate bloc. There are those who, like Romita, once again advance the idea of a "socialist area" which would act as the hinge between the communist left and the DC. This, to mention just a few assumptions and not to mention the assumption of the "historical compromise" which remains the communist strategy. Romita thus again proposes the "socialist area," made possible, according to the social democratic secretary, by the "new position assumed by the PSI." A "socialist area," writes Romita in today's issue of *L'UMANITA*, which would not simply boil down "to the mechanical sum of the two parties (the PSI and the PSDI--editor's note), which would not again run over the already known roads of artificial unification but whose real objective would be to arouse a vast consensus in social strata which still do not feel that they belong to the socialist movement."

According to Romita, the construction of this "area" would be one solution "for resuming the normal dialectic between the majority and the opposition which could extricate the country from a dangerous situation in which political relations would simply freeze up."

"From that angle," observes Romita, "we are rather worried by the caution with which the DC received Craxi's theses. These invitations to caution contain not only preoccupation over the maintenance of the political framework but there is also fear that the motionlessness, guaranteed by the launching of relations between the DC and the PCI would break up." As a matter of fact, Romita adds, the DC is aiming at the "solidarity" between all parties in order to continue to run the country by itself.

The social democratic secretary--quite correctly interested in a revival of his proposal for the "socialist area"--however forgets that politics are made not only with proposals that remain nothing more than proposals. He therefore cannot blame anybody if the PSI has so far remained deaf to the call of the social democrats, looking in a rather critical fashion rather toward the communists. In the television interview, Craxi just the same notes that the "no" to the idea of letting the communists into the government did not come from the socialists and above all was not determined by the ideological disputes on the left. "Turning down the idea of letting the communists into the government," said Craxi, "was the doing of the DC, I believe, for reasons that have little to do with the debate on Marxism and Leninism."

On the communist side, however, the debate opened by the socialist secretary continued to be considered "absurd." It was defined as such in an interview given to *EPOCA* by Giancarlo Pajetta. The interview topics were primarily of an international nature. Among other things, the PCI leader said that he was optimistic about the possibility of new relations between his party and the Chinese party. As for the "absurd" debate, Pajetta--as did everybody else--urged people "to take a close look at things." Then, raising the tone

of the polemic, he asserted that "the confrontation, the search for elbow room, the search for votes, if you will--and I understand that this worries those who got less than we did--is not taking place on pretexts."

After this admonition to the "little brother," that is to say, the PSI, which has "less votes" than the PCI and therefore wants to grow also through the "pretext" of an "absurd" polemic, Pajetta criticizes Craxi himself.

Pajetta as a matter of fact reveals that the Berlinguer interview given to LA REPUBBLICA, which triggered Craxi's essay-response, was conducted in Italy. "I," he exclaimed sarcastically, "permit myself to ask where Craxi's article came from, where it was written. It might be that it was written in Tunisia, where Craxi spent his vacation, where a big political trial was underway against the opposition to the regime and where I do not know whether it was made public that the PSI secretary or his own party's secretariat issued an official declaration in response to the demand for 39 death sentences and the news that one of the accused had died in jail during the trial and that another one lost an eye."

More Details on PSDI Reactions

Rome IL POPOLO in Italian 1 Sep 78 p 2

[Text] Socialist secretary Craxi definitely ruled out the possibility that the current polemic between the PSI and the PCI could have any consequences on the current political situation; this much emerges from his lengthy interview on TG2, during which Craxi, in by the way rather harsh tones, again took up the topics of the polemic on Leninism. The socialist secretary asserted that "Andreotti is not getting far with his Leninism and neither is he getting anywhere with the national unity policy, in the sense that we have a very clear picture of the discussion on general principles and on the prospects of socialism in Italy and in Europe as well as the contingent responsibilities closely tied to a very complex and difficult reality; but with respect to that," Craxi emphasized, "I do not believe that there will be any effects, there should not be any negative or immediate political effects."

Craxi then said that he was "a little bit exhilarated" by the reactions produced by his "essay," maintaining that he said, "rather obvious things" because "nobody can deny that illiberal societies have sprung from Leninism," while on the other hand "socialism is the exaltation of liberty." Craxi played down the consequences which this polemic with the communists can have, asserting that "a well-stated and well-conducted debate--conducted above all in good faith by the chief conversation partners--can in the end produce useful results." After expressing the hope that the next PCI congress will "adopt decisions tied not only to the present time but also concerning an ideological revision," he confirmed that the prospect of socialism in Europe and in Italy "are tied to the advance of the ideas of a democratic, laic, reform-minded, and progressive socialism, moving in a

direction which is not that of Leninism." This without lacking in respect for Lenin, but not overlooking the fact that his teachings no longer have any "validity" for society today and for the prospects of socialism in the West.

The communist Pajetta also commented on the polemics between the PSI and the PCI, expressing the hope that everybody "will take a close look at things. Italy must make sure that the confrontation, the search for room, the search for votes, if you will, does not happen on the basis of pretext." Pajetta then termed "absurd" the PSI attack on the Berlinguer interview, an act which--he said--"was designed to underscore the unity of the left-wing forces."

The development of the polemic was followed very carefully by the social democrats. PSDI secretary Romita devoted a lengthy editorial to it in L'UMANITA to express his own political consensus to Craxi but also to state "some ideological reservations." According to Romita, it is "quite debatable to attribute so much weight to the thinking of Proudhon," just as it would be "a serious mistake" to liquidate "as being sectarian or fideistic, the Marxist interpretation of history." For Romita, "the action and prospects of democratic socialism must remain closely tied to the interests and role of the working class." Outlining the structure of the socialist democratic party, Romita confirmed the definite rejection of democratic centralism but also the rejection of the confusion and prevalence of the interests of groups, currents, and categories.

In Romita's judgment however, "one cannot help but detect hopeful signs for Italy's tomorrow in realizing that the PSI is getting ready to correct its utopianism of yesterday, its simply falling in line with the decisions of the PCI. This is an act which begins with giving substance to the fact that it refers to itself as a European and Western party." Romita also wrote that it is necessary very carefully to follow the developments of the new political position assumed by the PSI, both with regard to the specific choices that may derive from that, and to verify the adhesion which it will find within the PSI itself.

Finally, according to Romita, one must aim at the creation of a socialist area which "would not boil down to the simple mechanical sum of the two parties" and which would arouse a vast consensus among social strata which do not yet see themselves in socialism. As far as the PCI is concerned, the social democratic secretary believes that the PCI will have to "resolve three problems": full autonomy from the USSR, abandonment of democratic centralism, and rejection of collectivism as the ideal of social life.

Another social democratic exponent by the name of Di Giesi, talking about the Lombardi interview, said that the latter "although trying to understand the PSI secretary, definitely criticized him harshly." Di Giesi asserts then that the PSI in seeking to create difficulties for the PCI by covering a "very broad range of interests" in order to propose itself as "the alternative to the DC"--without worrying about the more distant prospects.

ITALY

PCI'S MACALUSO VENTURES ONTO PSI-PCI IDEOLOGICAL BATTLEGROUND

Text of Interview


Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 5 Sep 78 p 3

/Text/ Interview with Emanuele Macaluso by Beppe Lopez/

/Text/ Genoa, 4 September. If Craxi's heralded new attack is made against the issue of "democratic centralism," then it will almost certainly be zeroing in on the target. The communists, as a matter of fact, have announced as of now that they are not prepared to switch. The next party congress is supposed to eliminate the reference to Leninism from Article 5 of the charter but Berlinguer and his people will not renounce democratic centralism. "For a simple reason," explains Emanuele Macaluso: "Because there is no better and more democratic party organization in Italy than ours. It is one thing to develop the internal debate to the maximum-- and we are doing that--but it is an entirely different thing to allow currents." Macaluso today arrived at the unity festival to talk about agriculture. But he did not avoid a frank talk on the topic of the day-- the polemic-- with the socialists.

/Question/ Let us review the situation, following the goldmine of statements and articles developed in Craxi's essay. What is the political meaning which you attribute to the socialist secretary's design and what worries you most?

/Answer/ Well, here it is: the tendency of the current PSI leadership group to create a division between the socialists and the communists. The re-discovery of Lenin and topics connected to Leninism as a matter of fact entails a dangerous premise in the well-known statement by Craxi's deputy, Claudio Signorile, according to whom a communist party, which remains anchored to our tradition, cannot be a party in the government. Now, here is the central point of the polemic: the reintroduction of an element of political discrimination, precisely on the fundamental objective of so many struggles which brought the PSI even into the first line, side by side with us. This is



Emanuele Macaluso

therefore a real distortion of the traditional socialist line, among other things in strident contradiction to the much-claimed desire for redimensioning the power of the DC. This--I would like to remind Craxi--one can get only through the overall strengthening of the left, not by working along the flanks of the PCI.

Question "Craxian" is now an adjective which, in the PCI, evokes anti-unity tendencies if not more simply adventurist tendencies. But, apart from Craxi and the various labels, men such as Lombardi, Manca and Mancini also supported the secretary in this debate. Are they all against unity?

Answer I think that, at this time, there is much reticence and that there is also a fictitious unity in the PSI. The initial 60 percent in the majority should have reached 95 percent. I do not believe there is any collegial determinations behind the secretary's initiative. If you look deep into the unanimity of the facade, you can detect considerable differentiations in the basic plans. All you have to do, for example, is carefully read the Lombardi interview."

Question Do you then, in turn, intend to keep after the PSI leadership group so that these differentiations may emerge?

Answer I do not like the words "keep after." I would say, more simply, that we intend to do our part, through coherent political initiatives on the level of the local entities, but also on the national level, so that the unity-oriented positions, which certainly exist in the PSI, may come out.

Question Some people expect you to do your part, above all by resolving basic theoretical and political problems, first of all, of course, the problem of democratic centralism. When questioned on that issue yesterday, Gerardo Chiaromonte seemed to us to have the intention to disappoint those expectations.

/Answer/ We cannot become a party of permanent debate (Macaluso told us quite frankly, adding that, with a view to the congress itself, two commissions will spell out suitable statutory mechanisms for facilitating maximum development of the internal discussion) and, at any rate, however, we cannot permit the formation of organized currents.

/Question/ Is this your own opinion? Is this the answer which the party will give at the next congress on the problem of democratic centralism?

/Answer/ Starting with our experience and that of the other parties, we are bound to conclude that internal organizations, such as that of the DC and that of the PSI itself, would be anything but exemplary /would constitute examples/. Whereas we have democratic centralism, they, through the currents, work according to the iron law of nondemocratic centralism. This is why I am totally in accord with Chiaromonte: we must develop our internal democracy to the utmost because it today is already the broadest in terms of substance although we must avoid ultimately winding up with the crystallization of positions and the organization of currents.

/Question/ If a manifesto were to be proposed again quite by chance, would the PCI then once again resort to expulsions? No rethinking, after 10 years?

/Answer/ It might perhaps be those who are pushing the manifesto who should think it over again and who should pose the question in terms different from those used then. Now, this thing about the manifesto is an old, well-worn motive also used by the Russian comrades in order sometimes to blunt our criticisms of their systems. But did you not tell me often not to kick people like Pintor out of the party? I always replied that, while people such as Pintor, Natoli, and Rossanda can found other parties, start magazines, and continue freely to express their own opinions, that possibility does not exist in Russia. The problem is the political system of the state.

An Attack from the Right

Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 6 Sep 78 p 2

/Excerpt from article by Francesco Damato/

/Text/ Some of Macaluso's statements recall the PCI's maneuvers which led to the birth of the PSIUP /Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity/ during the years of the left-of-center /coalition/. Replies from PSI secretary and from Balzamo. Andreotti's allusions to the dispute over Leninism.

Rome 5 September. Contrasts are blossoming out inside the Communist Party on the tactics to be pursued in the polemic with the socialists on Lenin and other myths of the left. While Gerardo Chiaromonte in an interview

underscored the timeliness of "discussing all of the issues posed by the PSI," on the sole condition that the socialists do not propose or do not agree to any discrimination against PCI participation in the government, Emanuele Macaluso practically threatened, in another interview, to push initiatives designed to split Craxi's party.

The language used by Macaluso--who, together with Chiaromonte, is a member of the communist directorate, meeting today to examine the political situation --recalls that of the communist leaders during the years when the left-of-center coalition was being prepared. At that time, the "stimulus" action of the PCI was aimed at Valori, Vecchietti, Libertini and others who in the end wound up leaving the PSI and founding the PSIUP. Macaluso's language finally recalls a recent interview in which former socialist secretary De Martino asserted that the polemic launched by Craxi with the communists could provoke another split in the party.

The reaction of the socialist leaders was immediate. Although referring only to the statements of De Martino, not yet being familiar with those of Macaluso, Craxi gave assurances to a weekly magazine in an interview several days ago and released this evening to the effect that "we will know how to prevent organized maneuvers against the unity of the PSI according to the well-known canons of Rakosi's salami tactics." In any case, he specifically indicated that "I do not as a matter of fact believe the party is threatened by any political and ideological splits," adding that "just talking about that is a pernicious error." Almost as if to demonstrate that he is not afraid of any complications, Craxi announced that "the field of discussion" with the communists "is destined to grow larger."

Balzamo, leader of the socialist deputies and friend of Mancini, on the other hand approached Macaluso directly to invite him not to entertain any "illusions" as to the possibility of cracking the PSI's unity. Balzamo furthermore rather severely argued with La Malfa who--although declaring himself ready to lead the majority if the accord on the 3-year economy plan does not look good to him--once again this morning accused the socialists of having introduced dangerous elements of division into the political debate with the communists.

Craxi himself very forcefully responded to the accusation which not only La Malfa but also the communists and many Christian Democratic leaders have made against the PSI, the accusation of threatening the so-called national unity policy through the debate launched about Lenin. He said that La Malfa and others are attacking the socialists because "they would like to assign us to a subordinate role, considering us, when all is said and done, as a force worthy of extinction, a kind of residue of history," without realizing that "there is a tendency now underway toward the rebalancing of the forces" throughout the country. Craxi however added that the PSI has no intention, at least for the moment, to return to the government, perhaps for the purpose of calming Berlinguer who is afraid of being soon forced into supporting, from the outside, no longer a company of ministers all of whom are Christian Democrats but rather a coalition of Christian Democrats and socialists.

The PSI's polemic with the communists today likewise produced conflicting reactions within the DC. Minister De Minta, for example, complained about that in a radio telephone interview. Andreotti, on the other hand, displayed a certain degree of pleasure out of the conviction that the government is not running any risks deriving from the dispute between two left-wing parties.

Comparing the government to Martha who put Jesus' house in order and comparing the parties to Mary who "resembles"--according to the image in the Gospel--the prime minister, wrote in DISCUSSIONE, the official weekly of the Crossed Shield, that "while the Marthas of various shadings converge and combine their efforts, the Marys must do their part by safeguarding and enlivening democratic pluralism" so that the political debate will not turn sour.

An Attack from the Left

Rome AVANTI in Italian 6 Sep 78 pp 1, 4

Text Interviewed yesterday by LA REPUBBLICA, the Hon. Macaluso, of the PCI is stuttering because of the brutality with which he announces how his party would intend to deal with the socialists. The tune is the same as always: the socialists are divided into good and bad people; the socialists who are united with the PCI are good and all the others are bad, headed by Craxi, who is accused of having said that unity between the two parties of the left will progress in relation to the clarification of some basic issues, such as Leninism, international relations, and democratic centralism.

The interviewer has him observing that this time the entire PSI leadership group is solidly behind its secretary, the Hon. Macaluso--not only through his facial expression but also by virtue of what he thinks and says--must be a kind of Tino Scotti character when he sang the passage "What Am I Thinking?"; he refuses to believe in the idea that the PSI is united. One must now loudly settle accounts but the figures do not come out even: "How could the majority," he must have exclaimed, "which was 60 percent, how could that majority now suddenly have become 95 percent? Is it possible that there is not even one 'unity-supporting individual' in the PSI?"

And here, then, is the announcement: "We will do our part through coherent political initiatives on the local entity level but also on the national level so that the unity-oriented positions, which certainly exist in the PSI, may come out." This statement "may come out" is a program by itself: Macaluso is talking about those whom he assumes to be his conversation partners in the PSI as if he were thinking of some wild game that has to be flushed out. Or perhaps that "may come out" is a kind of call into the forest and means "come out of the PSI." Finding the point of least resistance and starting the division first and then pushing the split among the socialists--that is a kind of Eurocommunism which is not at all new; it is the same that Rakosi theorized in Hungary: "You have to cut the socialists up like salami."

This is how some people would like to placate their concern for unity: by eating the salami.

Macaluso Counters AVANTI, IL GIORNALE Reviews

Rome UNITA in Italian 7 Sep 78 p 1

/Article by Emanuele Macaluso: "The Remaining Question" /

/Text/ I am forced to observe that, as the debate gets more severe and as some of the political problems begin to run together, the PSI journal often prefers to distort the positions of others and sometimes, rather than replying with arguments, it prefers to distribute insults and anathemas. This is what AVANTI! did yesterday on commenting on my interview in LA REPUBBLICA.

I am not interested in vulgarities, let us get right down to the facts. What do the communists want? AVANTI! has no doubts: breaking up the PSI and "cutting the socialists up like salami." All of this because I had told my interviewer--who asked me whether we would "keep after the PSI"--that I do not like the verb "to keep after" (because you only keep after an adversary) and that, on the local level and on the national level, we developed a political initiative aimed at bringing out the pro-unity positions in the PSI. Only somebody who wants to engage in agitation and not in discussion could read into my thinking (even though it may be reported rather sketchily) what the editors of AVANTI! read into it.

We do not want to seek any kind of breakup. We want to discuss with the entire PSI and we want to seek unity with the entire PSI and we will seek pro-unity provisions so that the search for unity may prevail in the PSI--amid difference. (With regard to the splits, the note-taker from IL GIORNALE --assuming that this is his trade--should know that the PCI did not encourage the split of the PSIUP which even Togliatti called a misfortune.)

I must therefore quite frankly say that one sometimes gets the impression that some people are trying to bring out party patriotism in order to avoid facing some ticklish political issues which on the other hand I consider useful to bring up again. I therefore repeat that we are not troubled and we are not as matter of fact worried by an ideal and political debate between the PSI and the PCI. What does worry us is the political inspiration, the political objective, the ultimate political goal which one might assign to that debate.

Do we want a confrontation which might possibly bring the PSI and the PCI closer together or which would move them further apart? This question is neither naive nor rhetorical.

Craxi said that the debate must revolve around three issues: Leninism, international position, and democratic centralism. Let us discuss only those issues but of course we cannot be hypocritical to the point of not telling each other, on these three issues, that our positions and those of the PSI are and will remain different, even though they may continue to evolve in relation to historical situations and political and struggle tasks.

As for the rest, it is evident that, if we had identical positions on those points, there would be only one party of the working class. Instead, we have two worker parties and we also have very many workers who feel that they belong to the DC (let us not forget that).

Hence, the question: what happens after the debate? There is the rub. Would the continuation of these historical differences--although in diverse forms--render possible a joint action beyond the country and the local entities, in parliament and in the government? I am asking this last question because Comrade Signorile said that a party which, like ours, claims to follow Leninism, not as a dogma, but in the historical-critical ways indicated by Berlinguer in his interview, cannot be a party in the government. Now, since our Leninism is not something that came up just yesterday and since the PSI said until yesterday that the PCI and the PSI must remain in the government together--and we are not talking only about the "emergency government"--what is the new thing that Signorile and other socialists were struck by? When the PSI leaders outlined the strategy of the alternative, were they thinking of the PCI, such as it is, or of a PCI which would be the image of and which would resemble the PSI? Many PSI leaders said that, to have an alternative, there would have to be a different ratio of forces /balance of power/ between the PSI and the PCI; and it is quite legitimate to think so. But I do not believe that there has been anybody who thought of the alternatives with a PCI that would throw overboard its entire historical and ideological heritage and that therefore would in practice cease to exist.

I would like to recall that Mitterrand--discussing the joint program with the PCF /French Communist Party/ and outlining the government of the left--quite correctly did not bring up the problem of Leninism, of the international position, and of democratic centralism. The breakup however took place in another area (the area of nationalizations) on which, by the way, the PCI has made choices different from those of the PCF.

There is one remark I made in the interview given to LA REPUBBLICA which seems to me has been picked up again. The PSI, in recent years, after the critical examination of the experience of the center-left, introduced as central point, for a change in the Italian political situation, the termination of the DC's political monopoly. How can this objective be attained if one introduces discrimination toward the PCI as a force in the government? It was not by chance that Galloni was able to say that the arguments brought up by some PSI leaders, in an effort to provide motivation for this discrimination, are the same that would justify the prejudices of the DC. It is clear that, if this discrimination continues, we will not break up the DC's political monopoly. And then one question comes up quite clearly: what are the political prospects for which the PSI is working and fighting?

We are not among those who believe that this prospect revolves around the center-left, also because I think that a large segment of the socialists at the top and at the grassroots does not want to repeat that experience, no matter how polished it may be. However, since a new prospect is conceivable and possible only if any and all discrimination toward the PCI is dropped, only if one accepts the diversity of the two parties (by the way, what is this thing called pluralism?), only if within this diversity there is a search for unity between the two parties which claim to be working class parties, only then will I continue to ask myself (and I believe I will not be the only one) what the political prospects are toward which the present PSI leadership is working.

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ITALY

MARXISM-LENINISM: VALIDITY OF THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The New, The Old

Rome IL MANIFESTO in Italian 27 Aug 78 p 4

[Article by Michelangelo Notarianni: "Craxi and the Odd Names in the History of the Socialist Party"]

[Text] I admit that I searched in vain, after repeated reading of "Craxi's essay," for traces within me of some surge of indignation. Placed in his shoes, I can understand Michele Achilli's protest in favor of revisionism; I understand Aldo Tortorella's desire for additional distinction and more widespread attention to the complexity of reality; I understand Eugenio Scalfari who, sarcastic and moved by nostalgia, returns to the years of the liberal novitiate, experienced beside Mario Pannunzio and Ernesto Rossi; I even understand, through an attempt at objectivity that was not easy, the leftist objections of Romita and of his associates.

Well, after all, everyone is where destiny and personal choices have led him. And frankly, from where I stand, I have the impression that the reserves of indignation are beginning to be exhausted, and are rarely available for the theoretical exercises of party secretaries. I will therefore quite simply relate my impression upon reading the "ideological manifesto" made public by the secretary of the PSI in ESPRESSO. Not without first again pointing out the conviction that has been emphasized several times by this newspaper, from the first foreshadowings of the concurrent explosion in the Euro-Left, in Portugal and in France, that the re-emergence in classically ideological terms of the contraposition between communism and social-democracy is but a symptom, even if a most serious one, of a cultural crisis and of analytical instruments that could turn into suicide in the face of the social crisis that we are experiencing and the prospects of joint responsibility with respect to the administration of power that the crisis offers to the left.

My first impression, contrary to the opinion already expressed by many, is that Craxi's text seems anything but a pedantic recall to the old texts

that have always been well known to those concerned with the works. I would say, on the contrary, if it would not seem a little too immoderate, that it is the product of an expert updating of an opinion that is very sensitive to the moods and to the requirements that spontaneously crop up in a mass culture.

From this point of view also the archaic act, the flavor of revival in the quotations and in the references appears necessary--the essential, strategic moment to launch a product that must have the characteristics of endurance recommended at this stage by the market. Craxi certainly could have cited more recent and interesting authors than Proudhon and Rosselli, Cole, Volodia Smirnof, and Bertrand Russell. But his text would have seemed to be the frail attempt of an individual intellectual, not the launching of an undertaking vouched for by history and by the common sense of the masses. The main point of his discourse in fact is anything but archaic. It corresponds rather to the fact of an awareness on the part of the masses, not only, and perhaps not even, especially Italian. It is apparently a question of that which today seems to be the consolidated result (yet still only a beginning and partially unreflected in its basic ambiguity) of the great 1968 wave---the involvement of the state as the possible propellant of change and of renewal, that anti-statism that is still oscillating between anarchist recurrences and conservative revival that often records, as recently in the United States of America, significant convergencies of opposite points of view (the case of ecology is not the only one).

It is a basic phenomenon, and anyone would truly be mistaken if he wanted to free himself from that idea (falling into the trap already prepared in Craxi's text), by going back to the classical terms of the historical polemics of the workers' movement. Schematically, and apologizing for the speed with which we allude to topics which, moreover, have already appeared more than once on the pages of this newspaper, it may be said that the reason for this crisis in the first place is due to the change of the "by right" state, formally neutral with respect to the decisions of the individual and of middle class communities, into a programmatic and interventionist state, no longer ruled by the apparent universality of the norm, but by decisions that are concrete and partial. It is this change, whose conscious and diagnosed beginnings go back at least to the first part of the century (to that complex of phenomena that Lenin reduced to the "popular" formula of imperialism), which leads to the progressive discovery of that phenomenon of the expropriation of society by the state, which Marx realized was parallel to that of the capitalist producers, and on which Weber founded his theory of the representative-bureaucratic state.

The liberal state, the state by right, is in reality the "strongest" state that history has known from its beginnings at the time of Locke and Smith, precisely to the extent in which the universality of the norm, the abstractness of representation, and the uniqueness of the sovereign combine to deprive individuals and the community, stripped at the same time of property and of legal authority, of non-abstract autonomy with respect to the market and to equal rights. These, too, are not recent discoveries, if it is true that the pluralism of which a great deal has been said in a recent period of Italian political culture consisted of essentially non-corporative theorizations, in Catholic circles on the one hand and in laborite circles on the other, aimed at empirically and "romantically" correcting this aspect of the liberal state that was considered "totalitarian."

But what counts is that this past decade has witnessed an emergence of a mass consciousness based on very specific experience, a consciousness that previously had been a reflection from above. The crisis of the welfare state, the so-called fiscal crisis of the state, the discovery of the inadequacy of Keynes' formulas for plans to deal with the problems that have piled up as a consequence of the progressively enormous phenomena of margination and of deviation produced by the previous expansion and by its crisis; all of these facts, together with the two great anxieties of our time, ecology and the danger of war, have drawn attention to the complete frailty of the structure of bourgeois rationalization and of its programmatic and centralist claim. It is perhaps useless to remind the very readers of the "manifesto" of our conviction--not just today's--that this is where the primary root of the so-called Marxist crisis lies, when the very debate presented in these columns, beginning with the Rossana Rossanda interview by Althusser has shown the common root of the difficulties of the traditionally reformist and Leninist left in the face of the new level of the contradictions in today's world.

But let us return to Craxi. The first spontaneous consideration, once the true subject of the discussion is recognized, seems to be the one concerning the references to the alleged socialist tradition that run throughout the "new gospel." But are Proudhon, Rosselli, Russell, the young Cole of the socialism of the guilds perhaps the true tradition of the Italian and international socialism? Are not Lassalle and Kautski, Bebel and Jaures, Sir Stafford Cripps and Lord Beveridge a part of the history of the true socialism as much as, and even more than, the solitary and odd personages cited by the socialist secretary? And is it not perhaps against the "statist" and authoritarian culture of official socialism--German first of all, but also British and French, that a culture like the one mentioned by the PSI secretary drew attention at the beginning of the century, through the work of a Georges Sorel, through the efforts of anarchist trade unionism?

Apart from the discourse on Craxi, it might be worth reviewing these topics. Today, it will be enough to limit oneself to a conclusion that will partially modify, or at least clarify precisely, the initial impression of a text structured as a message to the market. Disguising an up to date question in the form of an archeological debate between ideologies is not only a powerful expedient, well known to those skilful in these techniques. It is also a means of becoming involved with a real need, not compromising with the solutions to be indicated and the commitment to be made, not leaving in a vague and indefinite state the direction in which one wants to proceed in order to face the crucial points that exist in one's culture and history. In this case, the choice is between the neo-free trader ideology that comes forward as an anti-crisis expedient in the culture of multi-nationals and the effort at overcoming the state limits on the entire culture of the traditional left, which the 1968 heritage solicits and the new culture seeks. Not to clearly declare one's own choice is already to choose--in the direction of authoritarianism and manipulation. Craxi is not the only one to have made this choice. If the leftist debate is to be successful and to have hope of new unity, it will perhaps be necessary to start with this request for clarity.

Craxi's Historical Sources (Analysis)

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 1 Sep 78 p 8

[Article by Paolo Spriano]

[Text] We are dealing here essentially with a question of method: we could call it the use of quotations from the classics (and of their opponents) in ideological polemics, but the matter is a somewhat larger one if we approach it--as we will endeavor to do--with philological observations. As is by now well known, the Honorable Bettino Craxi's recent article was not lacking in quotations from authors, from texts on socialist political thinking: a veritable gallery, beginning with old Proudhon. There then appeared, either in front view, profile, or barely sketched in, or even just variously indicated, a sort of succession in perspective--Trockij and Rosa Luxemburg, Gramsci and Lenin, Bertrand Russell, Carlo Rosselli, Norberto Bobbio, Gilles Martinet, Isaac Deutscher, and ending with Cohn-Bendit. And let us not forget, from among the Russians, Martov, Plekhanov, Volodia Smirnov--among the good ones, and Robespierre and Bucahrin, among the bad ones. Someone looked for Marx and did not find him, but that does not seem to be the point.

Has the workers' movement always engaged in politics by insisting on texts? Of course, and this can be the starting point of the discourse, a critical and autocritical discourse, if it is true--and personally I am of this opinion--that one of the characteristic traits of Stalinism was precisely

the most unconstrained use of the theory, invoked brutally to serve a political course and a way of ruling. Now, to get on with the subject, we cannot seem to read any theoretical work from a non-historical viewpoint, but we do not expect that everyone do the same. Even a reading that attempts, without a historical filter, to arrive at the doctrinal relevancy of the thinking of an author cannot not respect the rule of trying to grasp the essence of that thinking. This will be the starting point of the ideological confrontation, the interpretation, including a contrasting one, of Marxism and Leninism or of any other current of thinking. It is another thing to establish a vein or a trend, to suggest a reference or an ideal library with such forcefulness that the distinctive aspect of the author cited and the relevancy of the reference to the discussion under consideration are revealed on the one hand as very extreme and on the other as artful.

The impression that the PSI secretary's anthology has made on us is precisely this. And the truth might as well be told, as they used to say, or else we will go to the texts.

Proudhon's is quite unusual, we will have to agree. It is a question--we say this because Bettino Craxi does not use bibliographical notes in his essays, and in some cases the citations are a little like some musical quizzes that have a "disguised theme"--of an extract drawn from a work published posthumously, in 1865, entitled "On the Political Capacity of the Working Classes" ("De La Capacite Politique des Classes Ouvrieres"). The extract is on page 60 of the new edition of the 1873 one, edited by Gustave Chaudey. At the time, he was criticizing a democracy that seemingly was based on the masses, but which would have led to an old absolutism. The context explains that we are in the presence of a completely individual polemic, in which it is not a question of Marx nor of the communism of the "Manifesto": Proudhon was against Cabet, Owen, Campanella, Tommaso Moro, that "school" born of the proceedings of the Luxembourg Committee (1848) that "starts with the principle that the individual is essentially subordinate to the community," and stresses the functions of the state in its programs.

Now, however, the most important point, at least for the matter regarding the method that we mentioned, is something else. Proudhon's book was written with a very precise purpose: to deter a group of workers in Paris and in Rouen from presenting a workers' candidate in the 1864 political elections. Those workers had signed the "manifesto of the 60," which became renowned in the history of the French working class movement just as in ours Andrea Costa's letter to the friends of Romagna did, as a shift toward "participation." Proudhon instead advised them to abstain, justifying this as a moral and political necessity for a new secession by the common people, a sort of Aventino; he declared himself against free education, made an apologia--typical of utopian socialism--for "mutualite" (mutual assistance). Let us be clear: it is a question of an important discussion, even though Proudhon's pages--if we stay with pre-Marxist literature--today are much less

palatable than many of Fournier's or of Saint-Simon's observations and perceptions. That which appears completely specious is a recall now to extremely dated experiences and discussions.

Is the purpose of recalling the libertarian, mutual, federalist instances of the "deep-felt and plebeian eloquence" of Proudhon (Gramsci) to provide the most remote hinterland to a continuing divide between authoritarian collectivism and spontaneity, anti-bureaucratic, autonomist pluralism? As a matter of fact, in Craxi's essay one finds this type of red thread, with the successive utilization of Trockij and of Rosa Luxemburg, of their literary works at the beginning of the century that polemized sharply with the ideas that appeared in 1902 in Lenin's renowned "What Is To Be Done?" ("Che Fare?"). But, if we were struck by the incongruity and anachronism of the reference to Proudhon, in the case of Trotzkij and of Rosa the effort to enlist them in a comprehensive antithesis--in a substantial incompatibility of communism and of socialism--is no more convincing. Craxi takes an extract from one of Trockij's works written in 1904 (which may be usefully examined in the Einaudi edition of the "What Is To Be Done?", prepared by Vittorio Strada; see, specifically, "Jacobinism and Socialdemocracy" ("Giacobinismo e socialdemocrazia," pages 418-443--along with other stands). Well, this is an article that was brilliantly analyzed by Isaac Deutscher, the great biographer of Trockij. Deutscher characterized it as a surprising work, "an odd assortment of lofty concepts and of meager polemical suggestions." But, according to Deutscher, it portrayed the prospect of the future drama of the Russian revolution; it seemed to foresee, beyond the theses of Lenin, the bureaucratic and authoritarian involution personified by one who at that time was "still an obscure social-democrat from the Caucasus," Joseph Stalin. But was Trockij (who, among other things in 1904 broke with the Mensheviks) therefore a pluralist; was he a libertarian; was he really anti-Jacobin?

If it were a matter of contesting the concept of the party as expressed in the "What Is To Be Done?", we would not fail to note how the presentation made in Craxi's essay, through the hospitality of ESPRESSO, is quite reductive. (It is enough to remember, with respect to the function of intellectuals, the direct inspiration of Kautsky, to whom Lenin explicitly referred, and that when Lenin stressed how political awareness must come to the workers "from the outside" he did not at all mean an indoctrination that comes down from above, from the "intellectuals," rather "the sphere of the relationships of all classes and of all strata of the population with the state and with the government"; in other words, an awareness acquired "from outside the economic struggle," the simple sphere of relationships between workers and owners; and the Leninist concept of "professional revolutionaries" has very little resemblance to the democratization of the "functionary" that Craxi deals with in his essay). Except that here it would be possible to go beyond a purely historical-doctrinal discussion in order that socialists and

communists might deal with the topics--to which we have long been committed--the relationship between organization and democracy in the workers' parties, the risks and the deterioration of the party-state, the degree of bureaucratization in the "actual socialism." Have the Italian communists really remained at the "What Is To Be Done?" stage of 1902, attesting to the theses that not even Lenin considered a point of doctrine (and he said so some years later)? In the introduction to the work, Strada properly drew attention to Lenin's lucid perception of the possibility of a despotic-personal deterioration of the centralized organization and recalled how he worried in 1922-23 over those dangers, when the spectre of an autocratic power was appearing on the dramatic scene of the Russian revolution. But it does not seem that it was Craxi's intention to invoke clarification and a probing.

His appears to be a bill of indictment. The trouble is that the examples chosen and the manner of emphasizing them show, instead, the opposite of what was meant. There is, in fact, the quite opposite danger of drawing from the request for a confrontation a sort of historical justification.

How on earth, we wonder, did it happen that Trockij who in 1904 warned against the cult of orthodoxy, who feared the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by "a group of carefully selected persons" and mocked "organizational fetishism" would be the man who, during the course of the Russian revolution, not only would be increasingly clearly associated with the bolsheviks but would vindicate the decisive nature of centralist importance, the strictest of party control over the state and the trade unions?

Completely analogous is the impression that one experiences in going back to Craxi's references to Rosa Luxemburg from the work entitled "Problems of Organization of Russian Social-Democracy," 1904 (the reader who wants to find the references may do so by obtaining the volume prepared by Lelio Basso for EDITORI RIUNITI, but will have to skip from page 219 to page 232, where the second half of the cited period is first found). And in fact Basso, pointing out the substance of sharp theoretical debate, and emphasizing--and this also seems essential to us--that the Bolshevik attitude cannot become a model and a line of action for societies that do not start from the backwardness of pre-revolutionary Russia, noted how greatly Rosa probably had been influenced, up to the eve of her death, by the example of the Bolshevik experience and the need to imitate it. And so she will be the very one, then, to weave the praise of the Bolsheviks as historical heirs of the Jacobins!

We must keep away from the temptation of historical justification precisely because it would only result in dogmatism; we would be obliged to dispute the terms of orthodoxy and revisionism, to end by concluding that if even men who assumed opposite positions were so involved in one "model" and one "example," it should still be followed. Thus, to take another example,

whoever re-reads the theses and statutes of the 2nd Congress of the 1920 Communist International sees how they are pervaded by certainties and by Manichee plans that tended to theorize, and even to mythicize, the political and organizational choices of the moment. But he will not at all find that which Craxi tells us were "the ethics and the science" of the Comintern: the theorization of an "ideal proletariat" that must enlighten the "actual proletariat." It is true, instead, that the only fact that is still at all valid--and in fact Gramsci took it up as a nullifying point in his struggle against 'bordighiano' extremism--is the statement--made known, repeated, and sanctioned in conference documents--that the communist party organizes only an actual "part" of the working class, which should not be juxtaposed to it. The opposite, in short.

Let us take a last example, precisely with respect to Gramsci. For years, and including a pressing and critical intervention--which we certainly have not dismissed as instrumentalist or agitator--by socialist students, or those in the field that has become known as socialist (the names of Bobbio and of Massimo L. Salvadori are compulsory here), we have been debating some of the most impassioned topics concerning Gramsci's work, the concepts of hegemony and of historical coalition, their relationship with pluralism and political democracy, etc. Craxi's document also speaks of Gramsci. In what way? By quoting one of his peremptory, almost truculent, statements, one with an anti-religious, if not anti-clerical, flavor. The quotation is obtained--it is worth mentioning--from a short journalistic article, one of the "Sotto la Mole" ("Under the Mass") cursives, 1916, published in AVANTI!, and reprinted in the volume of articles having the same title (page 148 of the Einaudi edition). In it Gramsci was answering some of his young contemporaries who were publishing a Catholic newspaper, IL SAVONAROLA, in Turin, and who had denied that there had been any moral value to the 50 years of socialist preaching in the workers' movement. With the typical enthusiasm of a neophyte--and, after all, was he perhaps wrong in defending the ethical significance of half a century of socialism among the poor and oppressed masses of the Italy of that period?--Gramsci protested: "All of these people have not realized, they who appropriately, or more often inappropriately, speak of spiritual values, that socialism is definitely the religion that must overpower Christianity." A banal polemical retort. It is known how Gramsci, even the young Gramsci, like Croce "without religion," speaks of Christ and of Christians quite differently in various other writings (there is even an apologia of Cottolengo!). But that was the very remark that was taken and resold to the innocent reader as the heart of the Gramsci theory. Thus Craxi can write: "It is certainly not by chance, then, that Gramsci defined Marxism as the religion that will overpower Christianity, by realizing its exalting promises and causing the ideal of the perfect society to pass from the state. It's murder, they say in Rome!"

In truth, there is very little rhyme or reason to discuss on such bases. We will therefore not tire of telling our socialist comrades that the tone and

expedients that we see increasingly adopted by their newspapers, suitable for the drilling of tough-minded commandos, but not for cultural discussion, do nothing at all to favor an exchange of ideas, for political democracy, or pluralism. It is not with a sub-machine burst against Lenin's thinking; it is not with a sharpshooter's shot fired against Gramsci that progress is made. Perhaps the greatest error that we communists could make would be to submit to the undoubted trouble that such intimidating techniques generate. There are of course many matters to be discussed; there is no lack of matters to be reviewed; there are immense theoretical and cultural problems to be faced--without iconoclastic fury and fictitious contra-positions.

We will do this, even if Craxi does not help us. Certainly none of the problems for discussion, nor the very topics of a European road to socialism in freedom, nor the questions about democratic centralism in the communist party, nor worries over the general situation, both national and international, can bring us back to antinomies such as were evoked in the writing that we tried to consider from a reflective point of view. It is enough to examine some facts, and to examine the history of the Italian workers' movement, at least for the past 40 years--but we, too, would willingly go further back--to see the uselessness of that interpretative key according to which true dialectics would reside in a continuing conflict between collectivism and pluralism. What door would that key open to us for a future outlook, for a consideration of the present? And for the past? Was this perhaps the reason for the struggle of socialists and communists against fascism? The joint role they had--in the resistance, in the elaboration of the constitution, in the defense of Italian freedom during the past 30 years, in the winning of fundamental civil rights--cannot continue to be shared with such ideological hatchets.

Revisionism, Classical Marxism

Rome AVANTI in Italian 2 Sep 78 pp 1, 4

[Article by Antonio Landolfi: "The Governmental Left Requests a Strong Revisionist Role."]

[Text] I must confess that, while admitting it to be legitimate, I do not consider a discussion concerning the thinking of Proudhon, of Marx, of Lenin, if they are not viewed as dated, considered from a philological point of view, and within the framework of the history of their time, as important. The history of scientific discoveries and of technical innovations, along with that of successive generations, certainly presents more exciting analyses. Proudhon and Marx lived and operated at the dawn of industrial capitalism. Lenin was the only one among them who learned of wireless telegraphy, but he died in 1924, that is, more than 20 years before the splitting of the atom.

This does not mean that the "classics" of social thinking should not be reviewed and discussed and that they should not be taken into account. It is especially not right to contest the rescuing of the libertarian theories of Proudhon, when great contextual emphasis is given (and it is right to do this) to the work of economist Piero Sraffa, who by-passed Marx in order to return to Davide Ricardo and to again take up the main thread of the classical economy. (In this connection, see the issue of this past 4 August of RINASCITA, devoted to the 80th anniversary of Sraffa).

Even more surprising is the reductive opinion that was given to the main thread of the liberal democratic political thinking whose presumed lack of connection with the theoretical tradition of the workers' movement is proclaimed when everyone knows where the greatest part of the Croce school ended, and especially when a reading is re-proposed of the "negative thinking" of Nietzsche in particular. Here, too, one can leaf through the pages of the issue that RINASCITA has recently devoted to it--we are not complaining of this, even if these operations that rescue Nietzsche from the embarrassing shadow of his sister Elisabeth, the Nazi Viking, seem rash, and provide him with the grey, double-breasted coat of the "committed" intellectual, rebaptizing the 'übermensch' from "superman" to "ultra-man." For all the good will and critical intelligence of Massimo Cacciari, it seems rather difficult to bring Nietzsche back into the picture of the theoretical evolution of the left, and to exclude from it the thinkers of logical empiricism, or the new philosophers beyond the Alps.

Not to mention, furthermore, the liberal socialist experience, which won its place in the history of the workers' movement not only through the lucid analyses of the Rosselli's, but also through the shedding of their blood. Some who turn their noses up at "liberal socialism," and who perhaps, as recently happened, even again flirt with Spengler while still awaiting the "decline of the West," should be advised to read, or to reread, Carlo Rosselli's excellent pages that give a critique of the problems of the revolution, the theory of the state, the analysis of the economic society and of the civil society, that have nothing to envy with respect to the analyses of Gramsci, which we certainly consider as valid for all.

There cannot be an ideological taboo against either Leninism or Marxism. And furthermore does not the philosopher and communist deputy Cacciari still define Marxism as "a knowledgeable machine that scientifically analyses the movements of the system of capitalist production, sees its contradictions, studies the crisis, and tries to reassemble them," while in reality capitalism has evolved in ways such as to make it impossible for this machine, by now obsolete, to operate?

If the PCI theorist and leader can present this picture of Marxism, or, as he specifies, one of many Marxisms, why is there so much ado if the socialists are dealing with the background problems of revisionism? Why cannot the matter of Leninism be dealt with by Craxi, when Santiago Carrillo has characterized it in the terms that we know of in the recent congress of the

Spanish Communist Party? There cannot help but be a well-founded suspicion that the polemic with the socialists hides the difficulty of following Carrillo in his coherent ideological and political evolution. The refusal to abandon Leninism is accompanied--still in disagreement with Carrillo--by the refusal to fully take note of the nature of the "real socialism," of the totalitarian nature of the society of the East, of the impossibility of combining the values of pluralism with the practice and the theory of the party-state.

The pluralistic and democratic option of the Italian Communist Party is thus presented, contrary to the will and the political spirit of its leadership group, as a half option, geographically limited to the area of societies having a "mature capitalism," equivalent, from the viewpoint of historical justification, to a different type of experiences of non-pluralistic socialism. The rear guard nature of such a concept is significantly verified by the courageous consideration given by Sergio Segre when he acknowledged that efficacious ideas for the workers' movement of the West can no longer come from the horizons of the East. For all its attempts at revision, it seems that Italian communism still does not know how to free itself from that which Foucault defines generally as the "panoptic complex," that is, the obsession with cumulative thinking that takes concrete form in "total institutions." That political technology that Foucault has called "panoptism," based on the model of Geremia Bentham, finds its designated place in the ideology and in the practice of the party as a "total institution," with the party--state and party--society, which is the true essence of Leninism. The originality of Lenin's thinking is not recorded in his fluctuating-type economic analyses (with the NEP [expansion unknown] he finally admitted, and how!...the market), but, rather, in the concept that identified political power and social power with the party. All the revisionists struck against this concept; and so did the revolutionaries who, as in the case of Rosa Luxemburg, were not resigned to replacing the class with the party. Carrillo fully understood that the crucial point of pluralism consists in setting aside this concept of the party as a "total institution," which led to the consequence of abandoning Leninism.

It is known that Lenin's concept was not Marx's; just as Marx never had a "statist" concept of the economy. In the "Manifesto" and in economic works, Marx always speaks of "socialization," never of "nationalization"--and the difference is profound. Gluksmann remarked that "the chapter on the State is lacking in the 'Capital.'" In this void "real socialism" has built the most gigantic apparatus for economic and political power that history has known, through the omnipotence of the state.

A revisionist discourse cannot ignore these matters and all their consequences. And Craxi has set them forth with undoubted courage. They were

implicit problems in the critical analyses of Nenni and of the others in 1956. But time goes on and with it the revisionist critique has found beneficial corroboration in events. Everyone knows, for example, how Marx's forecast, according to which the development of capitalism would have led to the disappearance of the middle classes and to antagonistic polarization of the working class proletariat and the capitalist class, was not only found to be false as the modern world evolved, but proved to be quite the opposite, to the point that the middle classes have become the majority and their articulation and differentiation are such that "today it is not possible to define the boundaries between the modern proletariat and the modern bourgeoisie;" not only that, but, as has been amply shown, it happens that in Europe and in countries that are highly capitalist conflicts, even opponents, within each of the social classes are revealed as more acute and widespread than conflicts between the social classes themselves. No ideological bandage can hide such realities any longer, and no party truth can hide how increasingly difficult it is to differentiate between class stratifications and corporative establishments that plan new scales of social hierarchies, of expropriator, statistical expansions of economic and social pluralism.

A revision that does not take these realities into account does not help to create that governmental strength for the left which, as Craxi has pointed out, is the real reason for the theoretical discussion in progress.

Changes in society, even the most proper, are a point of arrival, not a point of departure. The important thing is to begin on the right foot.

Revival of 1930's Liberal Socialism

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 3 Sep 78 p 14

[Article by Giovanni Sarbatucci: "What Is Liberal Socialism"?]

[Text] The liberal socialist ideology (that is, the attempt to reconcile in an organic doctrine, and not only in practice, the equalitarian principles of the socialism and the pluralism of the liberal tradition) is a specifically Italian phenomenon. It was developed at the beginning of the 30's (it was precisely in 1930 that Carlo Rosselli's "Liberal Socialism" appeared in France) in anti-fascist debates, as a consequence of the dual defeat suffered by socialists and liberals and as the result of the self-criticisms that had followed in both camps. It is not correct to define liberal socialism as a heretical current in the workers' movement. It was, rather, a question of a liberal heresy (the principal theorists of the movement, Rosselli the "politician" and Guido Calogero the philosopher, were of the liberal school, not socialist). Or, better still, it is a kind of obbligato passage through which very many liberal intellectuals arrived at socialism: therefore, an avenue of approach, rather than a way out.

From the political point of view liberal socialism never did have great success. The Freedom and Justice Movement, which was its inspiration, was an instrument to fight fascism more than a true political movement. The Action Party had a short and hard life and not all of its members shared the liberal social ideology. From the cultural point of view, the influence of Rosselli's thinking (if not of liberal socialism in the strict sense) was instead notable. Through the experience of GI and of the Action Party has passed an entire generation of intellectuals and politicians, especially socialist (Lombardi, De Martino, Lussu, Codignola, Foa), and republican (La Malfa, Reale, Visentini), but also communist (Battaglia, Muscetta, Alatri, Spriano), and even christian democratic as, for example, Giuseppe Rossini).

In this sense, the rediscovery of liberal socialism for the Italian political class is almost a duty. The discourse on the establishment of a liberal socialist party is another thing. Not even Craxi has ever seriously thought of this.

Marxism: An Historical Perspective

Rome AVANTI in Italian 3-4 Sep 78 pp 1, 20

[Article by Gilles Martinet, member of the PSF [French Socialist Party]: "Neither Pseudo-Marxism, Nor Opportunism"]

[Text] I am not certain that the debate that has been initiated between the socialists and communists essentially concerns the history of the workers' movement and its interpretation, but since it is its most obvious aspect, I should like to make the following observations:

- 1) In the beginning, two great currents ran through the most genuine component of the workers' movement, that is, its trade union component: the reformist current, that aimed essentially at improving the lot of the worker, and the libertarian current, that maintained that producers must assure themselves of the ownership of their work instruments and create a free association of self-managed enterprise.
- 2) The intellectuals, assuming the administration of the political component of the movement, grafted onto it themes that were directly inspired by the French revolution. We were then very soon in the presence of three influences: reformist, libertarian, and Jacobin.
- d) In some respects Marxism represented an attempt at synthesizing the latter two currents. When Lenin wrote "The State and the Revolution" he was not only a Jacobin; he was also a supporter of the decline of the state and of the "power of the cook."

In the Russian revolution the libertarian element (power for the soviets) disappeared almost immediately: it is the triumph of ultra-Jacobinism. But the libertarian current also disappeared at the same time in the West. Its quite primitive concept of self-administration was tied in with a phase of industrialization that has by now been surpassed. The development of the big machine industry brutishly sets forth the problem of competencies. The answer of the workers' movement will be of a centralist nature. We will have a Bolshevik centralism (totalitarian), but also a reformist centralism (a planner-type, but one that is respectful of political pluralism).

5) Only in the 60's, when the first signs of the post-industrial society manifested themselves, did we see the reappearance among university young people, among the technical cadres, and a portion of the trade union movement, of favorable trends toward strong decentralization of power and toward self-determination.

6) Expressed partially by the extreme left, this current today gives rise to an attempt at synthesis of neo-libertarian trends and reformist trends. The big exception of course is Jacobinism and its version of the 20th century: Leninism. The point is to ascertain if this revolutionary-reformist alliance is quite solid.

7) The answer to this question depends in great part on the content that is given to the socialist plan. I agree with those who think that many of the concepts elaborated by Marx are still operative, but the vision that he had of the future society was close to the idealism of the 19th century and, as Craxi emphasizes, to a laical form of christian millenarianism. This vision must be abandoned, but its replacement must be clearly declared.

8) From this point of view I do not believe it is very useful to recall the debates that characterized the schism of the 20's. Lenin does not give valid answers to the problems of our times; but neither do Turati, Blum, or Kautsky. I naturally would like Berlinguer to admit a certain number of truths with respect to Lenin and Leninism, but what I especially hope is that he will not be satisfied with temporarily wearing the boots of reformism and that he will define longer-term objectives, with a complete rupture with what exists and remains in the Soviet Union. The socialists can support this evolution, on condition of a definitive abandonment of old behavior characterized by a sense of inferiority with respect to the communist party. In Italy, as in France, pseudo-Marxist discourses in fact have long been mixed with opportunistic practices.

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IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF PSI SOCIALISM, PCI COMMUNISM

Ideological Differences Stall Government

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 22 Aug 78 pp 1, 2

[Article by Fabrizio Cicchitto: "Dangerous Encounter Between Centaur and Hircocervus"]

[Text] An effort must be made to give a constructive sense to the political debate in progress in the left and among all the forces of democracy. This objective, obviously, does not mean a surrender to the controversial aggression being conducted for some time now against the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] by some members of the DC [Christian Democratic Party], the PCI and the PRI [Italian Republican Party], as a whole, but rather it means going to the root of the political problems, making ourselves understand better all that perhaps we have not understood and also making others understand. Why this antisocialist revival consisting of a political and economic combine with a variegated composition? Basically, because, in the political field, the PSI has broken a spell consisting in turning the policy of national unity into a kind of reciprocal conspiracy of silence between the DC and the PCI by means of a new edition of that great dead calm of the Antilles with which Italo Calvino described the division of roles in the 1950's. Of what does this operation of reciprocal conspiracy of silence consist and what does it form in a possible degeneration of that policy of national unity that represents a necessary phase in Italian politics for us socialists also? It consists in the fact that the DC and the PCI are, in their deep-seated diversity, two contradictory, ambiguous parties, whose contradictoriness and ambiguity together are one of the reasons for their political strength in elections and one of the causes of the stalled situation of Italy's political system and, consequently, of the whole framework of government in our society.

To use a metaphor, we are faced by reckoning with a hircocervus and a centaur. Croce's metaphor of the hircocervus, used to ridicule the heterogeneity of the Action Party, is perfectly applicable to the DC. A party ranging from De Carolis to Fracanzani and that, aside from the men, brings together very divergent interests ranging from sectors of private and public enterprise to

Bonomi-type enterprises, from trade-union officials to theoreticians and to practitioners of the most unrestrained hysteria, from the parasitic zones of the state and the parastate to the young persons of Communism and Liberation, now concentrates in itself so large a part of the conflicts in Italian society as to be able to reconcile them only by maintaining, or rather expanding, a power system in which each has its slice. De Mita, Granelli and Donat Cattin, each with a different way of handling it, dispute the claim that the DC is a conservative party. Zaccagnini has spoken frankly of a "gradually revolutionary" party. They are all right, in the sense that the DC is not a European-type conservative party, with all that this implies in terms of clarity, strictness and even hardness, but it is a moderate Italian party, inheriting from the history of our country that mixture of corporativism and transformism that forms a permanent current in our national life, undoubtedly enriched and ennobled, in this case, by the various trends in Catholic culture. Therefore, the DC is, at the same time, so flexible and so "changeable" in its political and social expressions, so inconstant in arranging political party mediations, but also so constant in perpetuating a system of government authority that, in some respects, is also preferential to it with regard to protection of the present social system.

The PCI, in turn, has been defined as a kind of centaur because of its attempt to mediate and reconcile together democratic pluralism, Leninism revised by statutory modifications, Eurocommunism and a preferential relationship with the USSR. Once more, at present, the PCI is going through a situation of doubleness, quite different from the situation in the 1950's. It is seeking to solve and get rid of this doubleness by eliminating a real political and ideological presence of the PSI, which is the embarrassing evidence of this doubleness, yesterday silent and today speaking out, and to form in some way a relationship with the DC precisely because two ambiguities placed together do not make for clarity, but certainly from strength. The policy of the historic compromise is serving the PCI, at present, in order not to change its basic characteristics, in order to enter the area of government and to do so by having, in the DC, so strong a moderate counterweight as to put the conservative forces in Italy and the Americans on an international level at ease.

Already, of itself, the encounter between a hircocervus and a centaur is not among the most exciting prospects, because it risks making us return to the stone age and because, owing to the heterogeneity of the forces in the field, this clash may, in turn, find expression, in the medium term, in a destructive frontal encounter, or, in order to hold out, it may turn into a regime that sets aside any dissent labeled occasionally as social democratic or as extremist. According to Pietro Ingrao, this Italian situation is a more advanced occurrence in comparison with the rest of Europe. To tell the truth, if we look at the structural data, at the seriousness of the economic and social crisis through which we are going, this opinion does not stand up, if it is desired to grasp thoroughly that tie between economy and politics constituting an essential characteristic in the modern world. Ingrao is right, however, on one point, when he calls attention to the extent and richness of the social movement that has occurred in our country from 1969 to the present time. But the essential problem lies here.

The richest and most extensive mass movement that occurred in the capitalist West is now marking time, because it has not found a political outlet. It has not found a political outlet, because, obviously, the DC did not want to give one to it, and it has not found it, because the left did not want to furnish it with one. The consequence is that this movement is running great risks at present: either it shuts itself up in a corporative defense, or it opens up to an overall prospect for an economic policy, of finding a political framework and also an economic situation that offers, at best, limited margins for an operation of improvement.

For these reasons, when the PSI aims at introducing European dialectics in our country between moderates and progressives, an alternation of political leadership, on the one hand, it grasps the originality of the mass movement that has appeared in Italian society, and, on the other hand, it seeks to test its strength in the present and in the future with a problem of compatibility and of distribution of resources and, finally, it raises the problem of a different dialectics of the political system capable of guiding the coherence of a reform policy. In fact, at the root of the present economic and social crisis lies the fact that, after 1969, not only have wages increased, but also everything has increased, wages, pensions, stipends of company managers and executives, prices, transfers to enterprises, tax evasion, city income. That did not happen by chance, but rather because of the quality and characteristics of the political system of the forces in the field. And it is no use merely to evoke the specter of the center-left, as Barca does, because the socialist attempt at planning was upset not only by Christian Democratic corporativism, but also by the communist logic of "one more" on the parliamentary, revendicative and municipal level. At present, the policy of national unity must necessarily be cemented together with an operation of the opposite sign, because, otherwise, Italy's economy will explode. It is proper for everyone to take up his bundle of sacrifices and for the operation to be governed by means of mechanisms of real equity.

The meeting of the socialists with the democratic elements present in the DC and with the reform awareness emerging in the Communist Party is to be hoped for in this operation. Nevertheless, medium- and long-term reconstruction projects are also necessary. It is not by chance that we have put forward a suggested socialist plan. Now the plans for a new order and for social change or even (see AREL) for social conservation, must be put forward by homogeneous lineups. Therefore, we socialists believe that the salvation phase pursued by means of the policy of national unity must be followed by the plan phase based on alternation. But, in order for alternation to be able to succeed both with regard to acquiring a majority and to avoiding Chilean results, the "centaur" has to become either a man or a horse. This is the implication of our debate with the PCI. This debate does not dispute the possibility of communist participation in a national unity government. In this field, our communist comrades can exert their polemical force -- which is considerable -- on the DC as a whole. But, in order for alternation to take off, a quality leap is needed on the left that is not occurring at present and that can take place only if the socialists become involved in a political and cultural battle for a change in the ideological and social thinking of the entire Italian worker movement.

Those who already regard everything as having been done confuse the alternation line with a leftist front movement, which is something completely different and would also be a setback with regard to the line of historic compromise. It is not a question of having those who dispute the line of autonomy and alternation, which is, at present, the only feasible strategy for the PSI, be compelled to bring back the 1950's, that is to say, the period of greatest political and cultural leveling of the socialist movement, in order to demand Leninism grotesquely as a component of socialist culture. Alternation can take off, if the groundwork is laid so that Brezhnev cannot say, as Melnar points out, "you put your trust in the communist movement in Western Europe, but it has been of no consequence for the last 50 years." Brezhnev is right from his point of view, because he bases himself on two facts: failure of the Leninist and Trotskyist assumption of a revolution in the West and the division of the world made at Yalta. Therefore, the left can have weight and not stay indefinitely in midstream only if it places itself not only geographically but also politically in Europe and if it makes its gradualistic democratic reform choice thoroughly and without doubleness. In this respect, the Italian worker movement can really make a new, original contribution both to the difficulties of the European left and to socialist dissent in the Eastern countries. If, on the other hand, the largest part of the left remains in midstream and continues to maintain solidarity with Dubcek and with Brezhnev, with Carrillo and with Suslov, the result is that it must seek a compromise with the moderates, not in the field of tactics, but rather in the field of strategy, because it actually achieves a compromise with itself between its democratic feeling and a persistent authoritarian background.

The socialists would fail in their reason for being in the left and in Italian democracy, if they did not aim at exploding this contradiction and at solving this problem. Likewise, it is understandable that the shrewdest interpreters of Christian Democratic and employer flexibility prefer not to have this problem solved. But theirs is the same logic as Johnson's with regard to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: "eius regio cuius religio" was the great historic compromise of the wars of religion. But is the Italian left to gain anything from these kinds of divisive logic?

Communists Analyze PSI Ideology

Rome UNITA in Italian 23 Aug 78 pp 1, 12

[Article by Claudio Petruccioli: "In the Land of Anomalies"]

[Text] Emergence and prospects for change. Starting points for a discussion of the arguments of Cicchitto and Craxi.

In the praiseworthy and declared intention of "making an effort" to give a constructive sense to the political debate in progress in the left and between all the forces of democracy, Fabrizio Cicchitto finally defined the DC and the PCI, yesterday in AVANTI!, by comparing the former with an hircocervus and the latter with a centaur and by being horrified, as is obvious, at the

sole thought of what monstrosity may be born of an encounter and crossmating of animals already of themselves so controversial.

I confess that I have neither the strength nor the imagination to follow Cicchitto down this path and, therefore, I do not try, I do not say to sketch a reply, but not even to wonder what kind of animal the PSI is. But there really is a need for an effort to give a constructive sense to the political debate on the left and between the forces of democracy. At any rate, it is not a question of becoming discouraged and of letting an opportunity escape, regardless of how strange it may be.

Therefore, here are some notes.

1. The Italian "anomaly." The animalistic metaphor summarizes and restates an opinion from which socialist reflections have been deriving inspiration more and more frequently for some time now.

According to that opinion, Italian political nomenclature is said to be characterized by fundamental anomalies, by intolerable grammatical errors. The two largest parties are responsible for that: the DC insofar as it is said not to interpret duly and properly its role as a moderate-conservative party and the PCI, which is said to be stubbornly defending some of its characteristics in conflict with the political "norm" in Europe and thus to be preventing the emergence and establishment of a sufficiently homogeneous progressive lineup. Therefore, Italy's real problem is said to be one of correcting these "errors," in order to return to the normality of a "dialectics" (once more "European") between moderates and progressives.

This reasoning has at least two weak points, or, at any rate, points that cannot be taken for granted, but, rather, must be demonstrated.

In the first place, it must indeed be wondered what grounds and what motivations these anomalies have, in Italian history and the present situation, since three-fourths of the voters rally around them. Moreover, these same "anomalies" are judged on merit. The Christian Democratic "monstrosity" with regard to the archetype of the moderate party consists in the presence in that party of a current, of a need for forces that are not identified and refuse to be identified with the preservation and administration of the status quo and do not renounce the possibility of having and performing a driving role, in view of deep-seated transformations and changes of the nation's situation.

On the other hand, the "irregularity" of the PCI with regard to the "progressive" lineups in other European countries is due to the fact that, through it, the tension of a large part of the working class and of vast forces of the people has expressed itself in favor of a deep-seated general change of society, precisely that tension, however, which, at least in some of the countries offered as models, does not find expression.

It cannot, of course, be taken for granted that elimination of these "anomalies" would be an advantage to Italy's democratic, progressive forces.

But, then -- and this is the second point -- is it possible to refer to a European political "norm"? Perhaps, the political systems of other countries do not reflect historical events and events in the present situation?

For example, can the situation and political system in the FRG be explained without taking into account the tragedy and out-and-out physical destruction that struck the German worker movement no later than 40-50 years ago, or without taking into account the very special situation created after World War II that witnessed the existence of two German states with two different social regimes, incorporated in two different and opposing international alliances?

Or can France be explained without the events leading to the end of the Fourth Republic, to the coup d'état by De Gaulle, to the birth of the Fifth Republic with its special constitutional structure (it is the only "presidential" country in Europe)?

As can be seen, it is difficult to extract a European "rule" and, therefore, the objective of Italy's European "normalization" is rather vague, also from this point of view and aside from any other consideration.

The only specific indication gathered, when there is talk of European political dialectics, is alternation. Let us talk about it.

2. Alternation. This is an objective often put forward by our socialist comrades in controversial discussions with us, almost as if we were the supporters of a rigid conception of the relations between parties, excluding the formation of majorities and minorities different from time to time. We have stated several times, in more important places and on more important occasions, that this is the rule sponsored by us; that we intend, above all, to stress the equal dignity and the equal right of every democratic party, therefore also of the PCI, to participate in the country's government, an objective not at all attained, in view of the fact that it is still opposed by the Christian Democratic Party and not only by the Christian Democrats. Also by referring to the historic compromise, we have insisted ad nauseam that by it we mean a strategy that will entrust the renovation and transformation of society to the common endeavor of the large components of the Italian people's movement and not a formula of government or a plan for parliamentary coalitions.

Therefore, it is specious to insist on "alternation" as a criterion in the discussion between the forces of the left. The real problem and probably the real dissent lie elsewhere, in the question: Alternation for what? In fact, very often, not to say always, in many European countries, alternations, the formation of a majority and various oppositions, are substantially conservative in nature with regard to the system of society and to the sign of the government. Alternations within a framework of conservation are involved.

In a previous article, Cicchitto wrote: "Change brought about in consensus and in democracy is the only extensive strategic line, but it is also a politically and socially very difficult operation." I agree with all that. If that is so, then the real objective that must be pursued by the forces of the left takes shape in these terms: construction of a basic convergence between the democratic political forces that, even though it may find expression in various combinations and political coalitions, even though it gives rise to alternation, will make it possible to achieve and plan change. It is clear that this kind of convergence cannot be achieved only by means of common, loyal respect for the "rules of the game," but, rather, it requires that some demands and objectives for renovation and change, with all their differences, be accepted and recognized as valid by agreement.

This is the crucial problem unsolved by the traditional liberal political systems that have proved to be adaptable to alternation only when they do not involve important social and political changes. This is so true that when, especially in periods of crisis, deep-seated changes were necessary, the political systems themselves collapsed and left the field to dictatorial, authoritarian regimes.

Therefore, the real, important issues to be faced by the left do not find a solution in the simple and simplistic demand for alternation, which, as such, no one wants to restrain, but, rather, they make it necessary to find ways for opening up our democratic political system, with the rules and guarantees characterizing it, to the possibility of change.

3. The policy of national unity. The diversity of the points of view that we have sought to analyze so far results very definitely from an opinion by Cicchitto: "We socialists," he says, "believe that the salvation phase pursued by means of the policy of national unity must be followed by the planning phase based on alternation."

But what does "salvation phase" mean? Who should be saved and how? Perhaps, when salvation takes place, choices will not emerge that have great social and political importance, that mark the force relations between the classes, affecting -- especially if the crisis is deep-seated -- the nation's activity for a rather long period of time?

If there is a phase in which the left has an indispensable need for a maximum effort, maximum planning capability, this is precisely the "salvation" phase, when the left takes its own measure in the crisis.

If already during the center-left period the weakness and the vulnerability of the two-phase policy, of separation between the emergence phase and the reform phase, were tested, at present, in view of such great problems, a revival of that policy would be definitely ruinous. Perhaps this is a topic that should be discussed more thoroughly, because it can lead to a good understanding of some of the present divergences between the parties of the left.

In fact, it is not sufficient to lay claim to the policy of national unity. It is also necessary to come to an understanding and to agree on the procedure for carrying it out. Of course, it cannot be the basis for a great endeavor, if it is reduced merely to a "salvation phase."

4. Leninism (and Craxi). Cicchitto wants "Leninism to be dropped from the ideological and political scene of the Italian worker movement." I do not want to inject myself at this point in the controversial discussion now in progress on Leninism. I should like to point out, on the other hand, a victory of the Italian worker movement that is not being "dropped" but rather carefully safeguarded. Whether or not it has to do with Lenin is a problem that I am leaving aside.

What the Italian worker movement should not drop is the awareness that the political authority always has a class sign and that a plan for change cannot propose to modify this sign also.

There have been periods and there are historical experiences and theoretical formulation in which this awareness has found expression and finds expression in a devaluation of the democratic victories, of the values of freedom and pluralism.

It is a firm conviction of the PCI that, when that happened and happens, an error is committed with a negative repercussion also on the potentialities for liberation and social transformation of which the worker movement is the bearer.

Hence, our statements on democracy as a universal, permanent value. These statements diverge both from those statements that presume to subordinate democracy to the winning and exercise of political authority by the worker movement, and from those statements that conceive of democracy as an insurmountable obstacle to any change in the class sign of the political authority to the advantage of the worker movement.

Understanding democracy as a permanent value means affirming the possibility and the need for democracy precisely in the presence of qualitative changes in the social organizations and the political authority. If democracy and the guarantees of freedom are affirmed by the worker movement by setting aside the objective of those qualitative changes and by putting the class features of society and of political authority in the shade, then there is no solution to the great historical problem of building socialism in democracy, but simply we are withdrawn from it.

It seems to me that these remarks also apply to Craxi's article on "Leninism and Pluralism" of which, moreover, we are familiar only with the summary published by news agencies at the time of writing.

The things in this article that do not convince are not the ones said to define socialism, but, rather, the ones left unsaid.

"Socialism is democracy fully developed. Therefore, it is the historical surmounting of liberal pluralism and no longer its total destruction." I agree, but of what does the historical surmounting consist? Of course, it is not only "socialization of the values of liberal civilization, diffusion of authority, equal distribution of wealth and of opportunities to make a living, strengthening and development of the institutions of participation by the working classes in decision-making processes," and even less, the "law of competition." It may also be maintained -- as some PSI intellectuals, like Luciano Pellicani, have done, moreover -- that there is no freedom, if there is no capitalist market, but, then, this is not a synthesis between socialism and democracy, because socialism is not there.

The historic conquest of "liberal pluralism," to say it with Craxi, must be a frontier for the worker movement, but in the sense that we must not draw back from it, not in the sense that we are incapable of moving ahead from it.

Socialists View PCI Ideology

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 28 Aug 78 p 9

[Article by Luciano Pellicani: "We, the Communists and the Third Solution"]

[Text] In an article published in UNITA for 23 August, comrade Claudio Petruccioli made a praiseworthy effort to seek to understand the reasons driving our party to dispute the entire theoretical-practical tradition according to which the PCI operates. And he also sought to explain his party's reasons, but he did so with arguments that do not seem to me satisfactory, because they tend to shift the basis for discussion, in order to protect the main ideological nucleus of Marxism-Leninism and to confirm the validity of the communist strategy. Let us see why.

1. The Italian anomaly. Petruccioli says that Italy's political system is not an "anomalous case" for the simple reason that there is no "European normality." That already is something, because he was maintaining, a year ago, that it was an "advanced case," in the vanguard of democratic development. Obviously, introduction of the historic compromise and the confused mess of problems to be faced by the country must have made him change his mind, if now he is limiting himself to stating that the republic is not as anomalous as is believed, because almost every European nation is anomalous. But are matters really like what Petruccioli says? I should say not precisely. There is a normality in the functioning of industrial democracies, and one of the indicators singling it out is the alternation of political parties in government, one of which usually assembles the interests of the classes penalized by the logic of a capitalist market. The only significant exceptions are France and Italy, which are, precisely, the "anomalous cases."

Blum's theorem is in full force in them: "the socialists cannot win without the communists; however, the socialists cannot govern with the communists."

2. The communist centaur. What is the principal mold of the anomalous functioning of Italian democracy? The answer can be stated immediately: the PCI, which is a two-faced party, participates in the functioning of the system, but, ideologically, it is alien to it, because its positive model is the Soviet Union, a "socialist" country although "illiberal features" are present. Therefore, the PCI is not a party with a legal right to govern. Our communist comrades get vexed with regard to this discrimination. But wrongly, because a self-discrimination is involved. It is not possible to have one's brain in the West and one's heart in Moscow. It is not possible to be in favor of pluralism and, at the same time, view Soviet totalitarianism as a guiding ideal. It is not possible to play the part of a conservative party and of a revolutionary party at the same time. A choice must be made. That is exactly what they do not want to do, in spite of the fact that Carrillo has shown them the way. Communist "doubleness" is not a controversial invention. It flows from the very nature of the PCI. Therefore, I defended an "ideological centaur" in "Trasformazioni del comunismo italiano" [Metamorphoses of Italian Communism] (Rizzoli). Fabrizio Cicchitto liked the image and used it in his most recent article in AVANTI!. Petruccioli did not like it at all and he disputed it. But facts are facts. Among them is the one that Togliatti called the "iron bond" between the PCI and the Soviet Union. As long as this bond exists -- as comrade Claudio Signorile pointed out opportunely -- the PCI will be unable to obtain cancelation of the clause excluding it from the government of the Republic.

3. Leninism. Saying that there is bond (not iron at present, but certainly bronze) between the PCI and the Soviet Union means that Leninism is still the ideological frame of reference for the long-range activity of the PCI. Consequently, when a break from Moscow is demanded, a break with Leninist tradition is demanded at the same time. I am well aware that asking the communist comrades to give up Leninism is the same as asking them to cease being communists. Our request may seem provocative. And it is, frankly. But in the positive sense of the word. We want to provoke, in the minds of our "separated brothers," a process of overall reconsideration of their historical-ideological identity, with a view to the reunification of the two branches of the Italian worker movement. We do not limit ourselves to saying, as the conservatives do, that the PCI has no legal right to govern. We want it to have a legal right, in order to build together the socialist alternation. Because we are aware that this legitimization must necessarily go through a total purging of Leninism, we insist and shall insist on stating what we regard as crucial demands.

The theoretical reasons for the request were set forth clearly, precisely and exhaustively by comrade Craxi in his latest ideological speech. They may be summarized in one single sentence: Leninism and pluralism are organically incompatible with each other. If Leninism prevails, the second necessarily dies. Leninism in government is the theory and practice of "absolute centralization." It is the institutionalization of the principle according to which "the party corrects, designates and manages everything in accordance with a single criterion." How it is possible to reconcile that kind of system of

government with one based on free competition by all social forces is a mystery on which no one has succeeded in throwing light up to now.

4. Pluralism. The awareness that without a market there is no pluralism has increased in recent years within the revisionist left and the culture of dissent. It is true that, among us, the debate on pluralism was imposed in terms typical of Croce: great, subtle discussions on the legal forms and the political culture needed for the smooth running of liberal democracy, but not one word on the economic basis that is indispensable for pluralism to take root and develop. It seems incredible. The Italian Marxists argue with superstructural categories and, therefore, do not succeed in grasping the connection between pluralistic logic and market. Nevertheless, if the Marxist methodological principle, according to which the economic structure affects the political superstructure, is applied, the conclusion must be reached, logically, that an economy based on the principle of a single command cannot support a competitive political system. By this, I do not mean that the market is sufficient for having democracy. I only mean that it is indispensable. Up to now, there has been no historical denial of my assumption. The honor of proving the opposite lies, therefore, with those who believe that a controlled economy is the basis for substantial democracy.

But that proof has not come up to now. Most of them limit themselves to saying -- and Petruccioli is among them -- that anyone who regards the market as the indispensable (but not sufficient) requirement for democracy abandons the socialist field to go over to the bourgeois field, regardless of whether or not he realizes it. An old argument with which all questions raised by the Leninist practice were cut off short at emergence, with the results of which we are all aware. The fact remains that the first to maintain that there is an indissoluble tie between market and freedom was not a bourgeois theorist, but rather a great socialist thinker, Proudhon. And after Proudhon came Merlino, Cole, Otto Bauer to warn the left not to take the road to collectivism and to seek socialism in another direction.

5. Socialism and market. Petruccioli says: "If, like Luciano Pellicani, it is stated that there is no freedom if there is no capitalist market, then this is not a synthesis between socialism and democracy, because socialism is not there." Except that I have never identified the market with capitalism. Two different, separate concepts are involved that it is completely arbitrary to identify. Until the contrary has been proved, there is a market in Yugoslavia, but there is no capitalism.

It is incredible that these things have to be pointed out, but the Leninist way of thinking has so thoroughly taken over minds that an emotional rejection reaction is set off immediately with regard to the market concept. Unless Petruccioli pretended not to understand and resorted to the sly trick of making me say things that I have never written, in order to have an easy victory. But I refuse to believe that he uses means like these. After all, there is a difference in style between Petruccioli and Scalfari. When Scalfari writes that he would "never have imagined that, in 1978, the undisputed PSI leader would

have spoken the same language as Panfilo Gentile," everyone knows that he is engaging in low, specious controversy.

But let us get back to the point. When I speak of socialist market, I am referring to a market that has been socialized and I am pointing out, in planning and self-management, the two pillars of "market socialism." Anyone wanting to verify the solidity of such an economic system merely has to pick up the works of Yeroslav Vanek or the many items written on self-management. With regard to the procedure for socializing the market, I have referred repeatedly to the Meidner plan, which provides for expropriation of large capitalist enterprises; in other words, transfer of control of the top levels of the economy from private persons to the workers' collective. God only knows what the pattern I defend has to do with capitalism. The only serious objection that might be addressed to me up to now is the one by Domenico Settembrini, who questioned the effectiveness of a self-managed economy and expressed the concern that it may lead to the same political results as a completely nationalized economy; namely, totalitarian dictatorship by the "red bureaucracy."

6. Third solution. The fact that Petruccioli does not even succeed in coming up with an economic system that is not either capitalism or collectivism is enlightening, even though he is lavish in an endeavor, that does honor to him, to attempt to understand what we have been saying for the last couple of years. Nevertheless, in his interview granted to Scalfari, comrade Berlinguer said very clearly that the communists are engaged in seeking a "third solution." We do not say that we have found this third solution. Nevertheless, we are looking for it. On the other hand, the communist comrades say that they are in favor, but then they train their weapons on any proposal made for getting out of the paralyzing dilemma of "capitalism or collectivism." Thus, they are making no progress. Thus, they are standing still.

7. Socialists and communists. The conclusion drawn from this article is clear: we and our communist comrades differ on everything or almost everything. There is, however, a point on which there is agreement. It is a question of a fundamentally important agreement: this society, the capitalist society, does not satisfy us, because the distribution of values in it is not in accordance with the paradigm of substantial democracy. Therefore, we have a common objective, although we seek to attain it in different ways. Therefore, controversial discussions will continue between us and the communists and they will also be rougher than in the past, but always bearing in mind the intermediate objective to be achieved: unity of the left is the same as saying overcoming the ideological reasons for the Leghorn split. But that can take place only when the conviction prevails that the course indicated by Lenin and Gramsci does not lead to socialist democracy but, rather, to a Gulag.

Leninism, Soviet Socialist Model

Rome UNITA in Italian 8 Sep 78 p 3

[Article by L. Lombardo Radice]

[Text] Issues concerning the heritage of Lenin, a search for new roads to socialism, pluralism, Eurocommunism, are issues put objectively before the Italian democratic worker movement and not only the Italian movement. Therefore, I believe that they should be studied and discussed in the most documented and rational way possible, not only in the (legitimate) party interest. Consequently, I shall make no quotations, in the following brief notes, either in agreement or disagreement.

1. Lenin's heritage, and not Leninism, should be spoken of. When we say, for example, "Christianity," everyone knows that the "good news" announced by Jesus of Nazareth took place centuries ago and that it has many different, sometimes strongly conflicting, interpretations at present. The heritage of the Gospel consists of organizations, theories, ways of living rather different among themselves. Also when we say "Marxism," we begin, at present, not to think any longer about one doctrine capable of being codified unambiguously. We speak more often of "Marxisms" in the plural. The heritage of Karl Marx consists of organizations, theories, practices of living rather different among themselves and sometimes -- it may not be liked and it is not liked, but it is true -- conflicting. I believe that "Leninism" also has the same meaning. Moreover, when we speak of a Gramsci Leninism, it is something different from a Brezhnev Leninism, which, in turn, is not the same thing as Mao's Leninism or as Stalin's Leninism either. In short, the day will certainly come when the discussion will become more serious, will cease being propagandistic and ideological. Because, however, the word "Leninism" and even more so the term "Marxism-Leninism" still sound doctrinaire, as a consequence of the Stalinist codification, it is better to speak of Lenin's heritage. It is hardly necessary to say -- but one never knows at the present time -- that heritages can be accepted or refused, entirely or in part. It would be desirable, in today's discussion, for Lenin to be neither canonized nor demonized, but, rather, studied critically from the historical, political, ideological point of view.

2. The term "state socialism" -- that I have been using personally for several years now -- seems to me the most accurate (concise) definition of the "Soviet model." The expression "real socialism," or "really existing socialism," does not satisfy me. In fact, I believe that, at present, there are several socialisms, in the plural, differing among themselves. It seems to me absurd, unhistorical (often Manichean) to compress them all within one single formula, from Yugoslavia to the USSR, from China to Cambodia, Cuba, Vietnam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. Moreover, when we speak of state socialism in connection with the Soviet system (without rash generalizations), if we want to understand something, if we are content with pure propaganda, it is necessary to understand

the origin, the vicissitudes, the dynamics, the achievements, the contradictions in this new economic-political-social structure. Once more, praises and condemnations keep us immovable on this side of an understanding of the phenomenon.

3. Socialism is in history and there is history in socialism. This is one of the many things taught me by Palmiro Togliatti, whom I am pleased to recognize once more as a master of revolutionary fervor and of lucid intellectual courage. Let us always limit ourselves to the USSR. After the October Revolution, we had an initial phase (naturally capable of being broken down into periods, in turn) of democratic inrush by the masses in public affairs, with strong, different forms of direct democracy, the soviets. After some time, we had profound mass cultural changes of the "illuministic" type and an exceptional free cultural production, with libertarian touches, not aristocratic, affecting large masses (from motion pictures to the theater, from poetry to manifestos). In order to be understood, we shall speak of "Soviet phase."

In the transition period between the 1920's and 1930's, the "state socialism" line prevailed over the point of view of "Soviet socialism," by means of a very violent, later bloody, struggle within the party of the Bolsheviks, with forced collectivization of rural areas and the first 5-year plan. It prevailed, mark it well, not without widespread consensus of the masses who committed themselves with constructive zeal to the great changes that were being made under a constantly more centralized leadership.

4. At present, in the USSR, state socialism is experiencing serious difficulties. The "system" seems to have exhausted its constructive zeal, mindful of promoting the new society that it also created. The periodic crises that have been shaking the "Soviet system" since 1953, sometimes had the features of rebellions against it, but rather more often of renovation from within of a new course, which is, at the same time, a break and continuity (20th Party Congress, Prague Spring).

Prominent persons like Khrushchev, Dubcek, Smrkovski -- and like Kadar and Gierek himself -- become totally incomprehensible, if state socialism is regarded as a fixed system, outside of history, lacking conflicts, lacking innovative potentialities that are, on the other hand, constantly fed by the growth of great, new, vital societies that it is now impossible and senseless to try to control, regulate and discipline from the top.

5. The traditional "social democratic" models, ranging from the [British] Labor Party to "Scandinavian socialism," are also in crisis at the present time. I must immediately make one thing clear. I believe that the communist parties should still eliminate many residues of a sectarian criticism of European social democracies, called "agencies of the bourgeoisie" and the like. I believe, on the other hand, that it is necessary to take very careful, unprejudiced account of care structures, cultural institutions for workers, city planning and low-cost housing. In short, all the social work achieved by a Wilson in England or by a Palme in Sweden.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Scandinavian and British social democracies have limited themselves to conducting a good and even at times excellent social care administration within the capitalist system, without ever raising the prospect of its elimination. All that did not lead to a crisis of social democratic strategy until another, disturbing, crisis of the capitalist system exploded. I am not talking merely about the very serious economic crisis of financial difficulty and imbalance that we have been experiencing since 1973. More generally, basic structural conflicts are worsening, although they are taking on new forms. Thus, for example, new forms of poverty, no longer with regard to food but rather with regard to existence, are propagating in the opulent consumer society and are corroding it. In addition, anarchy in capitalist production is not only still producing its traditional effects (unemployment, irrationality in the development of production). It is now giving rise to ecological disasters, degrading and ravaging nature.

6. At present, Eurocommunism is proposing, as a solution to the crisis, prospects for an elimination both of the "Soviet model" and of the "social democratic model," and precisely the democratic construction of a new kind of socialism. Neither socialism without democracy, nor democracy without socialism. This point of view entails elimination of what Robert Havemann has called the "historic tragedy" of the worker movement that split up, after World War I, into two antagonistic Internationals (see his essay "Dictatorship or Democracy?", published by Studi Storici [Historical Studies], in 1977). Although some barriers have not been overcome, relationships between communist parties and "traditional" social democratic parties have been beginning, only for some time now, not to become habitual, but rather merely to exist. A very slow process, strongly opposed by a large component of European social democracy.

7. The most powerful and seasoned opponent of overcoming the break between communist parties and social democratic parties is within the leadership of the SPD, the German Social Democratic Party. I say "leadership," because I am well aware that there are, in that large party, important trends moving in opposite directions.

The present SPD leadership, which governs the capitalist state with the liberals, does not propose to the other European parties in the socialist International the regime with strong illiberal features now existing in the FRG.

The features of the "German model" that it is desired to export are different. First, a renunciation of any, even remote, socialist point of view, and regardless of the type, with simultaneous liquidation of Marx and all "Marxisms" (which the SPD did in 1959, in the famous Bad Godesberg Congress). Second, reduction of the influence of Eurocommunist parties by resisting it and by making their prospects for socialism vain, a socialism with a human face, indeed, but a socialism as the consistent, complete development of a pluralistic, predominantly collaborative, democracy, although containing conflicts within it.

There is no providence, either transcendent or immanent, in history. The battle is always uncertain. In Europe, I hope that the Berlinguer point of view will win out, but I cannot rule out, a priori, that the Schmidt line will prevail. With regard to Italy, there still are some important factors that make a lasting success of the "libertarian anticomunism," of the "anticommunist reorganization" of the PSI rather dubious. Meanwhile, in the long history of the PSI, all attempts at "social democratization" have failed systematically, from 1911 to 1970, from Bissolati to Bonomi, to Saragat, down to "unification."

Moreover, what I have called a Eurocommunist point of view in Europe, is, in Italy, the now traditional unified democratic point of view of the worker movement. Rosselli as well as Gramsci, Nenni as well as Togliatti, Morandi as well as Longo, Terracini as well as Pertini are its precursors, founders, exponents.

That means, moreover, that something more than a controversial discussion has opened up. A confrontation and a conflict between two strategies, between two historical points of view have opened up. In order to respond adequately, we must be well aware of this fact.

Alternative Ideologies

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Sep 78 p 6

[Article by Euzo Forcella: "A Great Controversy on Lenin and Then Immobility"]

[Text] In the world in which we are living, Leninism no longer is of any use. It is a blunt weapon. It can calmly be thrown away, or, more formally speaking, "consigned to history." If the objective of this summer's heated controversial discussion was all here, it must be said that this discussion broke down an open door. The Italian left, in its debate on theory and more so in its political practice, had already attained it much before these latest, not completely disinterested, pressures.

There is, however, heritage of Leninism from which all parties, excluding none, have not succeeded in freeing themselves. Rather, in the last 30 years, it has become the homogenizing characteristic of the manner of conducting politics in our country. It is the habit of ideologizing every political conflict and, consequently, of instrumentalizing ideas, of transforming theory, culture into secular arms of political action.

The by now also famous "ideological essay" of Bettino Craxi, with the whole flood of statements and articles to which it has given rise, marks, at the same time, the triumph and the turning point of this trend. A triumph, because the intention of calmly using, for immediate political ends, any remnant of the longstanding theoretical discussion of European Marxism could not prove to be more obvious. But also a turning point. In fact, the extremely simplified, frankly pedagogical, nature of this revival probably did not escape notice.

The times are very remote in which even Nenni, who also was always a great exemplifier, felt a need for entrusting long, complicated theoretical arguments to party publications, in order to motivate his political changes of direction. Now, a few pages suffice, a few well-placed comparisons of the Proudhon and Marx type, choice of the proper moment and channel, in order to succeed in marking, as has been written, a historical fact in the life of the Italian Socialist Party. Concerning the method of making politics, perhaps we are only now really entering the dimension of mass communications.

The strange thing is that all, regardless of whether or not they want to, are compelled to cooperate. Riccardo Lombardi, for example. A few weeks ago, in a roundtable arranged to celebrate the collection of his "Political Writings" from 1945 to the present, the aim of every illusion on the future of capitalism, its -- so to speak -- "radicalization to the left," turned out to be evident. But yesterday, obliged to be careful not to upset the balance on which the secretariat of the PSI rests, he made a statement that the newspapers were able to entitle indifferently "Even Lombardi Defends Craxi" (LA REPUBBLICA) or "Lombardi Takes His Distance From Craxi" (UNITA). Not at all strange, then, if, at the end of the discussion, almost all of us were left with a bitter taste in our mouth, with the feeling of having lost time in seeking to grasp the point of the matter, to differentiate propaganda from substance and the point at which the doctrinaire consensus becomes political dissent or vice versa.

Let us take the theme of this ideological gospel: rejection of the totalizing conception of politics, condemnation of the garrison state, of the concentrationary nature of the complete state control of human activity. How not to be in agreement? But how, at the same time, not to see that loading all those burdens on the back of Marxism reduces itself to an operation still worse than totalizing and mystifying? Jacobism is a liberal, democratic, rather than Leninist, stigma (let it suffice to think about democratic interventionism in the 1914-1918 war) and even the socialists warned, last year, against the new Parisian philosophers.

Marxism came into being and developed as a criticism of bourgeois liberal society in all its aspects. The various attempts at working out and producing alternative models have, up to now, proved to be disappointing or disastrous, it is true. But the criticism proved to be victorious.

Must this criticism still be trusted? Is it still possible to try to turn it into something constructive? The "third course" proposed by Berlinguer is still something vague and even ambiguous. But "pluralistic lay democracy," constructed by taking something from Trotsky, something from Rosa Luxemburg, a little from Cohn-Bendit and much from Carlo Rosselli, is no longer convincing.

A reading key on which it is worthwhile to reflect was proposed in this newspaper in an initial evaluation of the controversial discussion unleashed by Craxism. Two years after 20 June, when the attempts to turn those results into a definite, convincing political turning point have been frustrated one after the

other, the PCI and the PSI are nailed down to a strategy of immobility, compelled to witness a rapid moderate, corporative reflux of public opinion.

The communists are trying to oppose it by relaunching a program of government, which, moreover, is an almost empty box or, at any rate, devised in such a way that, as soon as a search is made to see what is in it, all the conflicts will explode. On the other hand, the socialists prefer to put on the agenda the problem of their "reorganization," with an inclination to tackle every social problem and a longing to do so quickly that result in turning change into pure agitation.

True, but perhaps something more may be said. The communists, entrenched in a defense of the political framework, must necessarily disregard, or at least underestimate, the progressive deterioration of the social body. On the other hand, the socialists, in order to continue to be the mirror and spokesmen of all its animosities, must accept all the contradictions, starting with the contradiction of an anticomunism that is of the right and of the left at the same time. In any case, the operation can succeed only if the guarantee of the present political framework remains, that is to say, if a situation is not created that will compel them to make their choices of a program and a lineup prematurely. It is a standstill, an immobilization with an opposite and convergent sign, from which the entire left risks coming out crushed.

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ITALY

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE OF LEFT AS VIABLE POLITICAL FORCE

Current Problems

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 6 Sep 78 p 6

[Article by Gianni Baget Bozzo]

[Text] In an interview on the Moro case, Sciassia stated that what politics in Italy needs most is truth: and not just about the Moro case (although that was indeed a dreadful event, fraught with fearful significance), but about politics itself. For this reason, the ideological debate that was sparked by the Berlinguer interview and reached its stormy climax in Craxi's article, is an important happening because it has cleared the way for a quest for the truth.

Italian political parties have all drifted away from the original formulation of their own truth and, in a way, they are all trying to go back and find it again. The surprising thing in all this is basically that in our time, that lost truth seems to be the same for all parties: democracy and socialism have ceased to be opposite points of reference for all political factions. And so the paradox is that the discussion stems more from a search for issues of contention, from the quest for a partisan identity, than from any expression of what all share in common.

One might even say that the Italian path to democracy and the Italian path to socialism have, almost imperceptibly, become one and the same, and that henceforward no one can accept the one without accepting the other. The Italian road to democracy, in the Christian Democrat view, looks to the parties with a socialist tradition as the only possible allies, and the Italian road to socialism has long been widely recognized on the Left as identical with the Italian road to democracy.

Stating the problem this way, Italy becomes an exception in the world, because these two things are, in the world's view, a very

far cry indeed from blending into one another. The world's two hegemonic powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- maintain on principle that there is a division between democracy in the Western sense, and socialism: and in this division lies their singular consensus.

In France, the crisis of the left meant its inability to come up with an alternative to a frankly conservative government. Germany's power is rooted not in the fact that the Social Democrats are in power, but in the success of its capitalist-style economy. Perhaps the country closest to Italy is England, which, however, still has historical ties to the United States which are too binding to permit it to constitute any sort of political exception.

That leaves Italy as the one country in which the problem of the link between democracy and socialism is actually on the agenda. By now, it can no longer be struck off on the basis of the country's domestic political forces. The satisfaction engendered by squabbles between socialists and communists in certain sectors of public opinion cannot breed any illusion that the Socialist Party (PSI) can somehow be transmogrified into some sort of mass liberal party. On the contrary: it is precisely because of the fact that this connection between socialism and democracy is on the nation's agenda that the PSI secretary was constrained to underscore the indissoluble link between socialism and democracy, and that he drew such a sharp line of demarcation between his party and established Stalinism. (This does not mean, however, that the cultural heritage of Lenin ought not to be appreciated as a creative element in any new socialist synthesis).

The problem of truth that faces us today is not concerned with the several parties directly involved in this situation; it has to do with the reality of this country and its role in history. The state of emergency cannot last forever: it has trouble lasting out the life of one legislature. There comes a time when it must give way to some proposal for collaboration. It is in that moment that the political formulation of the Italian road to democracy and to socialism must be fleshed out. In this sense, the debate over the role, the values, and the aims of democracy and socialism and over their relationship to one another takes on practical political meaning.

This unquestionably means a problem of international policy as well. This new thing in Italy, while it is alone in its ripeness, is not unique in its existence. The bond between socialism and democracy is surely ripe in many countries, even though it may have been suppressed in Prague or sidetracked in Paris. Can it be proposed today in new terms in Rome? There is no doubt but

that this question will very shortly demand an answer. The alternative to an answer is violent: the Communist Party (PCI) pushed into the opposition, the PSI split, and the Christian Democrats (DC) flung willy-nilly onto reactionary positions.

But on which side does the truth lie? What kind of creative composition is possible between the great Italian mass parties? What contribution can the political minorities, the social and cultural forces, make? These problems mean that, today, the debate over the bond between democracy and socialism is anything but a theoretical exercise: on the contrary, it is the principal issue facing this country.

Some time ago, the director of the DC weekly *DISCUSSIONE* stated (criticizing me, but forgetting Forlani, who was the deviser of the theory) that it was not true that "comparison" was void of content. I maintain that comparison had potential content, but that it was yet to be defined, and I advised the current supporters of the Zaccagnini line to define it. This, in a different direction, was the thrust of the question on foreign policy I posed to Sentaor Fanfani at Saint Vincent, and to which he replied with his usual predilection for speaking in proverbs.

In short, just what is socialism to the DC? What is capitalism to the DC? And I fear we could go on, unfortunately, into terra incognita: "Here there be lions...". Thus far, the DC has shown no sign of a fondness for definitions.

Rx for the Left

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 3-4 Sep 78 p 20

[Article by Federico Coen]

[Text] There has been a marked deflation, in the space of a few days, in the attempt to make a political sensation by blowing up the essay in which Comrade Craxi took up and developed some of the ideological themes in the "Socialist plan" into an "about-face" that would openly challenge the party's socialist nature. The fairly obvious aim was to stir up confusion and strife in our ranks. But the party reacted properly, and once again demonstrated the solidity of the new climate of unity.

Discovering that there was malicious intent behind certain interpretations, furthermore, in no way detracts either from the importance of the issues Craxi raised as to the irreconcilability of Leninism with pluralistic socialism, or from the legitimacy of the questions that have since surfaced in the press as to the more or less immediate implications of the debate that has opened on the left. What is the relationship between this debate and the alternative strategy? How do we reconcile it with the

convergence of the two parties on the policy of national unity? The answers we have already got to these questions from Craxi himself and from Signorile deserve to be taken up and further developed.

The basic issue, as has been said, is whether or not the Italian left is capable of becoming a full-fledged force in government of its own right. Not merely on the formal level, with the acquisition of a majority consensus among the electorate, but in terms of substance. This means having a plan for society, a design for government, a view of international relations that are credible and, at the same time, compatible with ties that stem from our political and cultural status as part of Western Europe and of the democratic socialism which has its roots in that context. When we pose this problem, and find that the PCI has not yet come to grips with it, we are not making a concession to the conservative forces. It is the workers themselves, the labor movement, the forces of democracy and of progress, which must fortify themselves against the danger that the battle for socialism might lead to dictatorship by an unscrupulous bureaucracy or to a Chilean-style outcome. It is therefore empty illusion to try to replace the self-evident legitimacy that stems from the maturity of the forces of the left and from their ability to learn from the errors of the past, and use that knowledge to build the future, with some sort of external assurance or investiture, which in the Italian case would derive from the alliance with the DC. There must be a reckoning with the DC -- nobody is considering a hole-in-corner alternative -- but only a left with its credentials in order to govern alone, if need be, can sit down to that reckoning without bowing to blackmail, and using every bit of bargaining power it can muster. The sad and sorry record of 2 years of emergency and national unity governments is the result not only of differences among the parties, but also of the unequal nature of the pact that binds them together. The DC's strength lies precisely in that inequality, and it has every reason to perpetuate the status quo. It is certainly no accident that the governing party, which stands to gain most from the PCI's inconsistencies and delays, has held itself indifferent to and aloof from the debate.

Ideology and politics, in this case, are thus intimately intertwined. Dialogue over the greatest systems, indeed! The fact that a party of the left still, in this day and age, harks back to the Leninist tradition, as does the PCI according to Berger, or one which, vice-versa, rejects that tradition and joins the ranks of pluralist, democratic, citizen-run socialism, as does the PSI, is no mere parlor-game for intellectuals, but a vital part of the political identity of both parties. How could anyone be unaware that Leninism is still the official doctrine of totalitarian regimes which, behind a facade of socialism, have trampled all individual and collective freedom under foot? We

do not seek to put Lenin in the dock: Leninism interests us as the political and cultural matrix of these regimes. To put it in political terms, the real issue is Stalinism: Brezhnev's of course, which differs only in detail from Stalin's own brand. Stalinism is not a matter for doctrinal disputation or for learned historiographical research: it is the very stuff of active politics, an essential protagonist in international relations; a benchmark -- positive or negative -- for anyone who would engage in politics in the West or anywhere else. The ability to look squarely at this towering political reality with the necessary realism, without distorting ideological lenses, is the essential requisite for any party in government, particularly in the West. When a party like the PCI proudly defends and avidly clings to its entire historical tradition -- upon which lies the weight of decades of coziness with Stalinism; when it persists in seeing as "socialist," and therefore politically akin to itself, societies that are governed by Stalinists; when it refuses to see the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy (that same hegemonism denounced by Tito and by Hua Kuo-Feng alike) and seeks on every occasion to justify the individual acts in which that policy finds expression, then it is legitimate to doubt the capacity and even the will of that party to assume, as by right, the role of government in a country like ours. If we want to establish the alternative strategy with its feet firmly on the ground, we cannot allow ourselves to ignore these issues.

It would be mistaken, however, to dismiss the questions raised in the socialist plan and dealt with in Craxi's essay as mere needling (or "provocation," as Berlinguer puts it) aimed at the communists. There is something more than that in our enquiries. There is an ambition to work out a possible strategy for socialism that has the Socialist Party as its protagonist, and which will serve as a meeting-ground for the other parties in European democratic socialism. This is not an ideologically homogeneous reality, but there is no doubt that both Proudhon's citizen-run socialism and Rosselli's liberal socialism -- to cite just two of the names that have, in their time, given scandal -- are by right historically part of it, no less than the Marxist factions of the Second Internationale. Look, for example, at Proudhon: interest in his work has been rising steadily in France of recent years, along with the development of the debate on worker-management and citizen-government. The only explanation for the scorn with which Italian communists regard this current in socialist thought, and the concept of worker-management itself, is their besetting dogmatism.

Furthermore, this is not merely a cultural pose. The same dogmatism is to be found in the dim view the communists take of the overall achievements and experience of the European socialdemocrat and labor parties, even though they represent the vast majority of the labor movement in Europe. Comrade Berlinguer's

arrogance when he said, in that now famous interview, that he would liquidate a thing as intricate and complex as that on the pretext that it had not achieved socialism -- as if the economic (not to mention social and political) progress achieved by the workers in Great Britain, in Sweden, and in Germany and elsewhere were a negligible thing -- is not merely a demonstration of provincialism: it casts a chilling shadow over that very European option which Berlinguer himself takes so seriously. To whom, then, can the PCI speak in Europe? And how is it possible to seek for some "third path" between capitalism and Soviet communism if you begin by tossing 60 years of the history of the Western labor movement onto the scrap heap?

No doubt, therefore, as to the political import of this debate. We are talking about the future of the left, in the short term and in the long. Claiming that you can make sure of the future by laying down a smokescreen over the past, and putting your money on the agreement with the DC, means sentencing the labor movement to permanent second-class status: let the old greybeards have the left, and let the DC govern, as Craxi puts it. At this point it becomes the sheerest hypocrisy to rend one's garments over the perils of a return to the center-left. The danger is in fact far graver than that: if the left does not make itself count for more, through a rigorous review of its ideas and its programs, the national unity policy may well be battered to pieces on the reef of the moderate mortgage that has marked its course thus far; and the most probable outcome if that happens will be deeper entrenchment of the DC regime and a return to the centrism of the Fifties. The restless uneasiness of which the socialists stand accused is an expression, in fact, of nothing other than their awareness of this danger and their determination to stand up and fight it.

Long- and Short-Term Prospects

Rome IL MANIFESTO in Italian 5 Sep 78 p 4

[Article by Luigi Pintor]

[Text] Bettino Craxi may not be making any friends, but he keeps on winning. Perhaps he deserves to. Maybe he is right, in his own way. Maybe those who would shout him down are more than a little bit wrong. And maybe this is why Bettino Craxi stirs up so much animosity and bitter rancor on the left, where everybody loves unity but likes uniformity even better, and where nobody will yield an iota to anybody else.

As secretary of a party, Craxi wants the party of which he is secretary to break out of the minority and amount to something more. If that is a failing, it is a well-nigh universal one. And then, for an Italian socialist, it is almost a historical novelty. I

fail to understand why we ought not to give it our benevolent encouragement, and seek to understand what motivates it. We might object that partisan considerations, even from a century-old party, must yield to those of class or even, if you will, to the general interest, if there is such a thing. However, we do live in a party system, and I have yet to see a party that did not identify itself with the whole.

I cannot see how Craxi, to achieve this result, is behaving so recklessly as they say. Until now he has, for better or for worse, improved his party's performance at the polls, to the amazement of all; he has breathed some life into it; it does not seem to me (at least as an outsider) that he has vulgarized it any more than it was in the days of the sottogoverno; and he has taken the initiative on occasion, which has at least helped to ward off "standardizing" everything, without thereby "destabilizing" anything. Ambiguous initiative? That is possible, even probable. But I should like to know who is exempt from so facile a suspicion.

Even less do I believe that Craxi is in danger of getting the opposite of what he is after: splitting the left more than it already is, and in the end splintering his own party. It seems to me that De Martino, for all his artful indolence, is mistaken. It is not his quoting Proudhon, certainly, but rather the way he performed in government that has cost the PSI, over the years, those many comrades and voters whom De Martino now fears his successor may lose. Why this haste to play Cassandra?

I would also rule out, absolutely, the possibility that Craxi wants to break with the PCI, and that this intention is behind his sallies. Keep his distance, even perhaps lengthen it: but why a break? Craxi would have to be stupid, and it may well be that he is stupid; if he is, though, it does not show. I do not see how we can deny that he has a feeling for the subtleties of power relationships and alliances of convenience. I should even go so far as to say that a flair for just this sort of thing is one of his political gifts, and without it there would not be a socialist in the Quirinale. Therefore I can very easily imagine that going back into a government with the DC and breaking with the left would mean allowing himself to be torn to bits, just as forming a bloc with the PCI on the basis of an abstract bias toward unity -- which, on top of everything else, he does not want -- would mean painting himself into a corner.

It is altogether possible that the opposite may happen, that more thoughtful argument on the part of the PSI will nudge the PCI, too, toward greater caution and a greater concern for unity; toward more consideration for an alliance that should come naturally, rather than to assign such unwarrantedly high priority to relations with the DC; and, in general, to strive for more inventiveness. All these would be good things. A strategy of alertness, instead of harassment. Togliatti respected even the

alleged intelligence of Saragat, and ordered the communist propagandists to use moderation in dealing with him. It would therefore be fairly unrealistic on the part of his successors were they to prove intolerant of Craxi's arrogant wit, while they can easily put up with Andreotti's subtle craftiness.

Furthermore, I see no similarity between Craxi and Saragat or his ilk. Parallels like this are "rear-view": they look at the PCI, the PSI, social democracy, Europe, and the world as they were in the Fifties. Saragat was the DC's errand-boy (and the Americans') when the DC was the all-out enemy of the PCI and of the entire labor movement. Craxi is not, as of now, the DC's errand-boy, and the DC itself is no longer the mortal enemy of the PCI, but its privileged interlocutor, and in a universally accepted Atlantic and Western European area to boot. That does make a difference.

I also find an excess of flinty glitter in many of the attacks on grounds of ideology and "principle" being directed at the PSI secretary (who is no ideologue) because he apparently aspires to a degree of cultural recasting of the socialist tradition, and therefore gives short shrift to Leninism, imputing to it its now unquestioned paternity of the socialists in power, as well as that of certain twisted kinds of Marxism, and all in the name of that very serious thing known as individual liberty. It would be well to contradict him, but calmly, if possible, and not necessarily on every point; not forgetting that in these easy circumstances there is confusion everywhere under the sun, from the Balkans to Eurasia, from the Caribbean to the Horn of Africa to Latin and Catholic America; and that the most foolish thing in the world is to pretend that there is none.

Aside from that, it seems to me rash to discourage Craxi from wrestling with historical and doctrinal matters. If you force him over onto the level ground of day-to-day contingencies, it will be all too easy for him to strike a bargain on the market and on profits and on the intermediate classes and their role in any present or future society; again not with Marx or even with Scalfari -- both of them too anti-bourgeois -- but certainly with Napolitano, Barca, and Peggio, and the whole medium- and even long-term PCI plan. Such a deal would not be a great step forward, even though, were it to come to pass, a great deal of anti-socialist polemics would be silenced at a stroke.

What I do find particularly odd, though, is that Craxi should be under fire for everything (including of course his desire to save Aldo Moro's life: because he is insincere? or because he is evil?) except the one essential point: the enormous contradiction between the PSI's ambition to offer a new ideal reference, and the softness of the challenge it poses to the existing social order and to the Christian Democrat government that expresses it.

I do not know what sort of socialism there is in the PSI's far distant outlook; I cannot believe that there is none; nor yet would I be overly surprised were I to find that it does not include a concept of a society egalitarian (and therefore free, or vice-versa), a concept which is extraneous, for that matter, to the tradition of all of the left throughout history. I do know, though, or I believe I understand, that the less distant goal of the PSI is that of a government with a majority either composite or potentially leftist, and therefore I am right to be surprised if this goal, legitimate and profitable and probably realistic in a certain European setting, is not accompanied by content and patterns of behavior that are adequate, innovative, and clear, as well as by political practice and a convincing thrust of struggle against the current state of affairs and against Christian Democrat domination. This is the standing criticism which the new PSI, like the old one, deserves, but which it would gladly be spared by those who cannot forgive its secretary's style.

And yet, this is the political test-bench, the essential one for the whole of the left, not just the PSI; and it is also the only solid ground on which to judge the roots, the class inspiration, and the ideal orientation of each party. If on this ground a more ambitious PSI should leave itself open to more spectacular contradictions (like those of which Lombardi is steward), and if therefore it can more readily be spurred to overcome them, all the better for us all. Why should this anger us, or frighten us? There is really no reason to be afraid of Bettino Craxi: he lacks the wolf's skin, and perhaps his undesirable habits as well. One can be afraid of him only if one is still given -- out of pure nostalgia -- to conjuring up spectres of a uniform left (uniform to what, nobody knows); or if one believes that history is about to be turned upside-down and will brook no further let nor hindrance; or, more simply, if one prefers, in the meantime, the peace and quiet which Christian Democrat hegemony guarantees us. Nasty spots to be in, all three.

When it comes down to it, I know: Montanelli likes Craxi, and that is a bad thing. Scalfari, on the other hand, does not like him, and that in itself is a good sign. The liberal democrats -- if there are any -- like him, and I do not know whether that is good or bad. Then again, the newly appointed bolsheviks do not like him, and that is certainly a good thing. There is at least some room left for curiosity about the future. And meanwhile we can expect that whichever ass whose turn it is will bray that we have all taken out socialist party cards.

Moving Toward the Center

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[Editorial]

[Text] The debate continues, or rather swells, over Craxi's article and the PSI's ideological aboutface. The communists

(obviously) do not want to be the ones to burn the bridges: they criticize, but moderately, and they are hoping for a miraculous return to right thinking. The non-confessional area (social democrats and liberals) simultaneously express satisfaction at the new Craxian course, and fears of over-keen competition. The truly paradoxical upshot is that Romita -- at least according to his interview in our paper yesterday -- has wound up actually finding himself somewhat to the left of the PSI secretary.

Yet it is inside the Socialist Party that you find the greatest perplexity. Achilli's minority has touched off a furious conflagration, actually demanding convocation of the central committee. Manca (we carry a wide-ranging interview with him in this issue) is looking for a middle-of-the-road position; Lombardi and Signorili, called onto the carpet by Manca, have for the moment lapsed into impenetrable silence. Even Mancini is mute. And De Martino? We all know that the old party leader does not share Craxi's neo-liberal views, but it is still unclear whether he plans to come out into the open or to bide his time.

Meantime, beyond the ideological debate, the parties are wondering what the practical purpose of Craxi's outbursts may be. Why in the world should Craxi decide at this particular moment to embrace the liberal socialist position, drastically reject Marxism although it is still pointed to as the essential source of inspiration in the PSI's constitution; and, above all, why should he be digging an all but unbridgeable ideological trench between the socialists and the communists?

There are at least three reasons, and they are synergistic.

1. Craxi's ideological turnabout will be used to prepare the PSI for the European elections, and to bring it into line with the other socialist parties in the Community. The German, English, and Scandinavian social democrats, and even the French Socialist Party, have long since broken away from ideological "obedience" to Marxism; they are, on the whole, progressive parties with non-confessional traditions, which express aspirations toward social justice and income redistribution, but without proposing radical changes in the economic system. Precisely because of this sort of background, they have been able to "capture" broad consensus among the bourgeoisie and the centrists, making sound governmental alternatives possible "within" the current machinery of capitalist production and "within" the present system of international division of labor. The PSI still displayed a few anomalies with respect to its brethren in the Internationale, even though it had come a long way since 1956. Now, with the Craxi article, these anomalies have been removed, making the PSI, too, a "pragmatic" and a "liberal" party.

2. It is significant that Craxi, as he went beyond many of his European counterparts on this ground (for example, the British Labour Party and the Scandinavian Social Democrats, not to mention

the French Socialist Party), has closely and, one might say, indissolubly united political pluralism with economic liberalism. Some of the assertions contained in the ESPRESSO article sound like full support for "proprietary" values, the like of which has not often been heard in any European social democracy, and which might well trigger considerable change in the socialist electorate and in the party's rank and file membership. What the PSI secretary has done is tantamount to a "shift to the center." This is a novelty which has already pricked up a lot of ears among the more astute Christian Democrat observers, concerned over this unexpected socialist competition on turf they had hitherto viewed as their safe and exclusive preserve.

3. With the present ideological and political positions of the PSI, the strategy of a left alternative, which constituted the program platform of the PSI approved at its Turin congress, has been knowingly jettisoned by the Party secretary. This aspect of the question is far more important and fraught with practical consequences than are Craxi's ideological views. Clearly, the PSI can contract alliances with other parties, but not with those still harking back to some vague, long-dead and buried "left;" only with those interested in down-to-earth programs for legislation and government. At this point, any alliance, supported by a joint program commitment, becomes possible and equally plausible: with the communists, with the non-confessional center parties, or with the DC.

This is the great novelty in Craxi's ideological sally: from now on, the PSI is to be completely "free," having severed every bond that held it fast to a left that has, once and for all, ceased to exist.

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